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Competition policy in the Telecoms 
Sector 
by Alexander SCHAUB, 
Director General for Competition, European Commission 
Telecommunications is one of the 
largest and most profitable economic 
sectors in the world. At a time when 
nearly all large industrial and service 
corporations faced general economic 
slow down the télécoms sector has 
thrived. Where télécoms services (data, 
long distance and mobile) have been 
subjected to the greatest level of 
competition is where the greatest 
revenue growth and new employment 
have been created. In those countries 
in the EU and around the world with 
the longest experience of liberalisation, 
it is also evident that télécoms 
employment by new service suppliers 
offsets jobs shed by incumbent PTOs 
as they take on the productivity gains 
of new technology. 
At the same time, the increasingly 
strong link between efficient télécoms 
service and the whole national economy 
is shown in the growing reliance which 
business in general places on télécoms. 
Over the last ten years the ratio of 
business télécoms links to employees 
was around one to nine, now it is more 
than one to three. The benefits to 
business of télécoms competition are of 
course well known. However, it is 
important to underline that figures from 
around the world show that residential 
users also see significant benefits when 
competition is introduced. 
The information sector today 
represents 450 bn ECUs (600bn US$) 
in the European Union alone. It is 
predicted that we will be facing a 3 
trillion dollar worldwide market by 
the end of the 90s. 
THREE KEY INGREDIENTS : 
CONVERGENCE, DIGITALI-
ZATION, COMPETITION 
The new information sector is being 
fundamentally re-shaped by the 
convergence of the télécoms sector 
with information technology and the 
"content industries" of television 
broadcasting and publishing. This 
poses decisive and unprecedented 
challenges for public policy at both 
national and EU level, as we run up to 
full telecommunications liberalisation 
by 1998. 
There is massive potential for growth 
in Europe especially in the market for 
broadband services to the home. 
Compared with the US where 35% of 
households are equipped with PCs, we 
are still below 20% - though growing 
rapidly. Over 60% of US homes are 
linked to cable networks; in Europe six 
of the Member States have less than 
25% of households passed, and three 
have no cable network to speak of yet. 
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The impulse of market players to 
pick up the slack between potential 
and market penetration is remarkably 
rapid. As we speak a wave of mega 
mergers and joint ventures are being 
formed in Europe. Much of these are 
spurred on by developments in 
multimedia services and applications. 
This is characterised by the vertical 
integration of content producers and 
various distributers and carriers, and 
also a horizontal convergence 
between the télécoms, cable and 
computer networks. 
Competition will be amplified by the 
entering of digitisation in the 
television sector which may have 
similar effects in the television sector 
in the nineties as the introduction of 
d ig i t a l i s a t ion had in the 
telecommunications sector in the 
eighties. Its first consequence is 
further multiplication of channels and 
supply. A second is convergence with 
telecommunications and software 
services, in the context of the 
Information Society concept. 
The resulting new opportunities of 
packaging of offerings across sectors, 
particularly in fields like video-on-
demand, special interest offerings and 
on-line services is leading to 
repositioning and alliances across 
technologies and markets in the move 
towards multi-media.The media 
sector is undergoing substantial 
restructuring in Europe as in the 
United States. 
These developments have led to a 
dramatically increased role of EU 
competition law for the sector. We 
are in favour of commercial initiative 
and partnerships when they are in the 
interests of the Information Society. 
But alliances must have a competitive 
not an anti-competitive logic behind 
them. With this in mind we have 
two general conditions: 
The first is that such a powerful and 
radical revolution in télécoms as we 
are experiencing must be overseen by 
competition safeguards: basic 
principles which need to be as 
flexible and global as the moves and 
the players themselves 
The second is that the markets must 
be liberalised before we can allow 
their dominant players to join forces. 
We cannot risk that markets such as 
digital interactive TV, or global 
mobile satellite systems, are sewn up 
by defensive commercial moves 
before they are even opened to 
competition. New gateways must be 
opened to avoid gatekeepers 
strengthening their positions. 
COMPETITION POLICY IN 
THE TELECOMS SECTOR : A 
"THREE PRONGED" 
APPROACH 
Competition policy in the telecomms 
sector follows a " three pronged" 
approach: 
1. Lifting government restrictions on 
market entry (Article 90). 
2. Setting down minimum rules of 
fair play which must be ensured by 
national governments (Article 90). 
3. Controlling the behaviour and 
agreements of dominant players 
(Article 85 and 86, Merger 
regulation). 
On March 13, 1996 the Commission 
adopted the final directive needed to 
complete the first of these "prongs". 
It implements into EU law the 
commitment to full competition in the 
EU telecommunications market by 1st 
January 1998. The directive fixes the 
date for full liberalisation into EU 
legislation and sets out deadlines for 
progress in national implementation in 
preparation for this goal. A crucial 
factor in achieving this was the 
recognition that competition, in the 
presence of the necessary regulatory 
safeguards provided by the Open 
Network Provision (ONP) framework, 
will enhance the provision of 
universal service as well as promoting 
economic growth and employment 
both within and outside the télécoms 
sector. In line with the broader 
interests of global information society 
coordination, adoption of this new EU 
legislative framework came just four 
weeks after final agreement in the US 
of the 1996 Telecoms Act which fully 
modernises US télécoms regulations 
and market structure. 
In addition to the 1998 date for 
opening up the markets in voice 
telephony and public network 
infrastructure, the full competition 
directive accelerates the liberalisation 
in all other areas. As of July 1 of this 
year use of all alternative 
infrastructure (such as the télécoms 
networks of railways, energy and 
water companies which are currently 
only authorised for restricted "in-
house" purposes) must be liberalised 
for carriage of commercial télécoms 
services. This provision excludes 
public voice telephony service which 
may be reserved to the national 
télécoms organisation until 1998. 
Alongside the lifting of government 
restrictions, the directive also sets 
down broad competition principles as 
regards the appropriate national 
regulatory frameworks for the post 
1998 environment. This concerns, in 
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particular, interconnection, licensing 
and financing of universal service. 
Such regulatory instruments must be 
transparent, non-discriminatory and 
as least restrictive of competition as 
possible whilst still achieving 
important policy goals of public 
service, interoperability and use of 
limited resources such as spectrum 
and rights of way. 
The harmonisation requirements of 
Member State rules in these areas fall 
under the EU's ONP (Open Network 
Provision) framework which is 
concerned with open and efficient 
access to, and use of, the public 
télécoms networks and services. 
ONP Council and Parliament 
legislation in these areas, issued 
under Article 100A, is currently 
under discussion but a review clause 
in the directive ensures that the 
Article 90 framework will be fully 
coordinated and coherent with the 
ONP framework. In the meantime, 
before implementation of ONP rules 
is achieved and/or in areas where 
their application is limited, the rights 
of new entrants to liberalised market 
entry under the terms of Treaty 
competition rules will not be 
compromised. 
The full competition directive 
represents the last hurdle in the series 
of directives in the télécoms sector 
issued under Article 90 (amending 
directive 90/388), phasing out 
Government restrictions and protected 
monopolies across the EU. 
DEADLINES FOR MEMBER 
STATES 
The absolute deadlines for Member 
States to notify measures 
implementing liberalisation (ie taking 
into account derogations where 
applicable for countries with less 
developed or very small networks) 
are now as follows: 
August 1995: satellite services and 
equipment; 
July 1996: transmission capacity on 
alternative networks; 
October 1996: use of cable networks; 
November 1996: mobile 
communications; 
January 1998: public voice telephony 
service and public network provision. 
The second "prong" of competition 
policy noted above concerns the 
establishment of minimum rules of 
fair play. The deadlines for 
notification and publication of terms 
and conditions for the multi-operator 
environment are: 
January 1997: 
- notification of any licensing or 
declaration procedure for the provision 
of voice telephony and/or public 
networks to the Commission. 
- notification of national universal 
service schemes to the Commission; 
July 1997: 
- publication of all licensing or 
declaration procedures; 
- publication by télécoms organisations 
of terms and conditions for 
interconnection; 
- ensuring that adequate numbers are 
available for all télécoms services. 
PRIORITY ON THE 
IMPLEMENTATION 
Having completed the first stage of 
the Article 90 framework, formal 
adoption of the liberalisation measures 
by the Commission, DG IV will now 
devote increasing attention and 
resources to the task of 
implementation, ensuring compliance 
and policing the deregulated sectors. 
The clear calender set out above must 
be strictly adhered to and DG IV will 
maintain a tough stance int his area. 
With this in mind we will start 
infringement procedures with Member 
States immediately the date indicated 
has passed if a target notification or 
publication has not been achieved. 
The infringement procedure followed 
is set out in Article 169 of the Treaty 
which enables the Commission, where 
necessary, to bring Member States 
before the European Court of Justice. 
Failure to implement a subsequent 
Court judgement will ultimately result 
in fines. Strict discipline does not, on 
the other hand, mean pursuing 
unnecessary "red tape": we will 
generally close the formal procedure 
as soon as the tardy implementing 
measure has been adopted in the 
Member State concerned. 
Implementation problems concerning 
the actual content of Member State 
measures (ie whether they are 
sufficiently in line with the principles 
set down in the directive) is obviously 
more complex than the clear cut 
question of dates and deadlines. For 
a start we must take into account the 
varied legal traditions and legislative 
practices in the Member States, as 
well as the diverse historical and 
actual market structure of their 
télécoms industries. In this context 
we rely, to a certain extent, on the 
experience and feedback of market 
participants to inform us of the 
practical details of non-compliance 
and remaining barriers to market 
entry. It should be noted that such 
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input from market players does not in 
practice represent a formal complaint 
since any legal negotiations are 
between the Commission and the 
Member State government and does 
not directly involve the undertakings 
concerned. 
Alternatively, market entrants may 
seek to ensure compliance with our 
directives through bringing problems 
or disputes to the national courts of 
the Member States concerned. 
Starting proceedings at national level 
may in fact be the most rapid and 
effective path to pursue given the 
greater resources available and the 
proximity to the point of effect. 
Provisions in Article 90 directives 
which are sufficiently clear and 
precise, such as a date for lifting 
restrictions, have "direct effect" in 
the member states. This means they 
can be directly translated into 
decisions or orders of the courts vis 
a vis government regulations or the 
behaviour of undertakings. Even in 
cases where the text of a directive is 
not so precise as to warrant direct 
effect the national court is anyway in 
a position to grant compensation to a 
party which has suffered from non-
implementation. 
CONTROLING "DOMINANT 
PLAYERS" 
The third "prong" of competition 
policy in télécoms, mentioned above, 
is controlling the behaviour and 
agreements of dominant players in 
the context of deregulation. 
Timing is critical. We must ensure 
that markets are not foreclosed by the 
defensive strategies of the dominant 
incumbent players before effective 
competition has had a chance to 
"bite". The next five to ten years 
will demand particular attention as 
the ex-monopolists reposition 
themselves and adjust their behaviour 
to the new commercial environment. 
Competition policy dictates that we 
allow normal "performance based" 
competitive behaviour on the part of 
dominant companies, whilst 
preventing defensive and anti-
competitive behaviour. The 
distinction between the two is both 
complex and dynamic, depending 
upon, inter alia, the state of de-
regulation, the structure of the 
market, intent of the dominant player 
and effect on actual and potential 
competitors. 
Two key areas are (i) strategic 
alliances and (ii) discrimination as 
regards terms, prices and conditions 
of access to networks. Generally one 
can expect that the first of these will 
be dealt with under the provisions of 
Article 85 (for cooperative joint 
ventures) and the merger regulation 
(for concentrations between 
enterprises in separate markets). The 
second of these will tend to come 
under the scrutiny of Article 86 
(abuse of a dominant position). This 
will both complement and underscore 
télécoms specific regulation as 
concerns access to public networks 
which is harmonised under Article 
100A in the ONP framework. 
Alliances 
On the one hand, the situation 
(market, technology and regulatory) 
is changing all the time so we cannot 
give out clear rules in advance to 
would be investors as to what will 
and what will not be problematic 
from a competition point of view. 
On the other hand recent decisions 
over the past year or so should 
provide a certain amount of guidance 
as to the way the Commission's 
application of Treaty Articles 85 and 
Merger regulation, is actually working 
in this area. 
Three important cases, Holland Media 
Group, Media Services GmBh and 
Nordic Satellite Distribution, proved 
to be unacceptable agreements in their 
notified form. There was, in essence, 
one basic reason: they all involved 
the strengthening and/or creation of 
dominant positions: 
In the HMG case we concluded that 
the venture would lead to a strong 
dominant position on the TV 
advertising market in the Netherlands 
and to the strengthening of Endemol's 
dominant position on the Dutch TV 
production market. In the MSG case 
it was concluded that the venture 
would aggravate or extend dominance 
on all three relevant markets: 
administrative /technical services, 
provision of film/programme content 
and cable infrastructure. The Nordic 
Satellite agreement would have 
provided NSD with a "gatekeeper" 
function for the supply of satellite TV 
channels to the Nordic market. This 
was particularly problematic given the 
involvement of Kinnevik - a content 
provider holding strong interests in 
TV programming, magazines and 
newspapers. 
Although dominant positions pose 
risks to consumers and competitors, 
this clearly does not mean that 
alliances "caught" by the EU 
competition rules will always be 
disallowed. Often the benefits of 
agreements will be seen to 
counterbalance the potential risks, and 
/ or such benefits will be judged to be 
the legitimate advantages of normal 
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competitive strategy. This was the 
case, for example, with the BT-MCI 
agreement which was given the go-
ahead in 1994. Furthermore, 
agreements may be modified, or 
conditions (such as the regulatory 
situation) changed in such a way as 
to cause the Commission to 
reconsider its position. Both the 
Nordic Satellite group and the MSG 
parties are re-notifying new ventures 
to us this year in the hope that the re-
vamped agreements will be 
acceptable as either cooperative joint 
ventures or concentrations. 
The well known Atlas-Phoenix case 
is a good example of the way that 
changes in regulatory conditions and 
commercial terms allows the 
Commission to re-assess the pros and 
cons of an agreement. The initial 
arrangements raised serious concerns 
with respect to the home markets of 
France Telecom and DBPT where 
they hold legal and de facto dominant 
positions. In response to this both 
the parties and the national 
governments concerned have now 
undertaken certain new commitments. 
The parties amended the agreement 
so that the domestic French and 
German public data networks would 
not be included in Atlas, so that non-
discriminatory access to these 
networks would be ensured and so 
that cross subsidisation would be 
avoided. The governments 
committed to liberalisation of use of 
alternative network infrastructure by 
July 1996. On this new basis, the 
Commission has indicated that it is 
ready to take a positive view of the 
Atlas-Phoenix agreements. 
I hope that an understanding of the 
logic behind cases such as these will 
encourage investment in competitive 
and innovative alliances and re-
structuring, as well as discouraging 
defensive agreements aiming at 
market distortion and foreclosure. 
Real synergies between télécoms and 
broadcasting, and really global 
service offerings are benefits which 
should be promoted. But this will 
always be weighed against the risks 
of extending dominance and harming 
competition. 
Discrimination regarding access to 
networks 
In the broadest sense "access" refers 
simply to: access to and from the 
customers of network operators, 
whether these are end users or 
wholesale service providers. 
Telecom operators in a dominant 
position as regards basic network 
infrastructure (in particular customer 
connections, switching and 
interexchange transport) are under 
special obligations to both customers 
and other service providers. Article 
86 prohibits the abuse of a dominant 
position in particular concerning 
unfair conditions of trade, 
discrimination and tying practices. 
Where an abuse on the part of a 
telecom operator is explicitly 
condoned or even dictated by 
national regulations or government 
decisions then the case will involve a 
breach of both Article 86 (directed at 
the télécoms undertaking) and Article 
90 (directed at the Member State) 
With respect to the application of 
these general principles to access 
markets in the télécoms and 
multimedia sector, decisions taken by 
the ECJ and the European 
C o m m i s s i o n a l ready give 
considerable guidance. They are to a 
certain extent generalisable in the 
form of a hierarchy of factors about 
the nature of the network operator 
(dominance, vertical integration, 
control of essential facilities) 
representing cumulative "check list", 
with a concomitant hierarchy of duties 
and obligations (concerning non-
discrimination, unbundling and 
transparency). 
It is essential that the conditions of 
access upon which other market 
players rely, are now clarified to the 
greatest extent possible. To this end 
we announced last year the 
publication of a Commission Notice 
which will give guidance as to the 
application of Treaty competition 
rules to access to telecom networks in 
a multi-operator liberalised 
environment. This will achieve three 
main tasks: 
* To set out access principles 
stemming from EU competition law 
relating to a large number of actual or 
potential Commission decisions in 
order to create greater market 
certainty and more stable conditions 
for investment and commercial 
initiative in the télécoms and multi-
media sector. 
* To define and clarify the 
relationship between competition law 
and sector specific secondary 
legislation harmonised under the 
Article 100A framework (in particular 
this relates to the relationship between 
competition rules and ONP 
legislation). 
* To open the way for the application 
of competition rules in a consistent 
away across the converging sectors 
involved in the provision of new 
multimedia services, and in particular 
to access issues and gateways in this 
context. 
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ACCESS PRICING AND NON-
DISCRIMINATION 
The issue of access pricing and non-
discrimination will be perhaps the 
key competition issue in this context 
over the next few years. 
This is made particularly complex in 
this period of flux, where the national 
operators need to be allowed to 
undergo progressive tariff reforms in 
order to align their prices with 
underlying costs and so prepare 
themselves for the challenge of 
competition. 
Competition policy must certainly 
encourage fair price differentials 
based on underlying costs. This is in 
the interests of commercially 
sustainable competition and of 
consumers. It includes, where 
justified by cost, flexible pricing 
arrangements for different types of 
users as well as the margin between 
wholesale and retail prices upon 
which many service providers will 
rely. On the other hand we will keep 
a close watch to prevent unfair price 
discrimination in the form of 
excessive or predatory pricing. In 
particular abuses under Article 86 will 
include pricing strategies not based on 
costs and which are designed to "lock 
customers in" and "lock competition 
out". This will often involve cross-
subsidisation from monopoly 
operations to those where competition 
has been introduced. Greater 
accounting transparency and 
accounting separation on the part of 
vertically integrated incumbent 
telecom operators will be very 
important to adequately assess these 
type of cases. 
The Commission has already 
launched an own initiative 
investigation in this area concerning 
the new charges set by Deutsche 
Telekom AG (DT) for providing 
voice services to business customers. 
In addition the Commission has also 
received a complaint (January 1996) 
from all the major competitors of DT 
in the recently liberalised areas of 
network and business voice services 
in Germany (CNI, RWE, Telliance, 
Plusnet, Meganet, Viag Intercom, 
Worldcom). These companies argue 
that this new tariff scheme should not 
be approved by the German 
authorities since it would drive their 
new business out of the market. They 
request "interim measures" (rapid 
action) representing an insurance that 
the government will prevent 
application of the new tariff. 
The complaint itself emphasises that 
the proposed tariff change constitutes 
an abuse of a dominant position in the 
form of predatory pricing and 
discrimination. It also underlines that 
the discount scheme is designed to 
lock-in DT's existing customers and 
that this threatens to prevent the 
growth of efficient and undistorted 
competition in the business services 
sector. The investigation will assess 
whether the public telecom operator 
is abusing its dominant position with 
the result of unfairly eliminating new 
competition in that part of the 
business market which has recently 
been liberalised. 
The proposed scheme would allow 
DT to grant large-scale rebates (up to 
43% on ordinary voice service 
tariffs), depending on the package and 
volume of voice services provided to 
a business customer. The rebates 
would cover currently still reserved 
services (voice telephony) as well as 
already liberalised services (eg closed 
user group communications). 
A number of telecommunications 
organisations in the European Union 
are currently considering major reform 
of their tariffs in preparation for full 
liberalisation of télécoms markets in 
1998. The Commission encourages 
the rebalancing of tariffs in so far as 
this reflects commercial adaptation to 
competitive conditions. However, 
until full liberalisation is achieved the 
Commission must pay close attention 
to the effects and motivations of tariff 
reforms. 
Currently competition is growing in 
the recently liberalised markets such as 
business and data services, while other 
areas, such as access to end customers 
and public voice telephony, will 
mostly remain closed until 1998. In 
this run up period there is a risk that 
incumbent telecom operators may 
restructure tariffs in such a way as to 
exploit the difference between 
increasing price elasticities in the 
competitive markets and the lower 
price elasticity (due to absence of 
competition) in the latter. This could 
harm the new suppliers of liberalised 
services, by "price squeezing" them 
out of the market. Even if the 
incumbents are forced to also offer 
discounts in the monopoly markets this 
does not ensure against the abuse of 
dominance to eliminate competition. 
A NEW EUROPEAN TELECOMS 
REGULATOR, OR BETTER USE 
OF EXISTING INSTITUTIONS ? 
One of the central aims of EU 
liberalisation and competition in the 
télécoms sector is to encourage the 
creation of an EU wide single market 
in télécoms services. This has raised 
the issue of whether there will be a 
need for a télécoms regulator at EU 
level in order to oversee, in particular, 
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the transborder issues. DG IV 
commissioned an intensive study in 1995-
96 to consider this important institutional 
issue ("The Institutional framework for the 
regulation of Telecommunications and the 
application of EC Competition rules" 
(1995), Forrester, Norall and Sutton, 
available through the Office for Official 
Publications, see page 47). 
The study examined the current situation 
and found that cooperation between 
National Regulatory Authorities (NRAs), 
National Competition Authorities (NCAs) 
and the Commission is seriously limited. 
It also confirmed the Commission's 
finding in its Communication on the 
implementation of 90/388, that the 
independence of certain NRAs is still 
questionable. Most agree that over time 
competition rules will emerge as the 
dominant regulatory tool, but there is 
disagreement as to the timing of this 
evolution. The study also revealed that, 
from the market players point of view it 
seems parties seeking redress foresaw that 
the Commission's competition directorate 
is likely to emerge "as the principal 
regulator of conduct on the liberalised 
télécoms market", since they could not 
rely on national authorities whose powers 
of investigation are confined. On the 
other hand it was also recognised that 
some sort of pan-European authority, 
alongside this, could play a key role in 
respect of frequency management, 
numbering and essential requirements. 
The study considers various options 
including an independent European Tele-
coms Authority, a European Telecoms 
Institute (carrying out specific tasks for 
the Community institutions) and 
consolidation of existing committees and 
bodies at EU level. The 2nd option is 
favoured (in conjunction with the third). 
However the strongest recommendation of 
the study is to concentrate in the 
immediate terni on closer and more 
effective cooperation and coordination of 
NRAs, NCAs and the Commission within 
a strong framework merging regulatory 
and competition law functions. Existing 
institutions and the frameworks for co-
operation between them represent a huge 
amount of untapped potential from the 
point of view of institutional efficiency. 
Liberalisation (lifting restrictions) 
certainly implies a burst of regulatory 
activity, including strong pro-competition 
rules. A key question is whether the latter 
needs to be télécoms specific or not. 
Under conditions of market convergence 
between télécoms, media, information and 
broadcasting it would seem unwise to 
make rigid regulations based on outdated 
sectorial divides. Some say the answer is 
to promote regulatory integration. 
However, the longer term solution is 
clearly increasing reliance upon general 
competition rules. In the shorter term 
more focused and "ex-ante" guidelines are 
needed. In any case improved 
cooperation and coordination between 
regulatory authorities and competition 
authorities is essential. 
LOCAL, NATIONAL, EU WIDE OR 
INTERNATIONAL AUTHORITY ? 
The other key issue is that of the 
appropriate "level" authority: local, 
national, EU wide or international 
(WTO)? 
The simple answer is that, according to 
the principle of subsidiarity, it depends 
on the issue. For example, town and 
country planning and environmental 
issues tend to be regulated at the most 
local level. Highly political issues 
concerning culture, content and universal 
service will always have a national 
aspect. Issues with a clear EU dimension 
include the internal market and 
competition issues (especially those with 
a transborder effect). Market access, 
including foreign direct investment, to 
télécoms markets for third countries or in 
third countries is increasingly a GATS 
issue. 
The core problem is, again, one of 
coordination and cooperation between 
these levels in order to increase 
efficiency and minimise uncertainly for 
market players. 
Staying on track for the 1998 full 
télécoms competition deadline is of 
paramount importance and wc must not lei 
attention and energy be deferred from this 
goal. As has been discussed above, once 
the gates are opened lo competition 
focused pro-competition regulation will be 
necessary in order to ensure fair play and 
control distortions caused by lhe extreme 
dominance of the incumbent telecom 
operators. However, ultimately wc are 
moving towards broader and more flexible 
pro-competition rules and guidelines in 
order to reflect the development of the 
market in terms of restructuring, 
convergence and increasing competition. 
This underlying development must guide 
the post 1998 regulation of competitive 
conditions. and any accompanying 
institutional reforms. 
So, for the moment we will focus on 
strengthening the existing framework. 
The current system is flexible and 
balanced, but needs strengthening. This 
means, inter alia. 
* Increasing resources, information and 
coordination vis a vis follow up of Article 
90 directives and harmonisation 
framework as well as the arbitration 
mechanisms. 
* Clarifying the complementary 
relationship between application of 
Competition Rules and Harmonisation 
directives especially in the area of 
interconnection and access to essential 
facilities. 
* Issuing maximum ex-ante guidance to 
the market vis a vis application of the 
Treaty Articles to relations between 
market players (access agreements and 
alliances) in the tclccoms sector. 
These represent practical and immediate 
solutions to many of' the legal and 
institutional issues which need to be 
addressed, and this is where our energies 
will be devoted in the coming year. 
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OPINIONS AND COMMENTS 
In this section DG IV officials outline developments in Community competition procedures. It is important to 
recognise that the opinions put forward in this section are the personal views of the officials concerned. They 
have not been adopted or in any way approved by the Commission and should not be relied upon as a 
statement of the Commission's or DG IV's views. 
Le Livre vert sur la révision du 
règlement relatif au contrôle des 
concentrations 
par Eric CUZIAT, DG IV-B 
La Commission a adopté le 31 
janvier dernier un Livre vert sur la 
révision du règlement relatif au 
contrôle des concentrations 
d'entreprises (Règlement du Conseil 
(CEE) n° 4064/89 du 21 décembre 
1989). Ce livre vert constitue la 
seconde étape de l'exercice de 
révision qui a débuté en 1995 par une 
vaste enquête sur l'application du 
règlement auprès des Etats-membres, 
des institutions communautaires, du 
monde des affaires et de la 
communauté juridique. Une large 
consultation a été engagée sur la base 
des orientations présentées dans ce 
document par la Commission, qui 
souhaite pouvoir adopter un projet de 
modification législative avant l'été. 
Le Livre vert s'inscrit dans le cadre 
de l'article 1(3) et des articles 9 et 22 
du règlement qui prévoient 
respectivement une révision des 
seuils de contrôlabilité et des 
mécanismes de renvoi entre la 
Commission et les Etats-membres. 
Toutefois, la Commission a saisi 
l'opportunité de cette révision pour 
proposer un certain nombre 
d'améliorations afin d'optimiser le 
fonctionnement du contrôle 
communautaire des concentrations, et 
qui ont trait notamment à la question 
des notifications multiples dans 
l'Union, à l'harmonisation du 
contrôle des entreprises communes, à 
l'acceptation des engagements de 
première phase et à la méthode de 
calcul du chiffre d'affaires pour les 
établissements financiers et de crédit. 
LA REDUCTION DES SEUILS 
DE CONTRÔLABILITÉ 
La Commission propose de réduire 
les seuils de contrôlabilité à 2 
milliards d'écu (seuil mondial) et 100 
millions d'écu (seuil communautaire), 
comme elle en avait d'ailleurs fixé 
l'objectif chiffré dès 1990 dans son 
19e rapport sur la politique de la 
concurrence. En revanche, elle 
propose de maintenir la règle des 2/3 
en l'état. 
La Commission est convaincue de la 
nécessité de réduire les seuils dans la 
mesure où leur niveau jugé trop 
élevé, ne permet pas de satisfaire 
pleinement à deux objectifs 
communautaires fondamentaux, à 
savoir l'application du principe de 
subsidiante et la réalisation du 
marché unique. 
La Commission considère en effet 
que pour des opérations de 
concentration "dont l'effet sur le 
marché s'étend au-delà des frontières 
nationales d'un Etat-membre", 
l'intervention communautaire se 
justifie en raison des objectifs du 
contrôle des concentrations et des 
moyens dont dispose la Commission 
par rapport aux Etats-membres. Or, 
au travers de l'enquête effectuée en 
1995, la Commission a constaté que 
l'ensemble des opérations ayant des 
effets transfrontaliers significatifs 
n'entrent pas dans le champ 
d'application du règlement, compte 
tenu du niveau actuel des seuils de 
contrôlabilité. Elle a ainsi identifié un 
certain nombre de concentrations 
d'intérêt communautaire qui ont 
échappé à son contrôle et dénombré 
plusieurs secteurs économiques 
d'importance qui pour des raisons 
structurelles sont soustraits dans une 
large mesure à l ' e x a m e n 
communautaire. 
Par ailleurs, la réalisation du marché 
unique suppose un soutien à 
l'intégration des marchés au travers 
notamment d'une évaluation rapide et 
uniforme des concentrations ayant des 
effets transfrontaliers significatifs dont 
le cadre idoine est fourni par le 
guichet unique communautaire qui 
permet une simplification des 
procédures administratives et une 
unicité du processus décisionnel 
garantissant un degré élevé de sécurité 
juridique. Or, la Commission a pu 
mesurer avec le concours des Etats-
membres qu'un nombre non 
négligeable d 'opérat ions de 
concentration, en dessous des seuils, 
étaient notifiées auprès de plusieurs 
autorités nationales de contrôle, 
disposant d'une législation spécifique. 
Il existe en effet actuellement onze 
systèmes nationaux de contrôle des 
concentrations dans l'Union dont huit 
sont à régime de notification 
obligatoire. Les entreprises soumises 
à ces notifications multiples ne 
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bénéficient donc pas des avantages 
du "guichet unique" communautaire. 
De ce double constat, la Commission 
conclut à la nécessité de réduire les 
seuils afin de mieux couvrir les 
opérations qui sont légitimement de 
sa compétence et de permettre aux 
entreprises européennes qui procèdent 
à des restructurations pour s'adapter 
au marché unique, de bénéficier 
d'une procédure uniforme. Dans 
l'hypo-thèse d'une baisse des seuils 
aux niveaux proposés, la Commission 
prévoit une augmentation de 60 à 80 
affaires par an. 
LES MECANISMES DE 
RENVOI (ARTICLES 9 ET 22) 
Dans son Livre vert, la Commission 
n'envisage aucune modification 
importante des mécanismes de renvoi 
entre elle-même et les Etats-membres 
dans la mesure où l'application 
rigoureuse des dispositions actuelles 
qui allient respect du principe de 
subsidiante et sécurité juridique pour 
les entreprises a reçu une très large 
approbation des milieux concernés. 
Quelques améliorations techniques 
sont toutefois proposées au débat, 
notamment en ce qui concerne 
l'article 22. 
LA QUESTION DES 
NOTIFICATIONS MULTIPLES 
Si une majorité qualifiée ne pouvait 
être réunie au Conseil pour voter la 
réduction des seuils, la Commission 
est d'avis qu'il convient, à tout le 
moins, de résoudre le problème des 
notifications multiples dans l'Union 
européenne. La solution est claire : 
attribuer une compétence exclusive à 
la Commission dès lors que plusieurs 
systèmes nationaux sont impliqués 
dans le contrôle d'une opération de 
concentration. En revanche, la 
procédure à mettre en place pour y 
parvenir soulève un certain nombre 
d'interrogations. Elle se doit, en tout 
état de cause, d'être simple et de 
constituer une amélioration de la 
situation actuelle. 
Le schéma simplifié de la procédure 
serait le suivant. 
Les parties à l'opération ayant 
constaté le caractère notifiable de leur 
projet auprès de plusieurs autorités 
na t iona les not i f iera ient la 
concentration auprès de la 
Commission. Cette dernière 
constaterait que l'opération constitue 
une concentration au sens de l'article 
3 du règlement et que des seuils 
planchers en chiffre d'affaires sont 
atteints. Les Etats-membres 
concernés vérifieraient que 
l'opération aurait été notifiable auprès 
de leur autorité de contrôle sur la 
base des seuils fixés par leur 
législation nationale. Si les Etats-
membres confirment l'analyse des 
parties notifiantes, la première phase 
de l'examen serait engagée. En cas 
de désaccord avec les assertions des 
parties, les Etats-membres pourraient 
déclarer l'opération non-notifiable 
auprès de leur autorité de contrôle et 
en informeraient la Commission dans 
un délai donné (deux semaines, par 
exemple). Dans cette hypothèse, la 
Commission déclarerait l'opération 
sans dimension communautaire. 
Malgré le caractère sommaire de 
cette description, le lecteur ne 
manquera pas de s'interroger sur le 
nombre adéquat d 'autori tés 
impliquées, sur le caractère 
obligatoire ou facultatif de la 
notification, sur la prise en compte 
des systèmes nationaux à notification 
volontaire, sur l'association des Etats-
membres à la procédure, sur 
l'attaquabilité des décisions adoptées, 
sur les aspects pratiques de la 
procédure : extension de la première 
phase, contenu du formulaire C/O. 
problèmes linguistiques. Commission, 
Etats-membres et autres intéressés ont 
eu déjà l'opportunité de discuter ces 
questions et la plupart d'entre elles 
sont en voie de résolution. 
LE TRAITEMENT DES 
ENTREPRISES COMMUNES 
Nombre de participants à l'enquête 
préliminaire de 1995 ont fait valoir à 
la Commission leurs préoccupations 
quant au traitement différencié des 
entreprises communes qui entrent clans 
le champ d'application du règlement 
sur les concentrations et bénéficient 
en conséquence des procédures qui lui 
sont propres et celles qui, considérées 
comme des coopérations entre 
entreprises, tombent sous le coup de 
l'article 85 du traité et du règlement 
d'application n° 17/62. 
C'est pourquoi la Commission a 
décidé d'ouvrir sur cette question un 
très large débat et a proposé à la 
réflexion des lecteurs du Livre vert un 
éventail de six options que l'on peut 
regrouper en deux catégories. Les 
options du premier groupe se limitent 
à apporter des solutions procédurales 
aux problèmes soulevés notamment 
quant aux délais de traitement et au 
renforcement de la sécurité juridique. 
Les options du second groupe 
conduisent à soumettre les entreprises 
communes coopératives de nature 
structurelle c'est-à-dire celles pour 
lesquelles l'accord aboutit à un réel 
changement de la structure des 
entreprises concernées et du marché 
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en cause, au test de substance et à la 
procédure du règlement sur les 
concentrations. 
La Commission reste à ce stade 
ouverte quant à la détermination de 
l'option la mieux appropriée pour 
résoudre les disparités dans le 
traitement des entreprises communes. 
AUTRES AMELIORATIONS 
La Commission suggère enfin un 
certain nombre d'améliorations qui 
doivent permettre d'optimiser 
l'application du règlement. Il est 
proposé de donner une base juridique 
expresse à l'acceptation des 
engagements présentés par les 
entreprises dès la première phase 
d'examen et d'établir à cette occasion 
des modalités procédurales propres à 
assurer la transparence et la 
consultation en temps utile des Etats­
membres et des tiers intéressés. 
Pour tenir compte des observations 
des représentants du secteur bancaire, 
la Commission a ouvert également 
une réflexion sur la méthode de 
calcul du chiffre d'affaires des 
établissements de crédit et autres 
établissements financiers. Pour 
l'essentiel, il s'agit de substituer le 
produit bancaire à la base de calcul 
actuelle qui repose sur le dixième des 
actifs. 
La période de consultation sur le 
Livre vert s'est achevée le 31 mars 
1996. La Commission s'attache à 
présent à traiter l'ensemble des 
informations qu'elle reçoit. Un 
document de synthèse sera publié 
dans le courant du printemps. 
C'est toutefois dans les propositions 
formelles de la Commission au 
Conseil que cet exercice trouvera son 
aboutissement. ■ 
Technology Transfer: the new 
Regulation 
by Chris MITROPOULOS, IV-A-2 
international cooperation in research 
and development through programmes 
such as Esprit, Drive and Brite 
EURAM. In this regard, the new rules 
should be viewed as an important 
back­up measure. 
SIMPLIFYING THE RULES 
At the end of January this year, the 
Commission finally adopted the new 
block exemption on technology 
transfer agreements (Commission 
Regulation EC No 240/96). The new 
regulation came into force on 1st 
April 1996 and remains in force for 
a period of ten years. It is the result 
of a long consultation process with 
Member States, the other institutions, 
representatives of industry and other 
interested parties. The objectives of 
the new rules together with their 
substantive provisions are outlined 
below. 
ENCOURAGING 
TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER 
The new rules reflect the 
Commission's aim of encouraging the 
dissemination of technical knowledge 
in the Community and promoting the 
manufacture of technically more 
sophisticated products. It sees the 
role of technology transfers as 
essential in strengthening the 
competitiveness of European industry 
within Community and world 
markets. To this end, the 
Commission is already encouraging 
Simplifying the way technology 
transfers are handled under the 
competition rules contributes to the 
Commission's aim of encouraging the 
dissemination of technology. The new 
block exemption replaces the block 
exemptions on patent licensing 
(Regulation (EEC) No 2349/89) and 
on know­how licensing (Regulation 
556/89). The first of these was 
adopted in 1984. It expired in 1994, 
but has been extended on several 
occasions due to the delays in 
adopting the present regulation. The 
latter was adopted in 1988 and would 
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have continued until the end of 1999, 
but is repealed in the new regulation. 
The overlap between the two former 
regulations meant that in the case of 
mixed patent and know-how 
agreements, undertakings were 
unsure as to which regulation applied 
and the Commission was often 
accused of not providing clear 
guidance on the matter. Under the 
new regime, know-how licences, 
patent licences and mixed agreements 
are treated together under a single 
legal instrument. The harmonisation 
of the new rules reduces the 
disparities which existed between the 
old regulations and creates greater 
legal ce r t a in ty . The new 
arrangements also reflect commercial 
reality in that agreements for the 
transfer of technology are more 
commonly mixed. 
FOCUSING ON ECONOMIC 
STRENGTH 
In addition, the old regulations drew 
no distinction in terms of the 
economic strength of the parties 
concerned. Under the old regime, 
automatic exemption was available 
even to dominant firms, which by 
securing exclusive licences, could 
succeed in monopolising a product 
market and prevent access to new 
technology by outsiders. At the same 
time, the restrictions which the 
Commission black listed in the old 
regulations (in order to counter the 
real danger of abuse) had a 
detrimental effect on firms whose 
relatively weak market position 
meant that they did not in any way 
hinder the interpénétration of 
markets. Such firms are given more 
lenient treatment under the new 
regime. The issue which was of 
foremost concern to industry was the 
obligation envisaged by the 
Commission that l icensing 
agreements be individually notified 
(thereby loosing the benefit of 
automatic exemption), where the 
licensee had a significant market 
position (over 40%). Following 
several written consultations and a 
public hearing, the market share 
threshold test has been dropped as a 
condition for benefitting from the 
block exemption, but remains an 
important factor in the Commission's 
appraisal of its withdrawal (see 
below). 
SCOPE 
The regulation applies to pure patent 
licensing or know-how licensing 
agreements and to mixed patent and 
know-how licensing agreements, 
including those agreements 
containing ancillary provisions 
relating to intellectual property rights 
other than patents, such as trade 
marks and copyright. It applies only 
where a licensee actually 
manufactures products or provides 
services or has products or services 
provided for him. Therefore, resale 
agreements or sale agreements styled 
as a licence do not qualify for the 
block exemption, as is the case with 
certain joint venture agreements and 
agreements between members of a 
patent or know-how pool. 
The main features of the new 
regulation are developped in the 
following few paragraphs. 
THE WHITE LIST 
Article 1 lists eight restrictive 
obligations which would ordinarily be 
caught by Article 85(1), but which 
are exempted by the regulation and, 
therefore, do not need to be notified 
to the Commission. These include the 
common territorial restrictions 
associated with technology transfer 
agreements. Such restrictions include 
an obligation on the licensor not to 
license other undertakings to exploit 
the licensed technology in the licensed 
territory or to exploit such technology 
in the licensed territory himself; an 
obligation on the licensor not to put 
the licensed technology on territory of 
the licensor or on territories which are 
licensed to other licensees. Such 
territorial restrictions are considered to 
improve the production of goods an 
promote technical progress in that 
they make the holders of patents or 
know-how more willing to grant 
licences. Licensees are in turn more 
inclined to undertake the investment 
required to manufacture and put a 
new product on the market. In this 
respect the regulation confirms the 
Maize seed doctrine. 
Certain time limits have been placed 
on the restrictions which may be 
exempted depending on the type of 
agreement and the type of restriction. 
For pure patent licensing agreements, 
the territorial restrictions in question 
are allowed for as long as the product 
is protected by parallel patents. For 
pure know-how agreements, protection 
is generally limited to ten years from 
when the product is first put on the 
market. In mixed agreements, 
exemption for restrictions is either 
limited to the duration of the patents 
or ten years, whichever is longer. 
The degree of territorial protection 
granted to the contracting parties is 
more far reaching than that granted to 
licensees in their respective 
relationships. In the case of the 
former, export bans are permitted for 
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the duration of the agreement. In the 
case of the latter, export bans can 
only be imposed for a five year 
duration from the date on which the 
product was first marketed in the 
Community. After this period, a 
licensee can only be protected against 
active sales on the part of other 
licensees. 
OTHER LAWFUL 
OBLIGATIONS 
In addition to the white list, Article 2 
provides a list of clauses which are 
generally not restrictive of 
competition and whose inclusion in 
an agreement does not affect its 
exemption. These include the 
obligation on the licensee not to 
divulge the know-how communicated 
by the licensor; the obligation on the 
licensee not to grant sublicences; the 
right of licensors to terminate the 
agreement in the event of the licensee 
challenging the validity of the patent, 
secret or substantial nature of the 
licensed know-how or the obligation 
for licensees to use their best 
endeavours to manufacture and 
market the licensed product. This is a 
long, but not exhaustive list of 
clauses normally found in licensing 
agreements, which if found to fall 
within Article 85 (1) should be 
covered by the regulation. 
THE BLACK LIST 
The black list contains clauses which, 
if contained in an agreement, would 
preclude it from benefitting from the 
exemption. These include restrictions 
on the selling prices of the licensed 
product or the quantities to be 
manufactured or sold. Such 
restrictions seriously limit the extent 
to which the licensee can exploit the 
licensed technology and quantity 
restrictions particularly may have the 
same effect as export bans (Articles 
3 (1) and (5)). Other unlawful 
restrictions include a ban on 
exploiting competing technologies, 
customer restrictions between 
competing manufacturers, obligations 
on licensees to assign improvements 
to the technology concerned and 
territorial restrictions for a longer 
duration than those exempted. 
The restrictions listed in Article 3 are 
restrictive and not capable of 
benefitting from the block exemption. 
Such obligations may only obtain 
exemption by an individual decision 
which takes account of the market 
position of the undertakings 
concerned and the degree of 
concentration on the relevant market. 
It should be noted here that the black 
list is significantly reduced in 
comparison with previous IP 
licensing regulations. 
OPPOSITION PROCEDURE 
Article 4 of the regulation contains a 
"reduced" opposition procedure, by 
which exemption is granted to 
agreements containing obligations 
restrictive of competition which are 
not covered by the white or black 
list, provided that such agreements 
are notified to the Commission and 
that the Commission does not oppose 
the application of the exemption 
within four months (as opposed to six 
previously). The opposition procedure 
applies to agreements which contain 
previously outlawed clauses, such as 
obligations on the licensees to 
procure from the licensor goods or 
services which are not essential for a 
technically satisfactory exploitation of 
the licensed technology or for 
ensuring that the production of the 
licensee conforms to the quality 
standards that are respected by the 
licensor and other licensees. 
Industry has complained that block 
exemptions act as straight jackets: 
often, amending an agreement so that 
it falls within the confines of a 
regulation can make it more anti-
competitive. It is believed that a 
reduction in the number of black 
listed clauses, an extension of the 
permissible restrictions and an 
opposition procedure covering 
previously outlawed clauses will 
promote the contractual freedom of 
the parties and allay industry's 
concerns of an interventionist 
approach. 
"EX POST CONTROL" WHERE 
A LICENSEE EXCEEDS 40% 
MARKET SHARE 
As mentioned, the new regulation no 
longer contains the controversial 
market share ceiling of 40 %, which, 
if exceeded, would cause the loss of 
au tomat i c e x e m p t i o n . The 
Commission, which invested much 
political capital in the market share 
thresholds, conceded that the 
quantative techniques required for 
assessing market share were costly 
and difficult to apply, especially when 
the technology was new and it was 
difficult to know how effective it 
would be. It, therefore, compromised 
and dropped the necessity for 
automatic notification whenever the 
aforementioned threshold was 
reached. It reasoned that its main 
concern, namely to ensure a broader 
dissemination of new technologies, 
could be achieved by less rigid 
methods. 
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However, market shares for a 
licensee which are of the order 
mentioned, will continue to be an 
important factor in the general 
economic assessment which must be 
made by the Commission when 
deciding whether to withdraw the 
benefit of the block exemption. The 
Commission's aim is to prevent 
agreements where the licensed 
products are not faced with real 
competition in the licensed territory 
and it considers this to be the case 
where the licensee's share of the 
market exceeds 40% of the whole 
market for the licensed products, and 
of all the products or services which 
customers consider interchangeable or 
substitutable on account of their 
characteristics, prices or intended use. 
The decisions by which the 
Commission withdraws the benefit of 
automatic exemption are only 
effective from the date of the 
decision itself. In order to protect 
themselves from unexpected 
withdrawal of the block exemption, it 
is suggested (Recital 27) that the 
parties may notify agreements 
obliging the licensor not to grant 
other licences in the territory, where 
the licensee's market share exceeds 
or is likely to exceed 40%. 
CONTINUITY OF 
AGREEMENTS IN FORCE 
BEFORE 1ST APRIL 1996 
The new block exemption entered 
into force on the 1st of April 1996 
and applies until the 31st of March 
2006. The patent licensing regulation, 
for which the last extension expired 
on the 1st of January 1996 was 
extended until the entry into force of 
the new rules and the know-how 
regulation was repealed on the 1st of 
April 1996. Thus agreements which 
are already in effect on the 31st of 
March 1996 and which comply with 
the two former regulations are able to 
continue to benefit from an exemption 
for the entire duration of the new 
regulation. 
In short, the new regime reduces the 
disparities which existed between the 
old rules, promotes the contractual 
freedom of the parties and meets 
competition concerns by keeping 
check on those undertakings whose 
sizeable market share may allow them 
to monopolise a market and prevent 
smaller undertakings from enjoying 
the fruits of technology transfer. ■ 
Telecoms sector soon fully open to 
competition : the central role of the 
European Commission 
by C. HOCEPIED, DG IV-C-1 
With the adoption, at the end of 
December 1995, of Parliament and 
Council Directive 95/62/EC on the 
application of ONP to voice 
telephony and, on March 13 1996, of 
Directive 96/19/EC amending 
Directive 90/388/EEC with regard to 
the implementation of full 
competition in telecommunications 
markets (OJ No L 74, 22.3.96), the 
first package of measures required 
for implementing, in EU law, the 
commitment to full competition in 
the EU telecommunications market 
by 1st January 1998 is now in place 
(there are a number of further 
measures, notably the interconnection 
and general licensing directives, 
which are currently being discussed in 
the European Parliament and 
Council). 
The first of the two Directives sets 
out the scope of universal service, the 
burden of which may be shared with 
new entrants. The second Directive 
fixes the date for full liberalisation 
and sets out deadlines for the national 
implementation of measures preparing 
for this goal. The package reflects 
the recognition in the Union that 
competition, in the presence of the 
necessary regulatory safeguards 
provided by the ONP framework, 
enhances the provision of universal 
service as well as promoting 
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economic growth and employment 
both within and outside the télécoms 
sector. On 13 March 1996, the 
Commission also issued a detailed 
communication setting out the 
approach of the Commission as 
regards the future provision of 
universal service in the Union. 
The adoption of a Directive is in 
practice only the first stage of a long 
process. To the extent that their 
national legislation is not yet in line 
with the Directive, Member States 
must amend it accordingly. The task 
of the Commission is to ensure that 
all Member States effectively 
implement the provisions of the 
Directive at the same pace. Where 
certain Member States fail to take the 
necessary measures, the Commission 
must initiate infringement procedures 
which can ultimately include bringing 
the relevant Member State to the 
Court of Justice. 
Directive 96/19/EC entered into force 
on 11 April 1996. DG IV has already 
initiated informal contact with the 
relevant departments of the Member 
States' ministries to assist them, 
where necessary, in the drafting of 
the measures required to implement 
this crucial directive in each of their 
national legislations. The task is not 
easy given the complexity and the 
number of obligations contained in 
the Directive. 
LIBERALISATION OF 
ALTERNATIVE 
INFRASTRUCTURES 
Article 2(2) of Directive 90/388/EEC, 
as amended by Directive 96/16/EC, 
requires Member States to abolish 
before 1 July 1996 all regulatory 
restrictions on the establishment of 
network infrastructure for the 
provision of services to closed user 
groups and on the use of authorised 
network infrastructure for the 
provision of already liberalised 
telecommunications services. In lay-
terms, this means that, as of July 1st 
this year, the use of all alternative 
infrastructures (such as the télécoms 
networks of railways, energy and 
water companies which are currently 
only authorised for restricted "in-
house" purposes) must be liberalised 
for the carriage of commercial 
télécoms services. This does not, 
however, imply the granting of way-
leaves to the undertakings 
establishing such networks. The 
measures adopted to ensure the lifting 
of such restrictions must also be 
notified to the Commission before 1 
July 1996. 
LIBERALISATION OF VOICE 
TELEPHONY 
The same Article of the Directive 
allows Member States to maintain the 
current special and exclusive rights 
regarding the provision of voice 
telephony and new public 
telecommunications networks until 1 
January 1998. The measures taken to 
abolish these rights must, however, 
be communicated to the Commission 
before 11 January 1997. This means 
that the appropriate legislation must 
be passed before that date, although 
it may contain transitional provisions 
regarding the date of abolition of the 
remaining special and exclusive 
rights. 
The abolition of special rights means 
in particular that any limitations on 
the number of undertakings 
authorised to supply voice telephony 
or to establish or provide public 
telecommunications networks must be 
lifted, except where justified by the 
lack of available spectrum. It implies 
also that any authorization procedure 
must be based on objective, 
proportional and non discriminatory 
criteria. The new article 4d of 
Directive 90/388/EEC, provides 
further for the obligation on Member 
States not to discriminate between 
p r o v i d e r s o f p u b l i c 
telecommunications networks with 
regard to the granting of rights of way 
for the provision of such networks. 
Where the granting of additional 
rights of way is not possible due to 
essential requirements, Member States 
shall ensure access at reasonable 
terms to existing facilities established 
under rights of way which may not be 
duplicated. 
As regards both the dates of 1 July 
1996 and 1 January 1998, Ireland, 
Portugal, Greece and Spain shall, 
according to the Directive, be granted 
upon request an additional 
implementation period of up to five 
years and Luxembourg one of up to 
two years, provided it is needed to 
achieve the necessary structural 
adjustments. 
Contrary to Article 4 of Directive 
96/2/EC, Directive 96/19/EC does not 
set out a deadline for requesting such 
a derogation. Application for 
derogations must be made before 11 
January 1997, but for reasons of legal 
certainty it is advisable that they are 
made as soon as possible. 
The application will have to include a 
detailed description of the planned 
adjustments and a precise assessment 
of the timetable envisaged for its 
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implementation. Once received, the 
Commission will publish a notice in 
the Official Journal asking the other 
Member States and all other 
interested parties to comment during 
a period of one month. The 
Commission will then take a 
reasoned decision on the principle, 
the implication and the maximum 
duration of the additional period to 
be granted. 
LICENSING INSTEAD OF 
EXCLUSIVE AND SPECIAL 
RIGHTS 
The Directive acknowledges that 
Member States may make the 
provision of telecommunications 
services as well as the establishment 
a n d t h e p r o v i s i o n of 
telecommunications infrastructure 
subject to licensing, general 
authorization or declaration 
procedures where necessary to ensure 
compl iance with essent ia l 
requirements. 
As regards already liberalised 
services, such procedures, if any, had 
to be notified to the Commission 
before the dates set out in directives 
90/388/EEC, 94/46/EC, 95/51/EC or 
96/2/EC, to allow it to assess whether 
these procedures are based on 
objective, non-discriminatory, 
transparent and proportionate criteria. 
Member States must, for the same 
reason, continue to inform the 
Commission of any plan to change 
existing procedures. 
As regards the provision of voice 
t e l e p h o n y and of pub l i c 
telecommunications networks, the 
Directive requests Member States to 
notify no later than 1 January 1997, 
any envisaged licensing or 
declaration procedure. The 
Commission must verify the 
compatibility with the Treaty of these 
drafts, before their implementation, 
and in particular the proportionality 
of the obligations imposed and that 
there is a possibility to appeal against 
any refusal. In recital 10, the 
Directive specifies that individual 
licensing procedures are only justified 
as regards the provision of voice 
t e l e p h o n y , p u b l i c f i x e d 
telecommunications networks and 
other telecommunications networks 
involving the use of radio 
frequencies. In all other cases, a 
general authorization procedure or a 
declaration procedure suffices to 
ensure compliance with the essential 
requirements. Member States which 
still apply individual licensing 
schemes for already liberalised 
telecommunications services must 
therefore amend their regulation and 
notify to the Commission the 
measures taken for that purpose 
before 11 January 1997. The 
Directive in particular requests the 
abolition of the sets of public-service 
specifications adopted under Article 
3 of the original Directive 
90/388/EEC for the provision of 
packet- or circuit-switched data 
services. The relevant individual 
licensing procedures may be replaced 
by declaration procedures or general 
authorizations. 
Under Article 6 of Directive 
90/388/EEC, Member States must 
ensure that any fees imposed on 
providers of voice telephony and 
public telecommunications networks 
as part of authorization procedures 
are based on objective, transparent 
and non-discriminatory criteria and 
that such fees as well as the criteria 
upon which they are based, and any 
changes thereto, are published in an 
appropriate and sufficiently detailed 
manner so as to ensure easy access to 
that information. 
The Directive, as modified by 
Directive 96/19/EC, furthermore 
requests Member States to ensure, no 
later than 1 July 1997, that : 
- the mentioned licensing or 
declaration procedures for the 
provision of voice telephony and of 
public telecommunications networks, 
are published; 
- the allocation of numbers is carried 
out by a body independent of the 
telecommunications organisation, that 
adequate numbers are made available 
for new entrants and, more generally, 
that numbers are allocated in an 
objective, non discriminatory and 
transparent manner. This does not 
prevent the required dialling of 
additional numbers to call a subscriber 
of one network from another network; 
ENSURING ACCESS TO THE 
NETWORKS OF THE FORMER 
MONOPOLIES 
It is not sufficient to abolish legal 
monopolies. Access to the market 
will only be possible if positive action 
is taken to ensure that new entrants 
can interconnect with the networks of 
the former monopolies. The Directive 
therefore provides that: 
- t he t e l e c o m m u n i c a t i o n s 
organizations should publish the terms 
and conditions for interconnection. 
Member States must ensure that 
measures adopted for this purpose do 
not prevent the negotiation of 
interconnection agreements regarding 
special network access and/or 
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conditions meeting specific needs. 
This obligation must be maintained 
for five years after the effective 
abolition of the exclusive rights for 
the provision of voice telephony and 
the underlying network. The 
Commission will review whether this 
obligation must continue, if, before 
the end of this five year period, the 
Parliament and the Council adopt the 
ONP-Interconnection Directive. 
- the telecommunications organi-
zations should implement a cost 
accounting system with regard to the 
provision of voice telephony and 
public telecommunications networks 
identifying the relevant cost elements 
for pricing interconnection offerings. 
It should reflect, for each element of 
the interconnection offered, the basis 
for that cost element, in order to 
allow monitoring that the pricing 
includes only elements which are 
relevant, namely the initial 
connection charge, conveyance 
charges, the share of the costs 
incurred in providing equal access 
and number-portability and of 
ensuring essential requirements and, 
where applicable, supplementary 
charges aimed to share the net cost 
of universal service, and 
provisionally, imbalances in voice 
telephony tariffs. The cost accounting 
system must also make it possible to 
identify when a telecommunications 
organization charges its major users 
less than providers of voice telephony 
networks. It should also be 
maintained during the five years 
following the date of effective 
liberalisation of voice telephony and 
the underlying networks. 
Moreover, the Directive requests 
Member States to adopt measures 
ensuring that, from 1 July 1997 on, 
where negotiations between 
telecommunications organisations and 
new entrants in the voice telephony 
or public telecommunications 
networks markets do not lead to an 
agreement within a reasonable time 
period, a settlement can be obtained, 
upon the request of either party and 
within a reasonable time period, 
establishing the necessary operational 
and financial conditions and 
r e q u i r e m e n t s f o r s u c h 
interconnection. 
DIRECTORY SERVICES 
The new article 4b inserted in 
Directive 90/388/EEC provides for 
the abolition by the Member States of 
all exclusive rights in their territory 
regarding the establishment and 
provision of directory services, 
including the publication of 
directories and directory enquiry 
services. Measures taken for this 
purpose must be notified to the 
Commission before 11 January 1997. 
FINANCING UNIVERSAL 
SERVICE 
Where Member States envisage 
introducing a scheme to share the net 
cost of universal service obligations 
entrusted to the telecommunications 
organizations, it must notify the 
relevant draft to the Commission 
before 1 January 1997 (Certain 
Member States, such as Germany and 
the Netherlands, have already 
announced that they would not 
introduce such a mechanism in the 
initial stage). The Commission will 
under the new article 4c inserted in 
the aforementioned Directive, by 
Directive 96/19/EC, assess whether 
the scheme : 
(a) applies only to undertakings 
providing public telecommu-
nications networks ; 
(b) allocates the respective burden to 
each undertaking according to 
objective and non discriminatory 
criteria and in accordance with 
the principle of proportionality. 
As stated in the framework of the 
Council meeting of 21 March 1996, 
the Commission interprets Article 4 c 
of the Directive (as well as Article 
5(1) of the common position on the 
ONP Interconnection Directive) as 
allowing contributions only to be 
imposed on voice telephony providers 
in proportion to their usage of public 
telecommunications networks, for the 
following reasons: 
- according to the principle of 
proportionality contributions must, as 
emphasized in recital 16 of the 
Commission Directive, seek only to 
ensure that market participants 
contribute to the financing of 
universal service. The scope of 
universal service, burden of which 
may be financed through universal 
service mechanisms, is set out in 
Parliament and Council Directive 
95/62/EC on the application of ONP 
to voice telephony; 
- the principle of non discrimination 
opposes financing mechanisms for 
universal service obligations which 
lead either to double contributions to 
the cost of universal service in the 
same Member State or to all 
u n d e r t a k i n g s i n t h e 
t e l ecommunica t ions markets 
subsidizing the voice telephony 
operators. Contributions must 
therefore be limited to services within 
the scope of the universal service 
definition. 
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The same Article of Directive 96/19/EC 
requests Member States to allow their 
telecommunications organisations to 
rebalance tariffs which are not in line 
with costs before 1 January 1998. 
Member States may, however, adopt 
special provision to soften the impact of 
re-balancing, where these are necessary 
to guarantee the affordability of the 
telephone service during the transitional 
period. Member States which consider 
that the rebalancing cannot be completed 
before this deadline, must, according to 
the Directive, forward to the 
Commission, before 11 January 1997, a 
report containing a precise timetable for 
the phasing out of the remaining tariff 
imbalances. This report should specify 
the net costs which are insufficiently 
covered by the tariff structure and the 
justifications for, if this is envisaged, 
such costs being reapportioned among 
all voice telephony providers. 
In this context, Directive 96/19/EC 
announces that the Commission will, 
within three months after the adoption 
by the European Parliament and the 
Council of the ONP-Interconnection 
Directive, assess whether further 
initiatives are necessary to ensure the 
consistency of both Directives. Possible 
overlap between the Commission 
Directive 96/19/EC, which is already in 
force, and the proposal for a 100a 
Directive does not, in any circumstances, 
justify delays in the implementation of 
the obligations set out in Directive 
96/19/EC. 
ACCOUNTING TRANSPARENCY 
Finally Directive 96/19/EC inserts a new 
article 8 in Directive 90/388/EEC, 
providing for the obligation for Member 
States to ensure that in the authorization 
schemes for the provision of voice 
t e l e p h o n y a n d p u b l i c 
telecommunications networks, where 
such authorizations are 
granted to undertakings benefiting from 
exclusive or special rights in areas other 
than telecommunications. Such 
undertakings will have to keep separate 
financial accounts as concerns activities 
as providers of voice telephony and/or 
networks and other activities, as soon as 
they achieve as they achieve a turnover 
more than ECU 50 million in the 
relevant telecommunications market. 
Contrary to Article 2 of Directive 
95/51/EC (lifting restrictions on the use 
of cable television networks), no 
derogation can be requested to this 
obligation. The relevant measures 
adopted for this purpose must be 
communicated to the Commission, under 
Article 2 of Directive 96/19/EC, not 
later than nine months after this 
Directive has entered into force, i.e. 
before 11 January 1997. 
MONITORING THE 
IMPLEMENTATION BY THE 
MEMBER STATES 
To facilitate the task of the Commission, 
Member States were asked to indicate 
clearly, when providing information on 
the implementation of the Directive, 
with regard to the various provisions of 
Directive 96/2/EC, the corresponding 
national measures already existing or 
which have been adopted to implement 
the Directive together with details of 
their publication. Within some months, 
the Commission will so have a 
comprehensive view on the (formal) 
implementation of each provision 
throughout the Community. As regards 
the actual administrative practice in the 
Member States, the Commission must 
rely on press articles and complaints to 
get a full picture. 
The nine month time period for the 
communication to the Commission of 
the (formal) implementation measures 
mentioned in Article 2 refers to the 
notification of these measures. It is not 
a transition period granted to the Member 
States to adopt the relevant legislation. 
Article 90(3) Directives only specify 
existing obligations under the Treaty. 
Such Directives and must therefore be 
complied with, regardless of the time 
period granted to the Member Slates to 
communicate implementation measures. 
According to the case-law of the Court of 
Justice, provisions of Directives have 
direct effect where they are complete and 
precise. This means that the relevant 
authorities of the Member States, 
including the national courts, may not 
implement laws or regulations which arc 
incompatible with such provisions of the 
Directive. As regards this Directive, such 
direct effect results in particular from the 
new Article 2(2) third indent, which 
allows the establishment of own 
infrastructure or the use of alternative 
infrastructures for the provision of already 
liberalised telecommunications services. 
The relevant undertakings may thus 
proceed - so long as they comply with all 
other relevant rules - to apply these rights 
acknowledged in the Directive without 
having to wait for national measures 
implementing the Directive. On the other 
hand, as regards provisions of Directives 
requiring further national implementation 
measures, the Court of Justice confirmed 
in its judgment of 5 March 1996 
(Brasserie du Pêcheur dc Schiltighem) 
that the national governments were liable 
for damages to compensate companies in 
case of infringement of Treaty provisions 
conferring rights on the latter. 
This case-law is as a matter of fact 
probably more effective to ensure full 
compliance with Directives than the 
infringement procedure provided for in 
Article 169 of the Treaty, which, taking 
into account the right granted to the 
Member States to state its case and the 
long administrative delays, can take more 
than three years before the Court of 
Justice pronounces a final judgment. ■ 
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Application of Articles 85 & 86 EC and 65 ECSC 
Main developments between 1st January and 31st March 1996 
Most important recent 
developments 
COMMISSION IMPOSES FINE ON 
BAYER AG FOR IMPEDING 
EXPORTS OF THE PHARMA-
CEUTICAL PRODUCT ADALAT 
WITHIN THE EUROPEAN UNION 
The Commission has imposed a fine of 
ECU 3 million on the German 
pharmaceuticals producer Bayer AG in a 
Decision finding that the company has 
infringed Article 85(1) of the EC Treaty. 
Documents obtained during investigations 
of the group's various companies show 
that the Bayer group has since at least the 
end of the 1980s been concerned by the 
phenomenon of parallel exports of the 
drug Adalat (in France, Adalate) to the 
United Kingdom. Adalat, which is used 
in the treatment of cardiovascular 
diseases, is one of the most important 
pharmaceutical products marketed by the 
group. 
The prices for Adalat vary widely in the 
various Member States in which it is 
marketed. Adalat's largest market shares 
are in the United Kingdom. The price at 
which it is sold is also considerably 
higher in the United Kingdom than in 
other Member States, notably France and 
Spain. 
Before 1989 in Spain and 1991 in France, 
the main customers of the French and 
Spanish subsidiaries of Bayer, i.e. the 
pharmaceutical wholesalers in those 
Member States, used to order larger 
quantities of Adalat than they required 
for supplying the domestic market. The 
surpluses were exported to other Member 
Slates, including the United Kingdom. 
As from September 1991, the French 
wholesalers found that Bayer France was 
no longer prepared to supply them with 
all of the quantities of Adalat which they 
ordered. The same phenomenon had been 
encountered in Spain since early 1989. 
Bayer Spain had set up a computerized 
system for identifying exporting 
wholesalers. In the autumn of 1991, a 
Bayer Spain executive came to explain 
how this system worked to the 
management of Bayer France. However, 
the system set up by Bayer France for 
identifying exporting wholesalers 
remained less elaborate (handwritten lists 
were drawn up specifying "do not 
supply" or "blocked" for certain orders). 
Wholesalers in France and Spain 
continued their commercial relations with 
Bayer in an attempt to obtain supplies of 
Adalat. They tried by various means to 
obtain larger quantities than their 
domestic requirements so as to enable 
them to continue exporting to the United 
Kingdom. In particular, the wholesalers 
used a system of spreading orders 
intended for export between their various 
agencies and a system of placing orders 
through other, small wholesalers not 
subject to monitoring. In this way, they 
endeavoured to ensure that their orders 
appeared to comply with Bayer's 
requirement that the product should not 
be exported. When one of the wholesalers 
was found to be exporting, Bayer France 
and Bayer Spain penalized him by 
imposing successive reductions in the 
volumes supplied. 
All these practices engaged in by Bayer 
France and Bayer Spain show that they 
subjected their wholesalers to a 
permanent threat of a reduction in the 
quantities supplied, a threat which was 
repeatedly put into effect if the 
wholesalers did not comply with the 
export ban. 
The export ban forms part of the 
continuous commercial relations between 
Bayer France and Bayer Spain and their 
respective wholesalers. The wholesalers, 
both in France and in Spain, have shown 
by their conduct that they accepted the 
export ban. It may thus be concluded that 
an agreement, of which the export ban 
forms an integral part, exists between the 
parties (Bayer France and its wholesalers 
on the one hand, and Bayer Spain and its 
wholesalers on the other), which 
agreement is in breach of Article 85(1). 
In determining the amount of the fine, the 
Commission has taken account of the fact 
that the practices involve a serious 
infringement of Community law. It has 
also taken account of the fact that 
pharmaceutical product prices are not set 
autonomously by companies, but are 
governed by the various relevant national 
rules and regulations. [IP/96/19] 
COMMISSION IMPOSES 
CONDITIONS ON COOPERATION 
AGREEMENT BETWEEN 
LUFTHANSA AND SAS 
Acting on a proposal from Mr Karel Van 
Miert, the Commission Member with 
special responsibility for competition 
policy, the Commission approved in 
Strasbourg a cooperation agreement 
concluded on 11 May 1995 between 
Lufthansa and SAS. 
However, the Commission imposed four 
conditions covering the following main 
points: 
a. At Frankfurt, Düsseldorf, Stockholm 
and Oslo airports, where available 
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capacities are saturated at peak periods, 
Lufthansa and SAS must as necessary 
give up up to eight slots a day to other 
airlines wishing to operate services on the 
following routes: 
- Dusseldorf-Copenhagen 
- Düsseldorf-Stockholm 
- Frankfurt-Copenhagen 
- Frankfurt-Gothenburg 
- Frankfurt-Oslo 
- Frankfurt-Stockholm 
- Hamburg-Stockholm 
- Munich-Copenhagen. 
b. Where a new entrant starts operating 
on one of those routes, Lufthansa and 
SAS may not increase the number of 
their daily frequencies by more than one. 
However, this figure may be increased to 
match, but not exceed, the combined 
number of frequencies operated by 
airlines other than Lufthansa and SAS. 
c. The new entrants must, subject to 
certain conditions, be able to conclude 
interlining agreements with and 
participate in the joint frequent-flyer 
programme of Lufthansa and SAS. 
d. Lufthansa and SAS must terminate the 
following cooperation agreements with 
other airlines: 
SAS must terminate its cooperation 
agreement with Swissair and Austrian 
Airlines within the European Quality 
Alliance; 
Lufthansa must terminate its 
cooperation agreement with 
Transwede within the Marketing 
Alliance in Scandinavia; 
Lufthansa must terminate its 
cooperation agreement with Finnair in 
respect of routes between Scandinavia 
and Germany. 
These conditions are applicable until 31 
October 2002. 
The Commission has also asked the two 
airlines to provide regular information on 
how their cooperation is working in 
practice, particularly as regards the level 
of fares charged. This information will be 
particularly important in enabling the 
Commission to assess the agreement's 
impact on air transport users. 
The parties intend through the agreement 
to create a long-term alliance, 
establishing an operationally and 
commercially integrated air transport 
system. The agreement provides for the 
setting-up of a joint venture to act on 
behalf of the two airlines as their 
exclusive vehicle for offering scheduled 
passenger and cargo air transport services 
between Scandinavia and Germany. 
However, the joint venture will not be a 
new airline. The transport services will be 
supplied to the joint venture by Lufthansa 
and SAS in their own names, on the basis 
of close operational and commercial 
cooperation, which will include the 
setting of fares. 
As regards worldwide cooperation, the 
parties intend to establish an integrated 
transport system involving joint network 
planning, a joint pricing policy and the 
harmonization of product and service 
levels, though without creating a common 
entity. 
According to the parties, the object of the 
cooperation is twofold: firstly, to enhance 
the two airlines' European and worldwide 
networks and, secondly, to carry out a 
plan for reducing their costs. 
The economic significance of the 
arrangement is considerable. In terms of 
passenger-kilometres within Europe, 
Lufthansa and SAS are respectively the 
second and third largest European 
airlines. Their cooperation agreement will 
thus have the effect of restricting 
competition significantly, particularly on 
routes between Scandinavia and 
Germany. 
However, account must also be taken of 
the positive aspects of the agreement, 
which must be seen in the light of the 
restructuring of European air transport. 
The alliance between the two airlines will 
give them a much more efficient 
worldwide network, enabling them to 
stand up more effectively to competition 
from other airlines, notably non-European 
airlines. 
Furthermore, the study on the future of 
European air transport carried out in 1993 
by the "Committee of Wise Men" showed 
that the European airlines arc handicapped 
by much higher unit costs than those of 
American or Asian airlines. The cost 
reduction plan accompanying the 
agreement between Lufthansa and SAS is 
an important aspect to be taken into 
consideration in this respect. 
Consumers will derive benefit from the 
agreement, firstly, by having much more 
extensive services available, notably as 
regards network size, better connections 
and the availability of a joint 
frequent-flyer programme and, secondly, 
by benefiting indirectly from the airlines' 
lower costs. 
The Commission has therefore concluded 
that the cooperation can be authorized for 
a period of ten years, but that conditions 
should be imposed to allow other airlines 
to operate services on the routes between 
Scandinavia and Germany in competition 
with Lufthansa and SAS. 
In general, the Commission has adopted 
the same approach in this case as that 
adopted in 1995 in the Swissair/Sabena 
case. In the wake of the liberalization of 
European air transport, new groupings 
between airlines may be useful in helping 
airlines to adjust to new market 
conditions, provide a better service to 
consumers and deal more effectively with 
competition from non-Community airlines. 
The Commission has no wish to stand in 
the way of such operations, but it has to 
ensure that competition is not eradicated 
on the routes in question and that new 
airlines can still enter the market and 
compete with established airlines. 
[IP/96/49] 
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PROFESSIONAL FOOTBALL: 
LETTER OF WARNING FROM 
THE COMMISSION TO UEFA 
Following the Commission meeting in 
Strasbourg on 16 January, Mr Van Miert 
- in agreement with Mr Santer and with 
his colleagues Mr Flynn and Mr Oreja -
has instructed his staff to send a letter of 
warning today to FIFA and UEFA 
questioning the compatibility of their 
rules on transfers and of the nationality 
clauses (known as the "3+2 rule") with 
Article 85 of the EC Treaty and Article 
53 of the Agreement on the European 
Economic Area. 
The letter is in response to the transfer 
rules the two federations notified to the 
Commission on 28 July 1995 and has 
been prompted by complaints brought by 
certain players in that connection. 
After preliminary scrutiny of the file in 
the light of the judgment of the European 
Court of Justice in the Bosman case 
(C-415/93), the Commission departments 
concerned informed FIFA and UEFA 
that, in their opinion, the rules in 
question constituted agreements between 
undertakings, or decisions by associations 
of undertakings, which were contrary to 
the rules of competition of the European 
Union and the European Economic Area 
and were therefore prohibited. Moreover, 
by virtue of the principles highlighted by 
the Court of Justice, the rules and clauses 
did not qualify for exemption from the 
rules of competition. 
The warning at this stage focuses on 
FIFA/UEFA rules governing the transfer, 
within the European Economic Area, of 
professional players or amateur players 
who have turned professional and on 
UEFA nationality clauses applying to 
national and international club 
competitions. The Commission may also 
at a later stage examine the effects on 
competition of FIFA's rules governing 
relations between the European Economic 
Area and the rest of the world, and 
national transfer systems. 
The letter expressly requests FIFA and 
UEFA to comply with Community law 
by abolishing the transfer rules and 
nationality clauses in question and to 
inform the Commission within six weeks 
of the measures taken. In the absence of 
a satisfactory reply, a proposal will be 
put to the Commission formally to 
initiate infringement proceedings under 
the 1962 Regulation (known as 
Regulation No 17) implementing the 
rules of competition enshrined in Articles 
85 and 86 of the Treaty and, solely in 
respect of the rules on transfers, to lift 
the immunity from fines which the two 
federations have enjoyed since their 
notification to the Commission of those 
rules on 28 July 1995. 
The purpose of the letter is to provide 
players, clubs and football federations 
with legal certainty in connection with 
the contractual and organizational 
decisions they have to take. 
Compliance with Community law and 
protection of players' and clubs' 
individual rights deriving therefrom are 
now matters for national courts, which 
are required to apply the provisions of 
the Treaty, as interpreted by the Court of 
Justice. That being so, the Commission 
remains determined to ensure compliance 
with the ruling of the Court of Justice 
and with the principles arising therefrom. 
Accordingly, it is now taking action as 
regards the rules governing transfers and 
nationality clauses. 
Tire Commission is prepared - subject, of 
course, to compliance with the judgment 
of the Court of Justice in Bosman - to 
contribute actively to devising, by way of 
an alternative to the present transfer 
systems, arrangements that can guarantee 
solidarity between clubs, both large and 
small, and finance the training and 
development of players. 
[IP/96/62] 
Other relevant 
Press releases 
The full texts of Commission's 
Press releases are available on­
line from the RAPID database, on 
the day of their publication by the 
Commission's Spokesman's 
Service. To obtain access to 
RAPID, please write to EUR-OP 
Information, Marketing and 
Public Relations (OP/4B) 
2 rue Mercier L-2985 
Luxembourg tel. +352 2929 
42455, fax +352 2929 42763 
IP/96/98 : TECHNOLOGY 
TRANSFERS: COMMISSION 
ADOPTS NEW RULES TO 
PROMOTE DISTRIBUTION OF 
TECHNOLOGICAL 
INNOVATIONS THROUGHOUT 
THE EUROPEAN UNION 
[96/01/31] 
IP/96/222 : NEW PROPOSALS TO 
ENHANCE THE 
COMPETITIVENESS OF 
EUROPE'S SHIPPING AND 
MARITIME INDUSTRIES 
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Court Judgements 
These summaries of Court Judgements have been prepared by DG 
IV officials and represent their personal views on the Judgement. 
These views have not been adopted or in any way approved by the 
Commission and should not be relied upon as a statement of the 
Commission's or DG IV's views. The CELEX document numbers for 
these Judgements are also included within brackets. 
JUDGMENTS OF THE COURT 
OF 24 OCTOBER 1995 IN 
CASES C-70/93, BAYERISCHE 
MOTORENWERKE AG V ALD 
AUTO-LEASING D GMBH, AND 
C-266/93, BUNDES-
KARTELLAMT V VOLKS-
WAGEN AG, VAG LEASING 
GMBH 
In two proceedings pursuant to Art. 
177 of the EEC Treaty, the Court of 
Justice, on 24 October 1995 issued 
preliminary rulings on the 
interpretation of Art. 85(1) of the EEC 
Treaty and Commission Regulation 
(EEC) No 123/85 of 12 December 
1984 on the application of Art. 85(3) 
of the Treaty to certain categories of 
motor vehicle distribution and 
servicing agreements (OJ 1985 L 15, 
p. 16, hereinafter "Reg. No 123/85"). 
Two leading German car 
m a n u f a c t u r e r s , B a y e r i s c h e 
Motorenwerke AG (hereinafter 
"BMW") and Volkswagen AG 
(hereinafter "VW") used their 
distribution network of selected car 
dealers to influence the market of car 
leasing, in which both undertakings 
participate through their own 
subsidiaries, BMW Leasing GmbH 
and VAG Leasing GmbH, 
respectively. 
BMW required its authorized dealers, 
by means of a circular letter, not to 
provide cars to independent, i.e., not 
BMW-connected, leasing companies 
who would make those BMW cars 
available to customers residing or 
having their principal place of 
business outside the territory assigned 
by BMW to the respective dealer. 
BMW's concern were those final 
customers later turning to the local 
BMW dealer established in their 
territory for supply and maintenance, 
thereby disturbing BMW's territorial 
division of the German market. ALD 
Auto-Leasing D GmbH challenged 
BMW's practice in German courts. 
The Bundesgerichtshof (Federal Court 
of Justice) then referred to the Court 
of Justice to answer the questions 
whether BMW's practice was 
prohibited by Art. 85(1) of the Treaty 
and eventually exempted by Reg. No 
123/85 and, if allowed under EEC 
competition rules, could nevertheless 
be forbidden under German 
competition law as a supply embargo 
(C-70/93, par. 13). 
VW, by means of a circular letter and 
a pre-formulated contract, turned its 
authorized dealers into exclusive 
agents for VAG Leasing GmbH, 
negotiating leasing contracts on behalf 
of VW's leasing company in the 
dealer's assigned territory. VW, 
having regard to the obligations 
established by their respective 
distribution agreements, expected its 
authorized dealers to buy brand cars 
from VW, transfer ownership in the 
cars to VAG Leasing GmbH in return 
of the purchase price and, upon 
expiration of the lease, effectively 
repurchase the cars from VAG Leasing 
GmbH. VW's dealers were allowed to 
supply independent, i.e., not VW-
connected, leasing companies only 
upon customer's request or upon 
introduction of the customer by such 
an independent leasing company. The 
German Bundeskartellamt prohibited 
VW's exclusive agency agreements as 
restricting market access. VW 
challenged this order in German 
courts, of which the Bundesgerichtshof 
then referred to the Court of Justice to 
rule on whether VW's practice violated 
Art. 85(1) of the Treaty, was 
eventually exempted by Reg. No 
123/85 and, if allowed under EEC 
competition rules, could nevertheless 
be considered unlawful under German 
competition law (C-266/93, par. 14). 
The judgments of the Court of 
Justice 
The Court of Justice first applied Art. 
85(1) towards the contested practices 
and turned to the question of 
agreements between undertakings. 
As to BMW's circular letter, the Court 
of Justice restated that "a call by a 
motor vehicle manufacturer to its 
authorized dealers" constitutes an 
agreement within the meaning of Art. 
85(1) of the Treaty instead of a 
unilateral act "if it forme[s| part of a 
set of continuous business relations 
governed by a general agreement 
drawn up in advance" (C-70/93, par. 
16, citing Joined Cases 25-26/84 Ford 
v Commission [1985] ECR 2725 at 
par. 21). The Court found such a 
general agreement in BMW's 
dealership agreement to which the 
circular letter referred "on numerous 
occasions" (C-70/93, par. 17). 
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As to VW's exclusive agency 
agreements, the Court of Justice, 
answering VW's allegations, 
distinguished separate undertakings 
from one economic unit and rejected 
the letter constellation as applying 
towards the relationship between VW 
or VAG Leasing GmbH and VW's 
authorized dealers. The Court of 
Justice pointed out that representatives 
are generally separated from their 
principal undertaking for the purposes 
of Art. 85(1) of the Treaty and will 
form one economic unit falling 
outside the scope of Art. 85(1) of the 
Treaty only if "they do not bear any 
of the risks resulting from the 
contracts negotiated on behalf of the 
principal and they operate as auxiliary 
organs forming an integral part of the 
principal's undertaking" (C-266/93, 
par. 19, citing Joined Cases 40-48, 50, 
54-56, 111, 113 and 114/73 Suiker 
Unie et al. ν Commission [1975] ECR 
1663 at par. 539). The Court found 
VW's authorized dealers, however, to 
partially assume the financial risks of 
leasing transactions by accepting their 
repurchase obligation upon expiration 
of the lease and to conduct their sales 
activities in their own name and for 
their own account (C-266/93, par. 19). 
Turning to possible restrictions of 
competition within the meaning of 
Art. 85(1) of the Treaty, the Court of 
Justice evaluated BMW's and VW's 
practices with respect to the leasing 
market. 
The Court held BMW's practice to 
amount to absolute territorial 
protection in favour of authorized 
BMW dealers, since only the dealer in 
whose territory the ultimate lessee 
resides is in a position to supply 
BMW brand cars to a respective 
independent leasing company. 
Additionally, the Court of Justice 
found BMW's exclusivity rights to 
reduce each individual authorized 
dealer's "freedom of commercial 
action", because its choice of 
customers was limited to such 
independent leasing companies having 
customers exclusively in the dealer's 
special territory (C-70/93, par. 19). 
The Court of Justice found VW's 
exclusive agency agreements to 
restrict competition mainly because 
they were, by their express terms and 
with all their obligations, closely 
attached to VW's distribution 
agreements which, so the Court, 
already restricted competition but 
were exempted by Reg. 123/85 (C-
266/93, par. 21). "since VW's 
authorized dealers had the exclusive 
right to sell VW brand cars within 
their territory, the attached obligations 
of exclusive agency in favour of 
VW's VAG Leasing GmbH restricted 
market access for other leasing 
companies which were "unable to use 
the privileged channels of 
communication with potential 
customers", i.e., VW's dealer network 
(C-266/93, par. 22/23). The Court of 
Justice again saw a further restriction 
of competition within the meaning of 
Art. 85(1) in the agency agreements' 
limitations on the "freedom of action 
of traders independent of VAG" by 
imposing exclusivity: authorized VAG 
dealers are, in effect, restrained from 
engaging in leasing activities 
independently and integration into the 
manufacturer's, i.e., the principal's 
distribution strategy is increased (C-
266/93, par. 24). 
With regard to the required effect on 
trade between Member States, the 
Court of Justice in both cases pointed 
to the contested practices' effects on 
the whole territory of the Member 
State Germany and the resulting 
foreclosure of the German market (C-
70/93 at par. 20 and C-266/93 at par. 
26). The Court of Justice also noted 
that BMW's practice had the effects of 
an export ban towards foreign leasing 
companies which customers would 
possibly not reside in the respective 
dealer's territory (C-70/93, par. 20). 
Accordingly, the Court of Justice 
found both BMW's and VW's 
practices in violation of Art. 85(1) of 
the Treaty. 
The Court of Justice next examined 
the question whether the two 
undertakings' practices were exempted 
by the provisions of Reg. 123/85. 
Both BMW and VW had argued that 
independent leasing companies not part 
of their distribution system would be 
in the same position as unauthorized 
resellers and relied on Arts. 3(10)(a) 
and 13(12) of Reg. 123/85 to justify 
their practices: BMW had purportedly 
lawfully prohibited dealers from 
supplying independent leasing 
companies and, similarly, prohibited 
distribution depots or intermediaries in 
accordance Arts. 3(8) and 3(9); VW 
concluded a fortiori that negotiations 
with independent leasing companies 
could be prohibited as much as 
supplying such companies. 
Applying the provisions of Reg. 
123/85, the Court of Justice noted at 
the outset that provisions in a block 
exemption have to be narrowly 
construed and will not extend in their 
application "beyond what is necessary 
to protect the interests which they are 
intended to safeguard" (C-70/93, par. 
28; C-266/93, par. 33). 
The Court of Justice then found that, 
for the purposes of Reg. 123/85, 
independent leasing companies not 
offering an option to purchase cannot 
be considered to be in a comparable 
position to resellers as long as they 
"confine themselves to purchasing 
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vehicles in order to satisfy requests 
from their customers and do not build 
up stocks which they offer to 
customers attracted in that way" (C-
70/93, par. 29; C-266/93, par. 34). 
Limited by reference of the 
Bundesgerichtshof, the Court in both 
proceedings considered only leasing 
transactions by independent leasing 
companies without an intention of 
transferring ownership to the lessee, 
i.e., purchase option (C-70/93, par. 3; 
C-266/93, par. 15). 
The Court of Justice additionally held 
that Art. 13(12) of Reg. 123/85 only 
relates to the manufacturer-dealer 
relationship and intents to prevent 
dealers from circumventing their 
obligations under the distribution 
agreement by using the transactional 
form of a lease instead of another 
transactional form of distribution. 
Art. 13(12), so the Court, does not 
provide guidance for the question 
whether independent leasing 
companies are comparable to 
unauthorized resellers (C-70/93, par. 
30; C-266/93, par. 35). 
Accordingly, the Court of Justice also 
rejected BMW's further arguments 
and found that neither Art. 3(8) nor 
Art. 3(9) of Reg. 123/85 governed 
BMW's supply ban, pointing out that 
independent leasing companies would 
act on their own behalf and had to be 
regarded as final users (C-70/93, par. 
34). Additionally, so the Court, the 
Ninth recital to Reg. 123/85 supports 
supply by dealers outside their 
territory and the regulation as a whole 
"does not authorize [manufacturers] to 
partition their market" (C-70/93, par. 
36/37). 
The Court of Justice therefore held 
that both BMW's and VW's 
restrictive practices were not 
exempted by Reg. 123/85. Since EEC 
competition law prohibited the 
contested agreements, the national 
court's question as to the relationship 
between Community and national 
competition law was left unanswered 
by the Court. 
Main points: 
Analysing the judgment, the Court of 
Justice refers to the two notions of a 
missing assumption of any 
transactional risk and of being an 
auxiliary organ forming an integral 
part of the principal's undertaking to 
define the limits of separate 
undertakings as opposed to one 
economic unit. The Court describes 
the principal-agent relationship (C-
266/93, par. 19 "representatives") 
establishing separation as the general 
rule that will be overcome only if the 
two mentioned factors are fulfilled 
cumulatively. The Court of Justice 
turns to financial risks and to the 
agent's remaining business to hold 
that with respect to VW's dealers non 
of the two requirements are met. The 
criteria used by the Court are thus 
pointed to the nature of the business 
relationship in each case. The Court 
has examined this question with 
respect to VW and its authorized 
dealers in the light of the terms and 
provisions of the contested agreement. 
The undertakings concluding these 
agreements at that time existed in the 
ordinary structure of a manufacturer-
dealer relationship. The proposed 
agreement did not change did not 
modify the legal status of the parties 
involved in that regard (see C-266/93 
at par. 18/19). 
The Court, in its analysis of VW's 
practices, relies on the restrictive 
effects of the distribution agreements 
exempted by Reg. 123/85 (C-266/93 
at par. 21) to which the contested 
agreement is an adjunct. However, the 
Court finds the positive effects 
accounted for by the block exemption 
not to extend to the exclusive agency 
provisions which reinforce the anti-
competitive effects of the distribution 
agreements. In its findings of an 
infringement of Art. 85(1) of the 
Treaty the Court of Justice clearly 
presents the "freedom of commercial 
action" of vertically connected 
undertakings as a value that, if 
negatively affected, constitutes by 
itself a restriction of competition. The 
Court effectively seems to take the 
view that, in addition to the 
foreclosure effect, any exclusive 
agency agreement will always impede 
Art. 85(1) of the Treaty: it will always 
affect the dealer's freedom of action 
(see C-266/93 at par. 24). In addition. 
Art. 13(12) of Reg. 123/85 accordingly 
protects only obligations already 
imposed on dealers by manufacturers 
and does not justify new ones. 
Finally, the Court's interpretation of 
Art. 3 of Reg. 123/85 also confirmed 
the Commission's view as expressed in 
the new Regulation 1475/95 regarding 
distribution of automobiles. 
It is unfortunate that the Court was not 
given the chance to clarify its position 
on the relationship between EEC and 
national competition law. [693J0070] 
M. WUNDERLICH and 
P. ADAMOPOULOS 
ARRETS DE LA COUR DE 
JUSTICE DU 12 DÉCEMBRE 
1995 DANS LES AFFAIRES C-
399/93" HG OUDE LUTTIKHUIS 
EA Cl VERENIGDE 
COOPÉRATIVE INDUSTRIALE 
MELKINDUSTRIE 
COBERCOBA" ET C-319/93, C-
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40/94, C­224/94 "DIJKSTRA C/ 
FRIESLAND COÖPERATIE 
BA", "VAN ROESSEL C/ DE 
COÖPERATIE VERENIGING 
ZUIVELCO­ÖPERATIE 
CAMPINA MELK­UNIE BA", 
"WILLEM DE BIE E.A. Cl DE 
COÖPERATIE VERENIGING 
ZUIVELCO­ÖPERATIE 
CAMPINA MELKUNIE BA" 
Ces affaires concernent la légalité au 
regard de l'article 85 du traité d'une 
série de clauses statutaires d'une 
coopérative laitière qui règlent les 
rapports entre la coopérative et ses 
membres et notamment celle des 
clauses dites "de fidélité". 
Domaine: Statut des coopératives 
laitières ­ Régime d'indemnité au 
départ ­ article 85 et Règlement n 26. 
Les Faits 
L'affaire C­399/93 "HG Oude 
Luttikhuis ea c/ Verenigde coopérative 
industriale Melkindustrie CobercoBA" 
concerne deux questions préjudicielles 
posées par l'Arrondissernentsbank te 
Zutphen et soulevées dans le cadre 
d'un litige opposant des éleveurs de 
bétail laitier à la coopérative agricole 
Corbeco BA dont ils étaient membres. 
Celle­ci s'engage à acheter la totalité 
du lait produit par ses adhérents, 
lesquels lui réservent, en contrepartie 
l'exclusivité. 
Les requérants ont résilié leur 
adhésion à Coberco le 1er janvier 
1992 après avoir respecté le délai de 
préavis en vigueur. Le litige a été 
soulevé à propos de l'obligation 
statutaire de payer une indemnité au 
départ en cas de retraite ou 
d'exclusion de celle­ci. Les questions 
portent sur les critères d'application 
de l'article 85, paragraphe 1 du traité 
CEE et de l'article 2 paragraphe 1 du 
règlement 26/62 à ce régime 
d'indemnité. 
Les affaires jointes C­319/93, C­
40/94, C­224/94 "Dijkstra c/ Friesland 
Coöperatie BA", "van Roessel c/ De 
coöperatie vereniging Zuivelcoöperatie 
Campina Melkunie BA", "Willem de 
Bie e.a. c/ De coöperatie vereniging 
Zuivelcoöperatie Campina Melkunie 
BA" concernent plusieurs questions 
préjudicielles posées par le 
Gerechtshof te Leeuwarden et 
l 'Arrondissernentsbank t e ' s ­
Hertogenbosch soulevées dans le 
cadre de litiges opposant des éleveurs 
de bétail laitier aux coopératives 
agricoles dont ils étaient membres à 
propos de l'obligation statutaire de 
payer une indemnité de départ en cas 
de retraite ou d'exclusion de celles­ci. 
Les requérants ont fait valoir que 
l'indemnité de départ exigée par les 
coopératives crée, une obligation de 
livraison exclusive pendant une 
période indéterminée qui restreint la 
liberté économique de ses membres et 
constitue une entrave pour les 
concurrents de la coopérative. En 
outre, les demandeurs au principal ont 
soutenu que le régime de l'indemnité 
de départ en question ne peut pas 
bénéficier de l'exception prévue à 
l'article 2 du règlement n° 26. 
Il convient de rappeler que, selon 
l'article 1 du règlement n° 26, les 
articles 85 à 90 du traité sont 
applicables à tous les accords relatifs 
à la production et au commerce des 
produits agricoles, sous réserve de 
l'article 2 du même règlement. Aux 
termes de l'article 2, paragraphe 1: 
"l'article 85, paragraphe 1 est 
inapplicable aux accords...(visés à 
l'article 1) qui font partie intégrante 
d'une organisation nationale de 
marché ou qui sont nécessaires à la 
réalisation des objectifs de l'article 39 
du traité (première phrase). Il ne 
s'applique pas en particulier aux 
accords...d'exploitants agricoles, 
d'associations d'exploitants agricoles 
ou d' associations de ces associations 
ressortissant à un seul État membre, 
dans la mesure où, sans comporter 
l'obligation de pratiquer un prix 
déterminé, ils concernent la production 
ou la vente des produits agricoles..., à 
moins que la Commission ne constate 
qu'ainsi la concurrence est exclue ou 
que les objectifs de l'article 39 du 
traité sont mis en péril" (seconde 
phrase). 
Sur le fond 
Sur les critères d'application de 
l'article 85 
La Cour indique que la compatibilité 
des clauses statutaires d'une société 
coopérative ne peut être appréciée de 
façon abstraite. Il faut l'examiner en 
tenant compte des conditions 
économiques sur le marché concerné. 
La Cour établit qu'afin de déterminer 
si le régime d'indemnité est compatible 
avec l'article 85, paragraphe 1, il faut 
examiner les critères relatifs à l'objet 
et les effets de l'accord et enfin 
l ' a f f ec t a t i on des échanges 
communautaires. Ainsi, elle confirme 
la ligne d'argumentation établie dans 
l'arrêt DLG du 15 décembre 1994 (C­
250­92). 
Quant à l'objet des accords, La Cour 
suit son approche d'un "rule of reason" 
limité en faveur des coopératives 
d'achat, comme elle l'a élaboré dans 
son arrêt DLG précitée. En effet, 
l'organisation d'une entreprise selon la 
forme juridique d'une coopérative ne 
constitue pas en soi un comportement 
anticoncurrentiel (arrêt Luttikhuis, 
point 12). Or, les restrictions imposées 
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aux membres par les statuts doivent 
être "limitées à ce qui est nécessaire 
pour le bon fonctionnement de la 
coopérative et de soutenir sa 
puissance contractuelle vis à vis des 
producteurs" (arrêt DLG point 35 et 
point 14 de l'arrêt Luttikhuis). 
Quant aux effets des accords ou des 
clauses statutaires, la Cour signale que 
la combinaison de certaines clauses 
peut produire une restriction de la 
concurrence. Ainsi, dans le cas 
d'espèce, l'obligation de livraison 
exclusive et l'imposition d'indemnités 
de départ excessives liant les membres 
à la coopérative durant des longues 
périodes et les privant ainsi de la 
possibilité de s'adresser à des 
opérateurs concurrents, pourrait avoir 
pour effet de restreindre la 
concurrence. Il en résulte qu'une telle 
situation rendrait le marché 
excessivement rigide et une 
consoliderait la forte position 
concurrentielle de la coopérative, ce 
qui ferait obstacle à l'entrée de 
nouveaux concurrents (point 16 de 
l'arrêt Luttikhuis). 
Quant au critère relatif au commerce 
intracomunautaire, la Cour reprend 
l'arrêt DGL pour établir qu'un accord 
est susceptible d'affecter le commerce 
entre Etats membres lorsqu'il peut, sur 
la base d'un ensemble d'éléments 
objectifs de droit ou de fait, exercer 
une influence directe ou indirecte sur 
les échanges entre Etats membres 
dans un sens qu'il pourrait nuire à la 
réalisation des objectifs d'un marché 
unique entre Etats membres (arrêt 
DLG, point 54). 
Sur les critères d'application du 
règlement 26 du 4 avril 1962: 
La Cour rappelé que l'article 1 du 
règlement énonce la règle générale 
d'applicabilité des articles 85 à 90 du 
traité et l'article 2 prévoit de 
dérogations à cette norme et il doit 
être interprété de manière restrictive 
(voir supra). Or, pour interpréter 
l'article 2, paragraphe 1 du règlement 
n° 26, il convient de tenir compte de 
la genèse ainsi que de la motivation 
dudit règlement. Il en résulte la 
volonté du législateur de protéger les 
coopératives agricoles en leur 
appliquant un régime plus souple. Par 
conséquent, les coopératives ne 
doivent pas être soumises aux 
conditions tant de la première que de 
la seconde phrase de l'article 2, 
pa rag raphe 1. El les sont 
exclusivement soumises aux 
conditions énoncées à la seconde 
phrase de cette disposition (arrêt 
Dijkstra, point 18). 
Cependant, il convient d'écarter 
l'argument selon lequel les accords 
visées à la seconde phrase de l'article 
2, paragraphe 1, bénéficient d'une 
validité provisoire aussi longtemps 
que la Commission n'a pas constaté 
que la concurrence était exclue ou que 
les objectifs de l'article 39 étaient en 
péril. Cette disposition n'institue 
qu'un renversement de la charge de la 
preuve en faveur des exploitants 
agricoles. 
En ce qui concerne les dérogations 
prévues par l'article 2 dudit 
règlement, la première n'a qu'un 
domaine d'application très limité 
parce que les organisations nationales 
de marché ont pratiquement disparu et 
la seconde dérogation s'applique aux 
accords nécessaires à la réalisation des 
objectifs énoncés à l'article 39 du 
traité. 
La troisième dérogation a, selon la 
Cour, une portée autonome par 
rapport aux deux autres dérogations 
énoncées au même paragraphe. Celle-
ci contient trois conditions 
cumulatives: La coopérative doit être 
ressortissant à un seul Etat membre, 
les accords ou clauses statutaires ne 
doivent pas porter sur le prix mais 
visent plutôt la vente de produits 
agricoles, ou l'utilisation d'installations 
communes de stockage, de traitement 
ou de transformation de ces produits, 
et enfin qu'ils n'excluent pas la 
concurrence ni mettent pas en péril les 
objectifs de la politique agricole 
commune. 
Pour ce qui est de ce dernier point, la 
Cour indique qu'une accumulation de 
clauses statutaires liant les membres à 
la coopérative durant de longues 
périodes et les privant ainsi de 
s'adresser a des opérateurs concurrents 
peut mettre en péril l'objectif de la 
politique agricole commune relatif au 
relèvement du revenu individuel de 
ceux qui travaillent dans l'agriculture, 
dans la mesure où ces derniers ne 
pourront pas se bénéficier de la 
concurrence sur des prix d'achat de la 
matière première pratiques par les 
différentes entreprises transformatrices. 
La Cour se réfère enfin aux affaires 
jointes C-319-93, C-40/94 et C-224/94 
(Dijkstra, Van Roessel e.a et De Bie 
e.a.) pour aborder la question 
concernant les pouvoirs de la 
Commission et des juridictions 
nationales en ce domaine, (point 29 et 
30). 
S'agissant de la répartition des 
compétences entre la Commission et 
les juridictions nationales pour 
appliquer l'article 2. paragraphe 1, du 
règlement n° 26, la Commission 
bénéficie d'une compétence exclusive 
pour constater qu'un accord remplit les 
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conditions prévues au paragraphe 1. 
En revanche, la Commission partage 
sa compétence pour appliquer l'article 
85, paragraphe 1 avec les juridictions 
nationales. Il convient d"examiner les 
conséquences de cette répartition de 
compétences à la lumière des 
principes dégagés par la Cour dans 
l'arrêt Delimitis (arrêt du 28/02/1991, 
aff. C­234/89). 
Afin d'éviter des décisions 
contradictoires, le juge national peut 
tenir compte des considérations 
suivantes: si les conditions 
d'application de l'article 85, 
paragraphe 1, ne sont manifestement 
pas réunis, le juge national peut 
poursuivre la procédure pour statuer 
sur l'accord litigieux. 
Au contraire, s'il estime que l'article 
85, paragraphe 1 est applicable et que 
l'accord ne remplit manifestement pas 
les conditions pour bénéficier de la 
dérogation de l'article 2 du règlement 
n° 26 ni d'une exemption au titre de 
l'article 85, paragraphe 3, il peut en 
déclarer la nullité conformément à 
l'article 85, paragraphe 2. A cet égard, 
il doit tenir compte des critères 
dégagés par la jurisprudence de la 
Cour et par la pratique de la 
Commission (décisions, rapports sur 
la politique de la concurrence, 
communications). 
En cas de doute, le juge national 
pourra, lorsque il s'avère opportun et 
conforme aux d i spos i t ions 
procédurales nationales, obtenir des 
informations complémentaires de la 
Commission ou mettre les parties en 
mesure de demander à la Commission 
de se prononcer. 
Points essentiels 
La Cour confirme l'application limitée 
de la règle de raison (rule of reason) 
aux coopératives comme elle l'a déjà 
énoncé dans son arrêt DLG, en 
confirmant leur caractère foncièrement 
favorable à la concurrence. La faveur 
du législateur national et des autorités 
communautaires pour cette forme 
juridique ont certainement joué un 
rôle important à cette prise de position 
de la part de la Cour. 
Afin de décider si les clauses 
statutaires d'une société coopérative, 
sont compatibles avec l'article 85, 
paragraphe 1, du traité CEE, la 
juridiction de renvoi doit prendre en 
considération les critères relatifs à 
l'objet de l'accord prévoyant ces 
clauses et ceux relatifs à l'affection 
des échanges intracommunautaires, en 
tenant compte du contexte 
économique dans lequel opèrent les 
entreprises, des produits ou services 
visés par cet accord ainsi que de la 
structure et des conditions réelles de 
fonctionnement du marché concerné. 
En ce qui concerne l'interprétation de 
la seconde phrase de l'article 2, 
paragraphe 1, du règlement n° 26, la 
Cour a adopté la thèse de la 
Commission relative à la portée 
autonome de cette disposition. 
A propos de la répartition des 
compétences entre la Commission et 
les juridictions nationales, la Cour se 
réfère aux critères qu'elle a élaboré 
dans son arrêt Delimitis, repris 
d'ailleurs par la Commission dans sa 
communication pour la coopération 
avec les juridictions nationales. 
[693J0399] P. ADAMOPOULOS 
and R: MILLAN SANZ 
Other Judgements 
Extracts are published in the weekly 
publication " Les activités de la Cour 
de Justice et du Tribunal de Première 
Instance des Communautés 
Européennes", available on-line from 
the RAPID database, a few days 
after its publication by the Court. To 
obtain access to RAPID please write 
to: EUR-OP Information, Marketing 
and Public Relations (OP/4B) 
2 rue Mercier L-2985 Luxembourg 
tel. +352 2929 42455, 
fax +352 2929 42763 
Arrêt de la Cour du 9/1/96: Aff. 
T-575/93 Casper Koelman / 
Commission des Communautés 
européennes; Concurrence; 
'Règlement No 17 - Rejet d'une 
plainte - Motivation - Juge 
national'; (Quatrième chambre 
élargie) 
Arrêt de la Cour du 15/2/96: Aff. 
C-226/94; Grand garage albigeois 
SA e.a. / Garage Massol SARL; 
Préjudicielle; Concurrence -
Distribution d'automobiles -
Règlement (CEE) no 123/85 -
Opposabilité aux tiers - Revendeur 
indépendant; (Deuxième chambre) 
Arrêt de la Cour du 15/2/96: Aff. 
C-309/94Nissan France SA e.a. / 
Jean-Luc Dupasquier du Garage 
Sport Auto e.a.; Préjudicielle; 
Concurrence - Distribution 
d'automobiles - Règlement (CEE) 
no 123/85 -Opposabilité aux tiers 
- Importateur parallèle - Cumul 
des activités de mandataire et de 
revendeur indépendant; (Deuxième 
chambre) 
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Application of Council Regulation 4064/89 
Main developments between 1st January and 31st March 1996 
Summary of the most important 
recent developments 
by John FELLS, DG IV-B 
Between 1st January and 31st March 
the Commission took 27 decisions 
under the Merger Regulation. This 
total included a decision under Article 
8(2) of the Regulation (clearance with 
conditions and obligations: Kimberly-
Clark/Scott Paper), and a decision 
under Article 9 of the Regulation 
(Member State referral: Gehe/Lloyds 
Chemists). 
KIMBERLY-CLARK/SCOTT 
PAPER 
On 16th January, after 5 months of 
e x t e n s i v e i n v e s t i g a t i o n , the 
Commission approved the proposed 
merger between Kimberly Clark 
Corporation (USA) and the Scott Paper 
Company (USA). However, this 
approval was only granted after the 
parties agreed to make substantial 
modifications to the merger in Ireland 
and the United Kingdom. The result of 
these modifications is that Kimberly 
Clark will not be able to combine its 
own Kleenex, and Scott's Andrex, 
branded consumer tissue businesses in 
the UK and Ireland. 
- The parties will divest all of 
Kimberly-Clark's existing branded 
consumer toilet tissue business sold 
under the Kleenex "Double Velvet, 
Quilted and Recycled" brands. In order 
to allow the acquirer sufficient time to 
establish these brands in the UK and 
Irish market, the purchaser will be able 
to make use of the Kleenex umbrella 
trademark for a maximum 10 year 
period and Kimberly-Clark has 
undertaken not to re-enter the market 
with the Kleenex trademark for a 
minimum 15 year period. Similar 
arrangements will apply for Kimberly-
Clark's branded consumer kitchen 
towel business. 
- The parties will also divest Scott's 
"Scotties" and "Handy Andies" brands 
for facials and hankies respectively and 
undertake not to use the Andrex 
trademark for consumer facials and 
hankies for an indefinite duration in the 
UK and Ireland. 
- The parties agree to divest Kimberly-
Clark's 80 000 ton-per-year tissue 
facility at Prudhoe in England, 
comprising the tissue mill, the 
converting factory and the consumer 
tissue products converting equipment to 
support the above businesses as well as 
the warehousing, offices and the 
adjacent regional distribution centre. 
Through the divestment of the Prudhoe 
mill, Kimberly-Clark's residual tissue 
paper production capacity will fall to 
below 40% of overall capacity in the 
UK and Ireland. The Prudhoe mill is a 
modern facility currently producing all 
of Kimberly-Clark's branded consumer 
toilet tissue and kitchen towel business. 
It is the only plant in the UK 
producing tissue paper using TAD 
(through-air-dry) technology which is 
capable of producing the highest quality 
toilet tissue. 
Kimberly-Clark and Scott Paper are 
major tissue paper and related product 
manufacturers with worldwide 
businesses in the consumer and 
industrial (away-from-home) areas. 
Together, the surviving Kimberly Clark 
Corporation will become the No. 1 
tissue paper producer both at the world 
and the European levels. 
The operation gave rise to concerns in 
the UK and Irish markets for toilet 
t i s s u e , k i t c h e n t o w e l s and 
facials/hankies. 
Because of the bulky, low value of 
consumer tissue products which gives 
rise to high transport costs, and in 
particular brand as well as differences in 
consumer preferences, the UK and 
Ireland constitute separate geographical 
reference markets. 
Private label products (ie sold under the 
retailer's name) play an important role 
in the UK and Irish markets, and now 
in fact cover more than half of market 
demand. Nevertheless, the parties' 
control of the two leading brands, which 
are essential brands for retailers to 
stock, coupled with their position as the 
leading supplier of private-label 
products and overall market strength 
would have combined to create a 
dominant position. In particular, the 
Commission was concerned that if lhe 
merger went through unmodified, there 
would no longer have been sufficiently 
strong inter-brand competition. The 
result would have been that consumers 
would have had to pay too high prices 
for basic tissue paper products and that 
the benefits to consumers of further 
innovation and product quality 
improvement would have been lost. 
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Moreover, the tissue paper market is a 
very large market with combined sales 
of approximately 1000 million ECU for 
toilet tissue, kitchen towels and 
facials/hankies in the UK and Ireland. 
The transaction was also notified to the 
U.S. competition authorities, who found 
competition concerns in the facial 
tissues and baby wipes markets. As a 
result, Kimberly-Clark agreed to divest 
Scott's baby wipes and facial tissue 
brands, Scott's Dover, Delaware, plant 
used to make Scott baby wipes and 
other products, and a maximum of two 
of four tissue mills. 
GEHE/LLOYDS CHEMIST) 
On 22nd March the Commission 
decided that the public bid by GEHE 
for Lloyds the Chemists should be 
referred to the competent United 
Kingdom authorities for further 
investigation. 
Through its AAI I subsidiary, GEHE is 
currently the largest wholesaler of 
pharmaceutical products in the UK and 
at the retail level GEHE also owns a 
large chain of chemist shops through 
AAH's subsidiary, Hills Pharmacy. 
Lloyds is currently the third largest UK 
wholesaler (behind AAH and Unichem) 
and the second largest retailer (behind 
Boots) of pharmaceutical products. 
Through the acquisition GEHE will 
become the largest pharmaceutical 
wholesaler and retailer in the UK. 
After the merger GEHE/Lloyds and 
Unichem will have over two-thirds of 
the UK market for the wholesale 
supply of pharmaceutical products to 
independent retail chemists. In certain 
regions their combined market share 
will be significantly higher. Although 
Boots has a large chain of retail 
chemists, it is not active in the 
wholesale market. After the merger, 
there will be only two wholesalers, 
GEHE/Lloyds and Unichem, supplying 
a full range of pharmaceutical products 
throughout the UK. Other wholesalers 
are very much smaller and operate only 
on a regional basis. Regional 
wholesalers would appear unable to 
provide a sufficient competitive 
counterweight to the duopoly pair 
composed of Gehe/Lloyds and 
Unichem. The Commission therefore 
considered that the proposed 
concentration threatens to create a 
dominant position in the market for 
pharmaceutical wholesaling in the UK, 
whether this market be examined on a 
regional or a national basis. 
The Commission also identified a small 
number of areas in which pharmacies 
belonging to the AAH and Lloyds 
chain of pharmacies would appear to 
have a local monopoly, as other 
pharmacies appear too distantly located. 
Fur thermore, the Commission 
considered that the vertical 
consequences of the merger require 
thorough investigation as after the 
merger, GEHE/Lloyds' position as the 
leading pharmaceutical wholesaler and 
retailer could have consequences for 
the supply of pharmaceutical products 
to independent pharmacies competing 
at the retail level with the group's 
outlets. The Commission therefore 
considered that the concentration also 
threatens to create a dominant position 
in the market for pharmaceutical 
retailing in the UK. 
Lloyds has no turnover outside the 
United Kingdom and the distinct 
geographical reference markets for 
pharmaceutical wholesaling and 
retailing are wholly limited to the UK. 
Gehe's bid for Lloyds was notified to 
the Commission on 8 February and a 
request for referral was submitted by 
the United Kingdom authorities on 1 
March. 
The Commission decided to refer the 
case to the UK authorities. The 
Commission considered that only a 
detailed analysis of both the 
pharmaceutical wholesaling and retailing 
markets in the UK will make it possible 
to determine the precise scope of the 
geographical reference market and to 
properly assess the competition 
consequences of the merger. The 
Commission noted that the United 
Kingdom authorities have already 
decided to refer the parallel Unichem 
bid for Lloyds to The Monopolies and 
Mergers Commission. Referral will 
therefore also have the advantage of 
allowing both bids to be examined by 
the same regulatory authority on a 
coordinated timetable. 
GENCOR/LONRHO 
In December 1995 the Commission 
decided to initiate a detailed 
investigation of the proposed merger of 
the PGM (platinum group metals) 
interests of Gencor and Lonrho which 
are located in South Africa. Both 
Gencor and Lonrho have substantial 
operations in the European Union. 
The merger involves share exchanges 
between the two companies with respect 
to Impala Platinum Holdings Limited 
("Implats"), Eastern Platinum Limited 
and Western Platinum Limited. 
The operation will result in Lonrho 
receiving new shares in Implats. These 
shares would be listed on the 
Johannesburg Stock Exchange and the 
International Stock Exchange in 
London. Following the issue of new 
shares Gencor and Lonrho will each 
hold about 32% of the shares in 
Implats. The remaining shares will be 
held by the public. 
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The Commission considers that the 
scope of the geographic market for 
PGMs is worldwide. The Commission 
decided to initiate the second phase 
investigation into the effects of the 
operation because of concerns that the 
merged company may have an adverse 
effect on competition in the PGM 
market. The second phase investigation, 
and hearings of the parties concerned, 
have continued during the first 
trimester of 1996, and the 
Commission's final decision is due to 
be taken by early May 1996 at the 
latest. 
TELECOMMUNICATIONS CASES 
Three decisions already taken in the 
first trimester of 1996 indicate the 
ongoing restructuring which is taking 
place in the telecommunications sector. 
The Commission cleared the 
acquisition by the American 
telecommunications company A.T.T. of 
certain business units of Philips 
Electronics N.V. in the market for the 
provision of public telecommunications 
equipment. The Commission also 
approved the acquisition from the 
Belgian State of a strategic interest in 
Belgacom by Ameritech International, 
Tele Danmark and the Singapore 
Telecom; although the companies will 
compete on the European-wide markets 
which should follow liberalisation, 
scheduled before the beginning of 1998 
by the Commission, they will be faced 
with strong competitors such as BT, 
France Telecom and Deutsche 
Telekom. Finally the Commission 
cleared the setting-up of a joint 
venture, 'Hermes', to create a pan-
European telecommunications network 
combining the telecommunications 
expertise of the American company 
GTS with the infrastructure of 
European national railway companies. 
ARTICLE 66 ECSC 
Raab Karcher Kohle GmbH / 
Ruhrkohle Handel GmbH. 
After an in-depth investigation of the 
effects of the concentration in the 
markets for the sale of hard coal and 
hard coal products in Germany the 
Commission approved the proposed 
acquisition of all capital and voting 
rights in Raab Karcher Kohle GmbH 
by Ruhrkohle Handel GmbH. 
Ruhrkohle Handel GmbH is a 
subsidiary of Ruhrkohle AG and is 
mainly active in the trade in solid fuels 
(hard coal, hard coal briquette, coal 
coke and brown coal). Accounting for 
over 80 % of domestic hard coal 
production, Ruhrkohle is by far the 
largest German mining company. Raab 
Karcher Kohle GmbH groups together 
the coal trading activities of Raab 
Karcher AG, a member of the VEBA 
group. 
The concentration affects the sale of 
hard coal to the electricity-generating 
industry, steelmakers as well as other 
industrial users, in particular in the 
cement, chalk and paper industry. In the 
past the German market for the sale of 
hard coal coal was characterized, in 
relation to the two main user groups of 
generators and steelmakers, by 
extensive price regulations and 
purchasing commitments according to 
the "Jahrhundertvertrag" and the 
"Hüttenvertrag". From 1996 the 
generators are not obliged any more to 
purchase certain minimum quantities of 
German hard coal but can demand 
imported hard coal. Nevertheless, in the 
next few years the market will open up 
only for a limited extent for imported 
coal. 
As a result of the concentration the 
market share of Ruhrkohle with the sale 
of hard coal to the electricity-generating 
industry increases to about 73 %. This 
sizeable market share is predominantly 
based on price-regulated direct supplies 
of Ruhrkohle to generators according to 
the "Jahrhundertvertrag". Since 
Ruhrkohle has no real scope of price 
setting here, this market share does not 
reflect real market power. Through the 
acquisition Ruhrkohle will improve its 
access to imported coal. However, on the 
basis of the limited importance of Raab 
Karcher as an importer and on the basis 
of the diminishing importance of 
merchants in the import of coal it will 
not gain any major advantage regarding 
the import of coal. 
Regarding the sale of hard coal to 
steelmakers Ruhrkohle has a market 
share of about 78 %, which wll be 
increased very slightly. This sizeable 
market share is based on predominantly 
price-regulated direct supplies of 
Ruhrkohle to steelmakers according to 
the "Hüttenvertrag" and does not reflect 
real market power. 
In the case of the sale of hard coal to 
other industrial users Ruhrkohle has a 
market share of about 38 %. Because 
these users are geographically dispersed 
and the volume of their purchase 
generally is small they depend on coal 
merchants active in Germany. However, 
with Stinnes, RTE, Rheinbraun and a 
number of smaller traders there will still 
be a sufficient number of alternative 
sources of supply. 
On the basis of the results of the 
investigation the Commission decided 
that the concentration fulfils the criteria 
for the protection of competition 
according to Article 66 paragraph 2 of 
the ECSC-Treaty. In view of the degree 
of concentration achieved and the high 
level of state coal subsidies, the 
Commission will carefully monitor 
future developments within this 
industry. ■ 
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Press releases 
The full texts of Commission's Press 
releases are available on-line from the 
RAPID database, on the day of their 
publication by the Commission's 
Spokesman's Service. To obtain 
access to RAPID, please write to 
EUR-OP Information, Marketing and 
Public Relations (OP/4B) 
2 rue Mercier L-2985 Luxembourg 
tel. +352 2929 42455, 
fax +352 2929 42763 
IP/96/14 : THE COMMISSION 
CLEARS A JOINT VENTURE 
BETWEEN ERICSSON AND ASCOM 
[96/01/09] 
IP/96/40 : THE COMMISSION 
CLEARS THE JOINT VENTURE OF 
SKANSKA FASTIGHETER AB AND 
SECURUM FORVALTNING AB IN 
THE FIELD OF HOTEL BUSINESSES 
IN SWEDEN [96/01/121 
IP/96/41 : THE COMMISSION 
APPROVES A JOINT VENTURE 
CREATED BETWEEN VEBA AND 
CIBA­GEIGY IN CHEMICAL 
PRODUCTS USED IN THE LEATHER 
AND PELT INDUSTRY [96/01/12] 
IP/96/48 : AFTER SUBSTANTIAL 
MODIFICATIONS, THE 
COMMISSION FINALLY GIVES THE 
GREEN LIGHT TO THE MERGER 
BETWEEN KIMBERLY­CLARK AND 
SCOTT PAPER [96/01/16] 
IP/96/97 : COMPANY MERGERS: 
THE COMMISSION LAUNCHES A 
WIDE RANGING DEBATE TO 
ADAPT THE REGULATORY 
FRAMEWORK TO THE REALITIES 
OF THE SINGLE MARKET [96/01/31] 
IP/96/110 : COMMISSION CLEARS 
THE CREATION OF A JOINT 
VENTURE BETWEEN NOKIA AND 
AUTOLIV [96/02/06] 
IP/96/129 : COMMISSION CLEARS 
THE ACQUISITION BY AT&T OF 
CERTAIN BUSINESS UNITS OF 
PHILIPS IN THE 
TELECOMMUNICATIONS 
EQUIPMENT SECTOR [96/02/07] 
IP/96/133 : COMMISSION CLEARS 
RAIL TECHNOLOGY JOINT 
VENTURE BETWEEN SIEMENS 
AND LAGARDERE [96/02/09] 
IP/96/138 : THE COMMISSION 
APPROVES THE ACQUISITION OF 
LANDIS AND GYR BY 
ELEKTRO WATT [96/02/13] 
IP/96/139 : THE COMMISSION 
APPROVES THE CREATION OF A 
JOINT VENTURE BETWEEN BP 
AND SONATRACH [96/02/13] 
IP/96/152 : COMMISSION CLEARS 
THE CREATION OF A JOINT 
VENTURE BETWEEN SKF AND INA 
[96/02/20] 
IP/96/163 : THE COMMISSION 
APPROVES THE DOW/DUPONT 
ELASTOMER JOINT VENTURE 
[96/02/22] 
IP/96/182 : COMMISSION 
AUTHORIZES THE ACQUISITION 
OF RAAB KARCHER KOHLE GMBH 
BY RUHRKOHLE HANDEL GMBH. 
[96/02/28] 
IP/96/192 : COMMISSION APPROVES 
STRATEGIC INVESTMENT IN 
BELGACOM [96/02/29] 
IP/96/199 : COMMISSION CLEARS 
THE CREATION OF A JOINT 
VENTURE BETWEEN 
WIENERBERGER AND STARCK 
[96/03/051 
IP/96/236 : COMMISSION APPROVES 
TAKEOVER BY PREUSSAG OF 
ELCO LOOSER [96/03/19] 
IP/96/251 : THE COMMISSION 
APPROVES TAKEOVER BY 
PHOENIX OF COMIFAR. [96/03/22] 
IP/96/252 : COMMISSION APPROVES 
ACQUISITION OF VALOIS 
INDUSTRIES BY TEXTRON [96/03/22] 
IP/96/253 : COMMISSION CLEARS 
THE ACQUISITION OF PART OF THE 
DIVERSEY CO. BY UNILEVER PLC 
[96/03/22] 
IP/96/254 : COMMISSION REFERS 
THE GEHE/LLOYDS CASE TO THE 
UNITED KINGDOM FOR FURTHER 
INVESTIGATION [96/03/22] 
IP/96/276 : THE COMMISSION 
CLEARS THE JOINT VENTURE OF 
VIACOM AND BEAR STEARNS 
[96/03/28] 
IP/96/277 : THE COMMISSION 
CLEARS DEAL BY WHICH 
LOCKHEED MARTIN WILL 
ACQUIRE SOLE CONTROL OF 
LORAL [96/03/28] 
Judgements 
Extracts are published in the weekly 
publication " Les activités de la Cour 
de Justice et du Tribunal de Première 
Instance des Communautés 
Européennes", available on-line from 
the RAPID database, a few days after 
its publication by the Court. 
Arrêt de la Cour du 11/1/96: Aff. 
C-480/93 Ρ Zunis Holding SA e.a. / 
Commission des Communautés 
européennes;'Pourvoi -
Concurrence - Contrôle des 
opérations de concentration -
Recevabilité du recours en 
annulation formé contre une 
décision refusant de rouvrir la 
procédure'; (Cinquième chambre) ■ 
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Application of Article 90 EC 
Main developments between 1st January and 31st March 1996 
Most important recent 
developments 
the effects of full network competition 
are felt. However, the rapidly 
decreasing price of competitive mobile 
services will set an effective ceiling 
for the wire based local tariffs. 
COMMISSION FORMALLY 
ADOPTS DIRECTIVE ACCELE-
RATING COMPETITION IN EU 
MOBILE AND PERSONAL 
COMMUNICATIONS MARKET 
The Commission has today formally 
adopted the Article 90 directive, put 
forward by Commissioner Van Miert 
in cooperation with Commissioner 
Bangemann, opening the EU mobile 
and personal communications market 
to full competition. 
The directive is based on the 
discussion process launched last year 
by the Green Paper on Mobile and 
Personal Communications. It requires 
Member States to abolish all 
exclusive and special rights in the 
area of mobile communications and, 
wherever this has not yet been 
achieved, to establish open and fair 
licensing procedures to authorise the 
launch of the digital services GSM, 
DCS 1800 and DECT. This includes 
lifting the restrictions on current 
licensees for one of these frequencies 
from applying to extend their services 
into the others. The directive 
stipulates that Member States must 
cease to restrict the combination of 
the mobile technologies or systems, in 
particular where multistandard 
equipment is available, while also 
taking into account the benefit of 
ensuring effective competition 
between operators in the relevant 
markets by allowing new entrants 
gain a foothold. 
The directive also removes all 
existing restrictions on use of 
facilities for mobile networks, 
allowing new mobile operators to 
make full use of their own 
infrastructure as well as that provided 
by third parties such as utilities' 
networks. Use of infrastructure other 
than those controlled by the 
incumbent télécoms operator is 
essential to the success of new 
entrants to the mobile market as it 
gives them much greater control over 
their cost base. Leasing capacity 
currently represents a cost factor for 
second operators of between 30 and 
50%. The right to set up their own 
networks and choose alternative 
infrastructure and connections also 
gives mobile operators significantly 
more flexibility representing an strong 
push towards further development and 
innovation in the mobile market. 
Greater efficency and choice bought 
about by competition in the mobile 
market is particularly important in the 
run up to 1998 full télécoms 
liberalisation as it will dampen the 
potential for increases in (fixed) local 
charges to the consumer. The 
increasingly commercial incumbent 
(fixed link) operations are now set to 
position themselves to make the most 
of their local loop monopoly before 
The Commission will be paying close 
attention to price adjustments in the 
télécoms sector between now and 1998 
in order to secure the maximum 
benefits of liberalisation for consumers 
across the EU. 
Time Table 
The mobile directive will enter into 
force twenty days after publication in 
the Official Journal of the EC which is 
expected within the next ten days. The 
Member States then have nine months 
to notify the Commission of the 
appropriate national measures taken to 
implement its provisions. 
From the moment the directive enters 
into force, in addition to what has 
already been achieved in opening up 
the GSM licensing process across the 
Union, Member States must open 
licence allocation procedures for all 
public access/Telepoint applications, 
including systems operating on the 
basis of the DECT standard. 
By January 1, 1998, at the latest the 
Member States must also have opened 
up the licencing of mobile systems 
according to the DCS 1800 standard. 
Restrictions on infrastructure and 
direct interconnection for mobile 
communications must be abolished 
immediately. However, Member States 
with less developed networks may 
apply for derogations of up to five 
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years to take account of their specific 
situations. This concerns Portugal, 
Greece, Spain and Ireland. 
Some figures about the Mobile 
Market 
With adoption of these measures the 
European Union has now taken the 
lead in setting the right regulatory 
conditions for encouraging the 
development of mobile and personal 
communications into a vast mass 
market. The directive means that the 
EU market will be the first region in 
the world to enjoy the combination of 
liberalisation of services and 
networks, together with the 
deployment of harmonised, leading 
edge, digital standards over such a 
large area. The standards confirmed 
for the EU are GSM, DCS 1800 (the 
two frequencies available for digital 
mobile services) and DECT (for 
digital cordless telephony within a 
fixed radius). This both reflects and 
further establishes the global 
momentum behind the take up of this 
technology for the second generation 
digital mobile systems. The wireless 
market is now set to become a core 
component of the information society 
and the development of true person to 
person communications. 
The mobile sector is by far the most 
dynamic in the télécoms market in the 
EU experiencing levels of growth of 
over 60%. In the last year the number 
of cellular subscribers in Europe has 
grown from around 12 million to over 
20 million, clearly outstripping 
growth in numbers of fixed 
subscribers. The vast majority of the 
new mobile customers are enjoying 
digital services, particularly GSM, 
which allows them to roam 
throughout Europe with the same 
handset and is also much more 
efficient concerning use of the 
frequency spectrum. 
On top of very substantial analogue 
networks in countries such as the UK, 
Italy and Scandinavia, the growth 
potential of GSM is now also evident 
in nearly all the Member States. In 
France, for example, GSM subscribers 
grew from around 337 000 to around 
797 000 over the past year. In 
Belgium there were around 53 000 
GSM subscribers at the end of 1994 
and there are now nearly 146 000. 
Italy saw growth over the same period 
from 45 000 in 1994 to 170 000 in 
October 1995. Germany still remains 
by far the most important market with 
almost three and a half million users, 
of which over two and a half million 
are now on the GSM network. 
However progress in countries with 
less developed networks is also 
notable. Over the last 12 months 
GSM subscribers in Greece increased 
from 125 000 to 255 000, and in 
Portugal, from 122 000 to 241 000. 
The Scandinavian countries are now 
also experiencing massive growth in 
take up of GSM. Most impressive is 
Sweden where the GSM market has 
grown from around 200 000 to 905 
000 over the past year. 
In total, Commission studies predict 
38 million cellular mobile users in 
Europe by the year 2000 and around 
80 million by 2010. 
The Market growth and lower prices 
brought about by introducing 
competition into these markets will 
effect all sorts of users: residential, 
both young singles as well as 
families, and elderly or disabled 
people who benefit from a cordless 
phone; small and medium sized 
businesses benefitting from the 
organisational flexibility implied by 
the cordless office, and international 
business travellers benefitting from 
cross border GSM roaming. 
[IP/96/51] 
Press releases 
The full texts of Commission's Press 
releases are available on-line from the 
RAPID database, on the day of their 
publication by the Commission's 
Spokesman's Service. To obtain 
access to RAPID, please write to EUR-
OP Information, Marketing and 
Public Relations (OP/4B) 
2 rue Mercier L-2985 Luxembourg 
tel. +352 2929 42455, 
fax +352 2929 42763 
IP/96/183 ¡COMMISSION 
ACCELERATES LIBERALISATION IN 
TELECOMS SECTOR WHILE 
EMPHASISING THE IMPORTANCE 
OF UNIVERSAL SERVICE [96/02/29] 
IP/96/205 : THE COMMISSION 
ACCEPTS PROPOSAL FROM DANISH 
GOVERNMENT TO SOLVE 
COMPETITION PROBLEM IN THE 
PORT OF ELSINORE [96/03/06] 
IP/96/211 : COMMISSION APPROVES 
CREATION OF PAN­EUROPEAN 
TELECOMMUNICATIONS NETWORK 
[96/03/08] 
IP/96/218 : COMMUNICATION ON 
THE FUTURE DEVELOPMENT OF 
THE UNIVERSAL SERVICE IN THE 
EUROPEAN UNION [96/03/13] ■ 
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Main developments between 1st January and 31st March 1996 
Summary of the most important 
recent developments 
by Henrik MØRCH, DG IV-G-1 
THE COMMISSION ADOPTS 
NEW "DE MINIMIS" RULE 
In 1992 the Commission set out its 
policy on state aid for small and 
medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) in 
Community guidelines (OJ C 213 of 
19.8.1992). In an effort to reduce the 
administrative burden on the Member 
States and on the Commission itself -
which ought to be left to concentrate 
its resources on matters of real 
importance to competition policy 
within the Community - the 
Commission decided to introduce ade 
minimis facility in the SME 
guidelines which provided that aid not 
exceeding ECU 50 000 per firm over 
three years for a given broad type of 
expenditure need not be notified to 
the Commission under Article 93(3) 
of the EC Treaty. The Commission 
considers that aid in such small 
amounts is unlikely to have a 
perceptible impact on trade and 
competition between Member States 
within the meaning of Article 92(1). 
In 1993 DG IV sent a note to all 
Member States on the use of the de 
minimis facility which clarified a 
number of outstanding issues, in 
particular that: 
- under the de minimis facility each 
firm may receive aid of ECU 50 000 
over three years for two categories of 
expenditure, i.e. investment of any 
kind and for whatever purpose except 
R&D and other expenditure. Hence, a 
given firm could receive a maximum 
of ECU 100 000 of aid under the two 
categories over a three-year period. 
- in respect of cumulation between aid 
under the de minimis facility and aid 
under an authorized scheme falling 
within the same category, the de 
minimis and authorized aid combined 
must not exceed the maximum award 
authorized by the Commission for the 
notified scheme if this is above ECU 
50 000. 
It has since become clear that the de 
minimis facility as outlined above 
does not cover some aid measures 
which clearly are not capable of 
distorting competition and affecting 
trade between Member States to any 
perceptible degree. Moreover, it has 
proved difficult to establish that the 
conditions laid down are being met, in 
particular where aid of this kind is 
combined with aid under other 
schemes approved by the 
Commission. 
Thus, in January the Commission 
adopted a revised de minimis rule in 
the form of a separate Commission 
Notice (OJ C 68 of 6.3.1996) the 
purpose of which is to make it clearer 
that, although SMEs may be the most 
frequent beneficiaries, the rule applies 
to enterprises of any size. Thus, the 
new de minimis rule which replaces 
the de minimis facility in the SME 
Guidelines as outlined above. The 
primary objective of the revised de 
minimis rule is one of simplification, 
so to make it more comprehensible 
and to facilitate the use of the rule by 
national authorities. The de minimis 
rule is amended as follows: 
- the ceiling for aid covered by the de 
minimis rule will now be ECU 100 
000 over a three-year period 
irrespective of the type of expenditure. 
In other words, the previous distinction 
between two categories of expenditure, 
i.e. investment and other expenditure 
for which ECU 50 000 may be 
granted, has been abandoned; 
-the ceiling of ECU 100 000 will 
apply to the total of all public 
assistance considered to be de minimis 
aid and will not affect the possibility 
of the recipient firm obtaining other 
aid under schemes approved by the 
Commission. In other words, the rule 
concerning cumulation of de minimis 
aid and aid under approved scheme is 
no longer necessary. 
- export aid is explicitly excluded from 
the benefit of the de minimis rule and 
still need to be notified to the 
Commission. The revised de minimis 
rule provides a definition of export aid. 
- the de minimis rule will also apply in 
certain sectors with specific rules on 
state aid, i.e. the synthetic fibres 
sector, the textile sector and the motor-
vehicle sector. However, as for the 
previous rule, it does not apply to the 
transport, agriculture, fishery and 
ECSC sectors. 
Competition Policy Newsletter ***** * * 
* * ** ** *** 
( ^ 
Volume 2 Number 1 Spring 1996 33 
> STATE AID 
THE COMMISSION ADOPTS 
NEW SME GUIDELINES 
The Community guidelines on state 
aid to small and medium-sized 
enterprises (SMEs), adopted by the 
Commission in 1992 (OJ C 213 of 
19.8.1992) provide that before the 
end of the three-year period 
following their publication the 
Commission will review the 
operation of the guidelines. The 
revision of the SME guidelines is 
now completed and has led the 
Commission to introduce certain 
modifications to the guidelines while 
maintaining the overall favourable 
position towards aid to SMEs. Thus, 
the Commission continues to 
acknowledge the important 
contribution of SMEs in terms of job 
creation, innovation and economic 
development on the one hand and the 
difficulties SMEs have in raising 
capital and their insufficient access to 
information on the other hand. The 
revised SME guidelines contain the 
following important amendments the 
purpose of which are primarily to 
make the guidelines more clear and 
coherent with other Community 
policy objectives and to facilitate 
their application: 
- in respect of the definition of SMEs 
the new guidelines refer to the new 
common definition of SMEs in the 
Commission's recommendation of 7 
February 1996 (IP/96/121 of 
8.2.1996). This means that in the new 
guidelines the financial tresholds are 
being increased so that an SME may 
have a turnover up to ECU 40 
million (ECU 20 million before) and 
a balance sheet of ECU 27 million 
(ECU 10 million before). The max. 
number of employees of 250 remains 
unchanged. 
In respect of small enterprises the 
turnover may not exceed ECU 7 
million (ECU 5 million before) and 
the balance sheet may go up to ECU 
5 million (ECU 2 million before). 
- the most important amendment is 
concerned with the clarification and 
extension of the type of investment 
eligible for investment aid under the 
guidelines. 
The SME guidelines from 1992 do 
not define which type of investment 
is eligible for investment aid and 
until now the Commission has 
applied the regional aid rules 
applicable to investment aid which 
stipulate that investment in fixed 
assets only is eligible for investment 
aid. To clarify and confirm this 
approach the new guidelines 
incorporate the Commission's 
definition of investment in fixed 
assets as laid down in the Principles 
of coordination principles of regional 
aid systems (OJ C 31 of 3.2.1979). It 
follows from this definition that the 
investment must be in land, buildings 
or equipment in the context of the 
setting-up of a new business, the 
extension of an existing business or 
in engaging in an activity which 
involves a fundamental change of the 
product or the production process of 
an existing business. The definition 
also covers investment in fixed assets 
by way of takeover of an 
establishment which has closed or 
would have closed had such takeover 
not taken place. 
The Commission's White Paper on 
"Growth, competitiveness and 
employment" stresses the importance 
of promoting immaterial investment 
as an instrument to boost the global 
competitiveness of European industry 
and calls for an elimination of the 
current discrimination in favour of 
material investment. Under the new 
SME guidelines the Commission will 
allow aid for immaterial investment in 
the form of transfer of technology 
from research institutes or other 
enterprises to SMEs. The aid intensity 
will be similar to that allowed for 
material investment, i.e. 7.5% -15% 
outside regional assisted areas and an 
additional 10-15% on top of the aid 
intensity allowed for bigger firms in 
assisted areas, and will be calculated 
on the basis of the costs of acquiring 
patent rights, licences or other 
intellectual property rights in respect 
of a given technology/process. 
- the Commission decided to maintain 
the criteria adopted in the existing 
SME guidelines in respect of aid to 
encourage SMEs to use consultants 
and provide training for their 
employees. This type of aid may 
benefit from an aid intensity of 50%. 
However, in the new guidelines the 
Commission considered it to be 
appropriate to stress that this type of 
aid will not be accepted on a 
continous or repetitive basis and may 
not contribute to cover the costs of 
consultancy forming part of any 
firm's normal operating costs, such as 
consultancy on legal or fiscal issues. 
- the de minimis rule in the existing 
SME guidelines does not form part of 
the new guidelines but is made into a 
separate Commission Notice, see 
above. 
THE COMMISSION ADOPTS 
NEW CODE ON AID TO THE 
SYNTHETIC FIBRES 
INDUSTRY 
In 1977, in recognition of the low 
average rate of capacity utilisation for 
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the production of synthetic fibres and 
yarns, the consequent job losses and 
the risk that further aid would 
exacerbate the situation and distort 
competition, the Commission adopted 
a Code on aid to the synthetic fibres 
industry imposing supplementary 
control on aid to producers of certain 
fibres and yarns. 
The validity of the current Code 
expired on 31.3.1996 and therefore in 
1995 the Commission commissioned 
an independent firm of specialist 
consultants to undertake a first study 
on the efficacity of the Code and the 
arguments for an against continuing 
to control such aid and a second 
study on the future control of aid to 
this industry. In the light of the 
consultants conclusions the 
Commission considers that the Code 
has been an effective industrial and 
competition policy tool in the past 
and that to avoid a severe disruption 
of competition in the capital-intensive 
synthetic fibres industry, in particular 
in those sectors still characterized by 
structural overcapacity, the 
Commission should continue to 
impose supplementary control on aid 
to that industry. However, as the 
consultants reports on the existing 
Code identified ways in which the 
control of state aid to the synthetic 
fibres industry could be refined, the 
Commission decided that it should 
continue to excercise control through 
the introduction of new industry-
specific measures rather than by a 
further extension of the period of 
validity of the current Code. 
In January the Commission adopted 
the new Code on aid to the synthetic 
fibres industry (OJ C 94 of 
30.3.1996) which modifies the Code 
in force until 31.3.1996 as follows: 
The scope of control 
The previous Code encompassed all 
categories of aid, with the exception 
of aid coming within the scope of the 
Community Guidelines on state aid 
for environmental protection and the 
Community Framework for state aid 
for research and development. In 
addition to these two exceptions the 
new Code excludes from its scope of 
control aid for vocational 
training/retraining awarded under 
schemes approved by the 
Commission. 
The new Code clarifies the scope of 
its application in respect of industrial 
processes in stressing that the scope 
of control should not encompass aid 
in support of processess upstream of 
polymerization and certain activities 
downstream of extrusion / texturi-
zation. 
The notification requirement 
Under the previous Code, Member 
States were obliged to notify any 
plan to grant aid in whatever form to 
the synthetic fibres producers by way 
of support for such activities. 
Under the new Code the de minimis 
rule also applies to the synthetic 
fibres industry and Member States 
will no longer be obliged to notify 
aid awards to firms in the synthetic 
fibres industry not exceeding ECU 
100 000 over a three-year period (for 
more details on the de minimis rule, 
see above). Moreover, Member States 
will no longer be required to notify 
the categories of aid which are 
specificly excluded from the scope of 
the new Code, see above. 
When proposals were notified under 
the previous Code in accordance with 
the standard format, the Commission 
was generally obliged to ask a number 
of additional questions some of which 
arose out of the specific features of 
the case but some of which were 
asked in all cases. These additional 
questions invariably extended the 
period required for the initial 
assessment and in order to reduce the 
administrative burden and accelerate 
the assessments the new Code 
introduces a supplement to the 
standard format for notification of aid 
proposals requiring Member States to 
supply certain additional information 
on the aid recipient(s) and the purpose 
of the aided investments. 
Methodology and authorization 
criteria 
The new Code introduces a 
methodology for the assessment of aid 
to synthetic fibres producers and a set 
of authorization criteria. 
In assessing the compatibility of aid 
coming within the scope of the new 
Code, the fundamental consideration 
is the effect of that aid on the markets 
for the relevant products, i.e. the 
fibres/yarn whose production would 
be supported by the aid. Thus, the 
Commission will examine the state of 
the relevant market, the effect that the 
aid would have on the production 
capacity of the relevant products of 
the recipient firm and the 
innovativeness of the relevant 
products. 
It is important to note that the 
authorization of aid will still be 
dependent on a significant reduction 
in the relevant capacity except where 
there is evidence of a structural 
shortage of supply. The new Code 
includes a non-exhaustive list of 
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factual evidence the Commission will 
consider when assessing whether the 
reduction in capacity would be 
"significant". 
Irrespective of the effect of the aid 
on the relevant market the Code 
provides for a limitation of the 
intensity of the aid. However, in line 
with the SME Guidelines SMEs will 
be able to receive aid at a higher 
intensity than larger firms and at an 
even higher rate if it would support 
the production of an innovative 
product. 
PROPOSAL FOR A NEW 
STEEL AIDS CODE 
In a Communication of March this 
year the Commission proposes to the 
Council of Ministers to give its 
unanimous assent pursuant to Article 
95 of the ECSC Treaty to the 
adoption of a new Steel Aids Code to 
replace the current fifth Steel Aids 
Code which will expire by the end of 
1996. 
The purpose of the new Steel Aids 
Code will be to ensure fair 
competition in the ECSC steel 
industry up until the expiry of the 
ECSC Treaty in the year 2002. The 
proposal is to renew the rules of the 
current Code, however with the 
exemption of its Article 5 covering 
regional investment aid for certain 
regions of the Community. 
The Commission proposal for a new 
Steel Aids Code shall be seen in the 
light of its intention to provide an 
equal footing of the Community steel 
industry with other industries in 
respect of awards of certain types of 
aid. Thus, under the proposed new 
Code the provisions on aid for 
research and development and aid for 
environmental protection refer 
explicitly to the Community 
framework on aid for R&D and the 
Community guidelines on aid for 
environmental protection, including 
any subsequent amendments to these 
rules. Hereby, an equal treatment of 
the steel industry under the two 
framework/guidelines would be 
ensured. 
Similarly, the proposed new Code 
intends to bring the procedural rules 
applicable to the steel industry in line 
with those under Articles 92-94 of 
the Treaty. The proposed provisions 
in the new Code stipulate therefore 
that the Commission's power to order 
the suspension of the payment of 
non-notified aid pending the outcome 
of its examination of that aid, (see 
Judgment of the European Court of 
Justice in the "Boussac" - C 301/87 
of 14.3.1990, ECR 1990 I 307), and 
the Commission's power in certain 
cases to adopt a provisional decision 
ordering the reimbursement of non-
notified aid pending the outcome of 
its examination of that aid (see 
Commission Communication to 
Member States in OJ C 156 of 
22.6.1995), also apply in cases of 
non-notified aid to a steel 
undertaking under the ECSC Treaty. 
The provisions concerning aid for 
closure are proposed to be maintained 
in order to promote further adaptation 
of the capacity of the Community 
steel industry. However, it is 
proposed also to allow closure aid for 
undertakings which are part of a 
g roup with d i f ferent s teel 
undertakings provided that the group 
does not increase its ECSC capacity 
for a period of five years. 
Press releases 
The full texts of Commission's 
Press releases are available on-
line from the RAPID database, on 
the day of their publication by the 
Commission's Spokesman's 
Service. To obtain access to 
RAPID, please write to EUR-OP 
Information, Marketing and 
Public Relations (OP/4B) 2 rue 
Mercier L-2985 Luxembourg 
tel. +352 2929 42455, fax +352 
2929 42763 
IP/96/50 : COMMISSION DECIDES TO 
TOUGHEN CONTROL ON STATE 
AID TO SECTORS OF THE 
SYNTHETIC FIBRES INDUSTRY IN 
OVERCAPACITY [96/01/16] 
IP/96/80 : COMMISSION APPROVES 
PLAN TO RESTRUCTURE 
COMPTOIR DES ENTREPRENEURS 
[96/01/24] 
IP/96/81 : COMMISSION AMENDS DE 
MINIMIS RULE IN ORDER TO 
SIMPLIFY NOTIFICATION 
PROCEDURES FOR STATE AID 
SCHEMES OF MINOR IMPORTANCE 
[96/01/24] 
IP/96/102 : COMMISSION 
AUTHORIZES CAPITAL INCREASE 
IN THE SPANISH AIRLINE IBERIA 
ON COMME-RCIAL GROUNDS 
[96/01/31] 
IP/96/111 : MEASURES IN SUPPORT 
OF COLLECTIVE GUARANTEES IN 
THE AGRICULTURE AND AGRO-
INDUSTRY SECTORS [96/02/07] 
IP/96/112 : MEASURES TO ASSIST 
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT IN 
MOUNTAIN AREAS [96/02/07] 
IP/96/114 : AGRI-MONETARY 
COMPENSATION AID [96/02/07] 
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IP/96/115 : STATE AIDS FOR 
FISHERIES IN THE UNITED 
KINGDOM AND SPAIN [96/02/07] 
IP/96/224 : MEASURES TO ASSIST 
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT IN 
MOUNTAIN AREAS [96/03/14] 
MOTOR COMPANY IN SUPPORT OF 
AN INVESTMENT PROJECT IN 
BIRMINGHAM [96/03/271 
IP/96/123 : COMMISSION 
AUTHORISES AID TO THE SALE OF 
IRISH STEEL TO ISPAT 
INTERNATIONAL [96/02/07] 
IP/96/125 : STATE AID - SPAIN -
COMMISSION ACCEPTS REGIONAL 
AID SCHEME GRANTED TO 
SPANISH SUBSIDIARY OF FINNISH 
OUTOKUMPU COPPER GROUP 
[96/02/07] 
IP/96/126 : AIDE D'ETAT - FRANCE 
ENQUETE DETAILLEE DE LA 
COMMISSION SUR UN 
INVESTISSEMENT DE 
SAAB-SCANIA A ANGERS [96/02/07] 
IP/96/159 : COMMISSION APPROVES 
INSTALLATION OF A GUARANTEE 
SCHEME FOR THE SHIPBUILDING 
SECTOR IN THE GERMAN LAND 
MECKLENBURG-VORPOMMERN 
[96/02/22] 
IP/96/160 : COMMISSION RAISES NO 
OBJECTIONS TO THE GRANT OF 
FRENCH GOVERNMENT AID FOR 
A EUREKA R&D PROJECT 
INVOLVING RENAULT AND 
SOLLAC [96/02/22] 
IP/96/161 : COMMISSION TAKES 
FINAL DECISION ON AID TO 
FRENCH MANUFACTURER OF 
PULP FOR PAPER INDUSTRY 
[96/02/22] 
IP/96/162 : AUSTRIA: COMMISSION 
OPENS PROCEDURE IN RESPECT 
OF AID FOR HOFFMANN-LA 
ROCHE FOR THE ORLISTAT 
PROJECT [96/02/22] 
IP/96/223 : MEASURES TO ASSIST 
SMES (SMALL & MEDIUM-SIZED 
ENTERPRISES) IN THE 
AGRICULTURAL SECTOR [96/03/14] 
IP/96/225 : AID FOR THE 
ACQUISITION OF SUGAR BEET 
DELIVERY POINTS [96/03/14] 
IP/96/226 : STATE AIDS : 
COMMISSION DECISIONS -
STRASBOURG, 13TH MARCH 1996 
[96/03/14] 
IP/96/238 : COMMISSION 
AUTHORISES AID TO DUTCH 
MARITIME SECTOR [96/03/21] 
IP/96/247 : THE COMMISSION 
AUTHORIZES A TOTAL OF #378 
MILLION IN AID TO THE UNITED 
KINGDOM COAL INDUSTRY 
[96/03/21] 
IP/96/248 : STATE AID FOR 
IPARLAT AND GRUPO LÁCTEO 
GALLEGO (GLG) [96/03/21] 
IP/96/249 : COMMISSION ADOPTS 
NEW GUIDELINES ON STATE AID 
FOR SMALL AND MEDIUM-SIZED 
ENTERPRISES (SMES) [96/03/21] 
IP/96/250 : THE COMMISSION 
DECIDED TO RAISE NO 
OBJECTIONS TO AN AID PROJECT. 
BY SPAIN, TO SUZUKI 
MANUFACTURING [96/03/21] 
IP/96/267 : STATE AID: FRANCE: 
COMMISSION AGREES TO "PACTE 
POUR LA VILLE" [96/03/27] 
IP/96/268 : STATE AID - ITALY -
COMMISSION DECIDES TO 
TERMINATE PROCEEDINGS 
CONCERNING ALUMIX [96/03/27] 
IP/96/269 : STATE AID - BELGIUM: 
THE MARIBEL CASE [96/03/27] 
IP/96/270 : COMMISSION APPROVES 
AID TO JAGUAR CARS AND FORD 
IP/96/274 : COMMISSION RAISES NO 
OBJECTION TO THIRD TRANCHE OF 
STATE AID TO TAP [96/03/27] 
Judgements 
Extracts are published in the weekly 
publication " Les activités de la Cour 
de Justice et du Tribunal de Première 
Instance des Communautés 
Européennes", available on-line from 
the RAPID database, a few days after 
its publication by the Court. 
Arrêt de la Cour du 29 février 
1996: Aff. C-122/94: 
Commission des Communautés 
européennes / Conseil de 
l'Union européenne; 'Politique 
agricole commune - Aide 
d'Etat'; (Cour plénière) 
Arrêt de la Cour du 29 février 
1996: Aff. C-56/93: Royaume de 
Belgique / Commission des 
Communautés européennes; 
'Aides d'Etat - Système 
tarifaire préférentiel pour les 
livraisons de gaz naturel aux 
producteurs néerlandais 
d'engrais azotés'; (Cinquième 
chambre) 
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Main developments between 1st January and 31st March 1996 
Summary of the most important 
recent developments 
by Steffan DEPYPERE, Thinam JAKOB, Brona CARTON and 
Y. SCARAMOZZINO, DG IV-A-3 
CENTRAL and EASTERN 
EUROPEAN COUNTRIES, 
BALTIC STATES, NEW 
INDEPENDENT STATES 
During the first quarter, the essential 
activity was situated at the level of 
bilateral relations and the preparation 
of events that will take place during 
the second quarter. 
Bilateral activity 
In the framework of the Europe 
Agreements, parties can meet in 
Association Councils, Association 
Committees or in Subcommittees. 
Competition issues are prepared by 
the Subcommittees for competition 
matters (one subcommittee for each 
CEEC) that can meet as subcommittee 
A (to discuss antitrust matters) and 
subcommittee Β (to discuss state aid 
matters). On behalf of the Union it is 
the Commission (DG IV) that 
participates. On behalf of the 
associated country it is the relevant 
institution (e.g. an AMO for antitrust, 
or a Ministry of Finance for state aid). 
In the subcommittee all the "daily 
business" is discussed. The results of 
the subcommittees' work are then 
transmitted to the Association 
Committee for information or 
approval. 
During the first quarter subcommittee 
meetings were held with the Czech 
and the Slovak Republics and with 
Hungary. With the Baltic States no 
subcommittees exist as yet. It is for 
the Joint Committee (first meeting on 
1-3 April) to decide on the creation of 
formal working groups they would 
correspond to subcommittees under 
the Europe Agreements. However, for 
the moment the Europe Agreements 
with the Baltic States are not yet 
inforce, and the corresponding bodies 
under the existing Free Trade 
Agreements are the Joint Committee 
and Working Groups). Nevertheless, 
the competition authorities from the 
Baltic States and DG IV met in an 
informal working group in Brussels to 
prepare the further cooperation with 
respect to competition aspects. 
Slovak Republic 
The subcommittee with the Slovak 
Republic met in Bratislava on 1 
February to discuss both antitrust 
(Antimonopoly Office) and state aid 
(AMO and the Ministry of Finance). 
As regards antitrust the discussion 
points were the practical organisation 
once the implementing rules would be 
adopted by the Association Council. 
(In the meantime the Association 
Council of 27/02/96 did adopt the 
rules). On both sides, the operational 
services have to take care, when 
handling cases, to verify whether or 
not an important interest of the other 
party is involved. They have to be 
aware also of the possibilities that are 
offered by the IR in terms of exchange 
of information and positive or negative 
comity actions (reminder : a 
description of the rules was given in 
the Newsletter of summer 1994). The 
subcommittee further reviewed 
technical assistance actions. This TA, 
which is financed through PHARE, 
has been an important tool to develop 
the competition policy in the Slovak 
Republic. The nature of this TA can 
vary. It can cover issues such as 
legislative advice, case advice, 
training, material organisation etc. The 
TA is delivered by external 
consultants, mostly law offices. 
Both DG IV and the Antimonopoly 
office have been very satisfied with 
the quality of the assistance and the 
support given by PHARE. 
As regards State aid the proposed draft 
of the implementing rules was 
reviewed. Both sides agreed upon a 
final text at administrative level. On 
the Slovak side further decisions have 
to be taken as to the monitoring 
authority. 
As soon as this final element of the 
text is ready it can be submitted on 
both sides for further approval and 
final adoption by the Association 
Council. 
Czech Republic 
The relations between the Slovak and 
the Czech antitrust authorities are 
excellent. This has allowed DG IV and 
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the associated authorities to organise 
joint subcommittees. Which is why 
the subcommittee (antitrust) for the 
Czech Republic met in Bratislava as 
well on 1 February. As with the 
Slovak authority, DG IV discussed 
with the Czech Ministry for Economic 
Competition the implementing rules 
and their practical application. To be 
noted that the rules were approved by 
the Association Council of 
31/01/1996. 
The subcommittee for state aid did 
not meet. To be reported however on 
the state aid side that the 
implementing rules have been cleared 
by the relevant aid monitoring 
authorities on both sides (DG IV 
respectively Ministry of Finance) and 
that they are now going through the 
process of adoption by the 
Association Council (on the Union's 
side this implies i.a. consultations 
with the Council and the Parliament). 
HUNGARY 
The EU-Hungarian Sub-Committee 
for Competition met in Brussels on 21 
March 1996, and it was followed by 
the EU-Hungarian Association 
Committee on 22 March in Brussels. 
The Sub-Committee focused on 
various issues : 
Approximation of antitrust legislation: 
The Hungarian delegation was 
encouraged to move ahead quickly 
with their legislative work. The new 
draft law was discussed. The 
Hungarian side hopes it will be 
adopted early so that it can enter into 
force by 1 January 1997. 
Article 64 of the Europe Agreement: 
public undertakings and undertakings 
with special or exclusive rights. 
A discussion on the interpretation of 
Article 64 of the Europe Agreement 
with respect to the corresponding 
Article 90 of the EC Treaty has taken 
place. The Hungarian delegation 
underlined they were ready to comply 
with the requirements of Article 90. 
The Hungarian delegation has 
provided a detailed state of play of the 
liberalisation in energy sector, 
telecommunication sector, transport 
sector and postal sector. 
Implementing rules undertakings: The 
Implementing rules have been 
approved by the Hungarian side, and 
by the Community side (Commission, 
Council) and by the European 
Parliament in its plenary session of 19 
September 1995. They are currently 
being examined by EU/Hungarian 
legal revisors. The Community side 
stressed that the work should be 
speeded up so that the Association 
Council can adopt the rules as quickly 
as possible by way of the written 
procedure. 
Implementing rules state aid: The 
Hungarian government has now given 
its approval. The Hungarian Ministry 
of Finance has been appointed as the 
monitoring authority. The above-
mentioned process of consultation 
with the Council, Parliament, can now 
start. It will lead to an adoption by the 
Association Council. 
Baltic States 
A first informal Working Group on 
C o m p e t i t i o n c o n s i s t i n g of 
representatives of Estonia, Latvia and 
Lithuania has taken place in Brussels 
on 19 March 1996, in the perspective 
of preparing the Association 
Committees of 1-3 April 1996. Three 
issues were treated : 
Implementing Rules for undertakings: 
The proposed implementing rules for 
undertakings were discussed by the 
group. The Estonian Ministry of 
Finance has already expressed its 
approval of the proposed rules and has 
asked to launch the formal adoption 
process. The Latvian and the 
Lithuanian authorities are expected to 
follow quickly. 
Implementing Rules for state aids: The 
proposed implementing rules for state 
aid were also discussed by the group. 
The Estonian Ministry of Finance has 
already expressed its approval. Here, 
likewise, the other delegations could 
agree on the proposed rules. Formal 
approval is expected in the near future. 
Approximation of legislation: The 
delegations reported on the legislative 
developments in their countries. 
Slovenia 
The Europe Agreement with Slovenia 
is not yet in force. Nevertheless 
relations between DG IV and the 
Slovene Competition Protection 
Bureau are picking up. The Slovenian 
Minister responsible for competition 
matters visited DG IV at the end of 
last year and cooperation was 
launched. Preliminary discussions are 
taking place about the implementing 
rules for state aid and antitrust, as well 
as about establishing an overview of 
state monopolies and undertakings 
with special and exclusive rights in 
Slovenia. At the occasion of a 
conference organised by the 
Commission (DG IA) and the Slovene 
authorities, ground could be laid for 
bringing the relations between 
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Slovenia and DG IV upto the same level 
as with the other CEEC. 
Preparation of horizontal events 
As already mentioned in previous 
newsletters the bilateral activity is 
complemented more and more by 
horizontal events, involving more than 
one country. This is also in line with the 
tendency towards p lu r i l a te ra l 
cooperation in competition matters. In 
the CEEC, PHARE has supported this 
tendency in a flexible manner by 
making available a horizontal TA 
facility. Two activities have been 
prepared during the first quarter. A 
report on the results will follow in the 
next newsletter. 
Baltic Booster Conference 
Currently, the DG IV is finalising the 
Baltic Booster Conference in 
cooperation with the CEEC and certain 
Member States. This project, financed 
by PHARE, will consist of a workshop 
in each of the three Baltic States which 
will be followed by a joint conference 
in Riga. This conference takes place in 
the week of 9-12 April 1996. Its 
objective is to speed up work on 
competition issues in the Baltic States. 
Conference in Brno 
This is a successor to the conference 
held in Visegrad last year. This year the 
Baltic states and Slovenia will join the 
conference. It is a unique event in 
bringing together so many competition 
authorities (EU + 10 associated 
countries) both on antitrust and state 
aid. 
Accession strategy 
At present major efforts are made to 
prepare for the accession issue. This 
implies making an inventory of all 
outstanding questions and making the 
point on the level of approximation of 
legislation. A further report will be 
made in forthcoming issues of the 
newsletter. 
FOLLOW-UP TO REPORT OF 
GROUP OF EXPERTS ON 
COMPETITION POLICY IN THE 
NEW TRADE ORDER 
As reported in the last Newsletter, the 
Directors General of the Member State 
competition authorities, at their annual 
meeing of 17 October, established a 
working group to consider in more 
detail the technical aspects of some of 
the recommendations of the report of 
the group of experts on "Competition 
policy in the new trade order". 
That working group had its first meeting 
on 9 January, when an extensive work 
programme was set out. On the 
instructions of the Directors General, 
the working group will concentrate in 
particular on the reinforcement of 
positive comity and the exchange of 
confidential information in the 
framework of deeper bilateral 
cooperation. 
At its second meeting on 21 March, the 
group examined the legal rules within 
the Community and the Member States 
governing the exchange of information 
in competition cases. It also assessed 
the practical experience acquired so far 
in exchanging information both within 
the Community framework and between 
Member States or between the 
Community or its Member States and 
third countries. Working group 
participants looked at other sectors, 
such as securities, taxation, customs and 
criminal matters, where international 
agreements already provide for 
extensive sharing of information of a 
confidential nature. 
The role played by comity in the conduct 
of investigations was also evaluated and 
the manner in which the important 
interests of other countries should be 
taken into account in determining what 
measures are taken to resolve 
an t icompet i t ive behaviour was 
considered by the working group. 
With a clear view of what can be and is 
being done currently in the competition 
area, the working group will go on to 
consider at its next meeting the 
Community's needs in terms of greater 
information exchange and a more 
developed positive comity instrument. A 
final meeting will consider how the 
needs identified by the working group 
can be realized. 
The working group will report back to 
the Directors General at their next annual 
meeting in the autumn and on the basis 
of the discussion which is generated the 
Commission will consider what, if any, 
measures it should propose in the area of 
bilateral cooperation. 
On the multilateral front, the 
Commission is currently preparing a 
position paper in the light of the 
recommendations in the report on 
"Competition policy in the new trade 
order" with a view to opening 
discussions with the Member States in 
Council on the approach the Community 
should adopt vis-à-vis the possible 
inclusion of trade and competition in the 
work programme of the World Trade 
Organization. The first WTO Ministerial 
conference in Singapore next December 
presents an opportunity to target trade 
related areas which could usefully be 
further explored within the WTO 
framework. The Marrakesh declaration 
has already identified trade and 
competition as a possible subject for 
inclusion and the Commission services 
will continue to work towards the 
definition of a Community position on 
this matter. ■ 
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Russian Competition Law on abuse 
of dominant position: basic 
provisions and application 
experience 
by louri V. KOKOVIKHINE, State Committee of the Russian 
Federation for Anti-monopoly Policy and Promotion of New 
Economic Structures 
The Russian Law on Competition and 
Limitation of Monopolistic Activity 
on Commodity Markets determines 
the organizational and legal 
foundations for prevention, limitation 
and suppression of monopolistic 
activities and unfair competition, the 
law is directed towards ensuring the 
condition for the establishment and 
effective functioning of commodity 
markets. 
The present law extends to relations 
having an impact on competition in 
the commodity markets of the 
Russian Federation involving Russian 
and foreign juridical persons as well 
as natural persons. 
State policy for promoting the 
development of commodity markets 
and encouraging competition, and for 
preventing, limiting and suppressing 
monopolistic activities and unfair 
competition, is conducted by a 
Federal Anti-monopoly Authority: the 
State Committee of the Russian 
Federation for Anti-monopoly Policy 
and Promotion of New Economic 
Structures. 
MAIN POWERS OF THE 
AUTHORITY 
The Russian Federal Anti-monopoly 
Authority has the right to issue to 
economic entities (undertakings) 
binding instructions (orders): 
- on the termination of infringements 
of anti-monopoly legislation and/or on 
the elimination of their consequences, 
- on the restoration of the initial 
position, 
- on their compulsory division or on 
separation of structural divisions from 
their setup, 
- on the dissolution or change of 
contracts (agreements) which are 
contrary to antimonopoly legislation, 
- on the conclusion of a contract 
(agreement) with another economic 
entity (undertaking), 
- on the transfer to the Federal budget 
of profits made because of 
infringement of anti-monopoly 
legislation; 
The Authority also has the right to 
take decisions concerning the 
imposition of fines and penalties on 
commercia l and non-profi t 
organisations and their managers, 
including individual entrepreneurs for 
infringements of anti-monopoly 
legislation except in the cases of 
violation of the procedures for price-
fixing in conformity with legislation 
on natural monopolies. 
Finally the Authority can establish the 
fact of a dominant position of 
economic entities (undertakings) and 
can exercise other powers stipulated 
by the relevant legislation of the 
Russian Federation. 
BASIC CONCEPTS OF THE 
RUSSIAN LAW 
Article 4 of the Russian law contains 
the following definitions: 
Commodity: a product or activity 
(including work, services) intended for 
sale or exchange. 
Commodity market: a sphere of 
circulation of commodities having no 
substitutes, or interchangeable 
commodities, on the territory of the 
Russian Federation or in its part, 
determined preceding from the 
economic capacity of the buyer to 
acquire a particular commodity or 
article of merchandise or manufacture 
on a given territory or the absence of 
such capacity outside territory. 
Dominant position: the exclusive 
position of an economic entity, or 
several economic entities, on a 
relevant market handling a commodity 
that has no substitute(s), or 
interchangeable commodities affording 
it (them) the possibility of exerting a 
decisive influence on the general 
conditions of circulation of a particular 
commodity on a given market or of 
making access to the market difficult 
for other economic entities. The 
position of an economic entity should 
be deemed to be dominant if its share 
on the market of a particular 
commodity makes up 65% of the total 
and more, except instances in which 
the economic entity can prove that, 
despite exceeding the said proportion, 
its position on the market is not 
dominant. The position of an 
economic entity should also be 
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deemed to be dominant, though its 
share on the market of a particular 
commodity is less than 65%, should 
this be established by the Anti-
monopoly Authority from stability of 
the share of the said economic entity, 
the relative shares on the market held 
by competitors, and possibilities for 
new competitors to gain access to that 
relevant market or other criteria 
characterizing the commodity market. 
The position of an economic entity 
whose share on the market of a 
particular commodity does not exceed 
35% should not be deemed to be 
dominant. 
Monopolist activity: actions (or failure 
to act) of economic entities that are 
contrary to anti-monopoly legislation 
and are directed towards prevention, 
restriction or elimination of 
competition. 
Monopolistically high price: the price 
of a commodity fixed by an economic 
entity occupying the dominant 
position on a particular commodity 
market, with the object of making 
good unwarranted losses caused by 
under-utilization of production 
capacity and/or of making extra 
profits by lowering product quality. 
Monopolistically low price: the price 
of a commodity fixed by an economic 
entity occupying the dominant 
position on the market, as a buyer, 
with the object of making extra 
profits and/or making good 
unwarranted losses at the expense of 
the seller; or the price of a 
commodity deliberately fixed by an 
economic entity at some level causing 
losses from the sale of a particular 
commodity. Its fixing causes or can 
cause a limitation of competition 
through displacing a competitor from 
the market. 
ABUSE OF DOMINANCE 
In accordance with Article 5 of the 
Russian Competition Law actions by 
an economic entity (group of persons) 
occupying a dominant position which 
have or might have as their result a 
limitation of competition and/or 
impingement on the interests of other 
economic entities or natural persons 
are prohibited, including such actions 
as: 
- the withdrawal of goods from 
circulation for the purpose of, or 
result ing on, creation and 
maintenance of a deficit on the 
market or an increase of prices; 
- consent to conclude a contract only 
on condition of placing conditions 
therein concerning goods in which the 
contracting party (or a consumer) is 
not interested; 
- posing obstacles to access to the 
market (or withdrawal from the 
market) for other economic entities; 
- infringement of the procedure for 
price-formation established by 
normative acts; 
- tying up a contracting party through 
the conditions of a contract which are 
not advantageous to it or do not relate 
to the subject of the contract 
(unjustified demands for the transfer 
of financial assets, property, 
proprietary rights, the contracting 
party's labour, etc.); 
- incorporation into a contract of 
discriminatory conditions which place 
the contracting party in an unequal 
position compared with other 
economic entities"; 
- fixing monopolistically high (low) 
prices; 
- reduction in, or discontinuation of, 
the production of commodities which 
enjoy a demand and draw orders from 
consumers (users) provided there are 
possibilities for their break-even 
production; 
- an unjustified refusal to conclude a 
contract with separate buyers 
(customers) while there are 
capabilities for producing and 
delivering a specific commodity. 
In exceptional instances, the actions of 
an economic entity specified above 
may be deemed to be lawful if the 
economic entity proves that the 
positive effect of its actions, including 
that in the socially economic sphere, 
will exceed the negative consequences 
for the commodity market under 
consideration. 
THE RECENT CASE OF 
ABUSIVE BEHAVIOUR ON THE 
MARKET : SINGER 
Concentration 
On November 1994 the Russian Anti-
monopoly Committee examined the 
application from the Semi-Tech 
Company Limited (Hong Kong) on 
acquisition of 70% of stocks of 
ownership capital of Joint Stock 
Company PODOLSK (Russia). 
Semi-Tech Company Limited is an 
investment company established in 
1982. Semi-Tech owns and operates 
the worldwide SINGER business. In 
March 1993 Semi-Tech reached a 
conditional agreement to purchase up 
to a 51 % share interest in G.M PFFAF 
AG of Germany. SINGER and 
PFFAF are the leading producers of 
consumer sewing machines. This 
international business group (SINGER 
and PFFAF) in 1993 possessed 37% of 
the consumer sewing machines world 
market. 
PODOLSK is the single producer of 
consumer sewing machines in Russia. 
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Its share of the relevant Russian market 
in 1994 was more than 73%. The 
Russian Anti-monopoly Committee 
deemed that PODOLSK held a 
dominant position in consumer sewing 
machines market. 
The Anti-monopoly Committee, took 
into account that information, supposed 
that the said transaction could lead to 
the strengthening of dominance of 
PODOLSK. Thereby the Committee 
had the right to reject Semi-Tech's 
application pursuant to Article 18(4) of 
Russian Competition Law but the 
parties to the transaction proved that 
the positive effect of their activities, 
including that in the socially economic 
sphere, would be more than their 
negative consequences for the relevant 
market. For instance PODOLSK's 
president in his official letter to the 
Anti-monopoly Committee wrote that 
the transaction should let them an 
efficient use of investment and should 
do home-made products more 
competitive in the world markets. Also 
he noted that they planned to produce 
consumer sewing machines in total 
amount of 350.000 units per year. 
Based on these facts the Anti-
monopoly Committee gave the consent 
to the Semi-Tech's acquisition of 70% 
of stocks in ownership capital of 
PODOLSK but at the same time the 
Committee informed PODOLSK that it 
should be under observation and 
control by the Committee in order to 
prevent the monopolist activity; in 
December 1994 the Joint Stock 
Company PODOLSK was named Joint 
Stock Company SINGER. 
Investigation of the PODOLSK 
(SINGER) company 
On July 1995 the Anti-monopoly 
Committee received a complaint from 
the Deputy of Parliament of the 
Russian Federation in which he 
reported that PODOLSK (SINGER) 
had discontinued the production of 
consumer sewing machines. The 
Committee also had taken the same 
information from several sources and it 
made a decision to undertake an 
inves t igat ion into PODOLSK 
(SINGER) as well as a general inquiry 
into that sector of the economy 
(consumer sewing machines). 
Results of the investigation showed the 
following. The volume of output in 
PODOLSK (SINGER) during the first 
half-year of 1995 decreased in six 
times and was about 35.000 
units(1995). The production was 
ceased in July 1995. The lowering of 
production had gone simultaneously 
with the decreasing of sale. The 
inspection ordered by the Committee 
discovered evidences concerning 
PODOLSK's (SINGER) refusals to 
supply orders from customers on 
consumer sewing machines while there 
was possibilities for their producing 
and delivering. 
At the same time the Committee 
conducted a customers opinion poll 
within Moscow and 6 provinces of the 
Russian Federation which demonstrated 
that consumer sewing machines made 
by PODOLSK (SINGER) had been 
enjoying a demand. More than 55% of 
respondents confirmed that. On the 
other hand the Committee of the 
Russian Federation for Trading had 
estimated a potential demand on that 
production in 1995-1996 about 300.000 
units per year. Information which was 
submitted by the State Customs 
Committee of the Russian Federation 
testified about a permanence of 
consumer sewing machines import in 
1994-1995 and about high increasing in 
it the shares of imported production 
from Germany and Japan. 
Under analysis of consumer demand 
the Anti-monopoly Committee drew the 
conclusion that the main buyers of 
PODOLSK's (SINGER) production 
were the families with average earned 
income (about 55,5% of all families) 
which preferred simple, reliable and not 
expensive home-made sewing machines. 
Thereby discontinuation of production 
of that kind of goods by PODOLSK 
(SINGER) should lead to creation of a 
deficit on the market and an increase of 
prices. 
Decision 
On 14 November 1995 the Anti-
monopoly Committee has adopted the 
following decision: 
- PODOLSK (SINGER) occupying a 
dominant position on the market of 
consumer sewing machines has 
infringed Article 5(1) of the Russian 
Federation Law on Competition and 
Limitation of Monopolistic Activity on 
Commodity Markets by reduction in and 
discontinuation (from 01.07.1995) of the 
consumer sewing machines which enjoy 
a demand and draw orders from 
consumers (users) while there are 
possibilities for their break-even 
production; 
- To issue to PODOLSK(SINGER) 
binding instructions (order) on the 
termination of infringement of anti-
monopoly legislation and in time before 
1 April 1996 the ensuring of production 
of consumer sewing machines in 
volume of output which shall satisfy the 
demand provided that there are 
possibilities for their break-even 
production. 
Conclusion 
This case has an important significance 
for anti-monopoly practice. There are a 
lot of discussions about this case in 
Russia. It is very difficult to investigate 
such kind of abusive behaviour because 
you have to prove available demand and 
possibility for break-even production. 
On the other hand some opponents 
consider that it means interfering in 
private company marketing strategy. 
Other analysts deem that these action 
could prove an agreement between firms 
aimed to the elimination of other 
competitors from the market. ■ 
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DG IV staff list 
Télécopieur central : 295 Ol 28 
Directeur général 
Directeur général adjoint 
plus particulièrement chargé des Directions C et D 
Directeur général adjoint 
plus particulièrement chargé des Directions E et F 
Alexander SCHAUB 
Jean-François PONS 
Gianfranco ROCCA a.i. 
Conseiller principal . . . 
Conseiller auditeur Hartmut JOHANNES 
Conseiller auditeur Joseph GILCHRIST 
(chargé également de la sécurité des informations) 
Assistants du Directeur général Christopher JONES 
directement rattachés au Directeur général : 
Affaires administratives et budgétaires; 
Information, Parlement européen 
Comité Economique et Social 
Questions informatiques 
Irène SOUKA 
Guido VERVAET 
2952387/2954576 
2994423/2962284 
2951152/2951139 
2955912/2956942 
2955673/2960246 
2965030/2957491 
2957206/2960189 
2959224/2951305 
DIRECTION A 
Politique générale de la concurrence et coordination Jonathan FAULL 
Conseiller Juan RIVIERE MARTI 
1 Politique générale de la concurrence et Coordination David DEACON 
Chef adjoint d'unité Emil PAULIS 
2 Affaires juridiques et législation 
Chef adjoint d'unité 
3 Aspects internationaux 
Chef adjoint d'unité 
Helmut SCHRÖTER 
Claude RAKOVSKY 
2958658/2965201 
2951146/2960699 
2955905/2960562 
2965033/2966207 
2951196/2955911 
2955389/2962368 
DIRECTION Β 
Task Force "Contrôle des opérations 
de concentration entre entreprises" 
1 Unité opérationnelle I 
2 Unité opérationnelle II 
3 Unité opérationnelle III 
4 Unité opérationnelle IV 
Götz DRAUZaÁ. 
Enrique LOPEZ VEIGA 
Roger DAOUT 
Kirtikumar MEHTA 
2958681/2952965 
2957381/2961180 
2965383/2965574 
2957389/2952871 
DIRECTION C 
Information, communication, multimédias 
1 Télécommunications et Postes 
Coordination Société d'information 
­ Cas relevant de l'Article 85/86 
2 Médias, éditions musicales 
­ Aspects de propriété intellectuelle 
John TEMPLE LANG 
Herbert UNGERER 
Suzette SCHIFF 
Sebastiano GUTTUSO 
3 Ind. de l'information, électronique de divertissement Fin LOMHOLT 
2955571/2954512 
2968623/2968622 
2957657 
2951102/2954363 
2955619/2951150 
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DIRECTION D 
Services 
Conseiller 
1 Services financiers (banques, assurances) 
2 Transports 
3 Commerce (y compris la grande distribution), 
tourisme & autres services 
Humbert DRABBE 
Georges ROUNIS 
Luc GYSELEN 
Luigi CAMPOGRANDE 
2950060/2952701 
2953404 
2961523/2959987 
2957243/2954623 
2952767/2960872 
DIRECTION E 
Industries de base Rafael GARCIA PALENCIA 
1 Acier, métaux non ferreux, produits minéraux non Maurice GUERRIN 
métalliques, bâtiment, bois, papier, verre 
2 Prod, chimiques de base & transformés, caoutchouc Wouter PIEKÉ 
3 Energie (charbon, hydrocarbures, électricité, gaz) Paul MALRIC-SMITH 
4 Cartels et Inspections Pierre DUPRAT 
Chef adjoint d'unité notamment chargé des Cartels Julian JOSHUA 
2950253/2950900 
2951817/2951816 
2959824 
2959675/2964903 
2953524/2954850 
2955519/2958986 
DIRECTION F 
Indu, des biens d'équipement & de consommation Sven NORBERG 
1 Indu, mécaniques et électriques et industries diverses Franco GIUFFRIDA 
Dieter SCHWARZ 2 Automobiles, autres moyens de transport et construction mécanique connexe 
3 Produits agricoles, alimentaires, pharmaceutiques, 
textiles et autres biens de consommation Jürgen MENSCHING 
2952178/2959031 
2956084/2950663 
2951880/2950479 
2952224/2961179 
DIRECTION G 
Aides d'Etat 
Conseiller 
Conseiller 
Task Force "Aides dans les nouveaux Länder 
1 Politique des aides d'Etat 
Chef adjoint d'unité 
2 Aides horizontales 
3 Aides à finalité régionale 
Chef adjoint d'unité 
4 Aides sectorielles I 
Chef adjoint d'unité 
5 Aides sectorielles II 
Chef adjoint d'unité 
6 Entreprises publiques et services 
7 Analyses,inventaires et rapports 
Asger PETERSEN 
Francisco ESTEVE REY 
Stefaan DEPYPERE 
Anne HOUTMAN 
Claude ROUAM 
Loretta DORMAL-MAR1NO 
Alfredo MARQUES 
Constantin ANDROPOULOS 
Geert DANCET 
2955569/2958566 
2951140/2955900 
2990713/2952007 
2959628/2969719 
2957994/2954592 
2967581 
2962542/2967581 
2956601/2960009 
2960993/2950068 
Cecilio MADERO VILLAREJO 2960949/2955900 
Ronald FELTKAMP 
Reinhard WALTHER 
2954283/2960450 
2958434/2955410 
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Documentation ... 
This section contains details of recent speeches or articles given by 
Community officials that may be of interest. Copies of some of these 
may be available from DGIV's Information Officer. Future issues of 
the newsletter will contain details of conferences on competition 
policy which have been brought to our attention. Organisers of 
conferences that wish to make use of this facility should refer to 
page 1 for the address of DGIV's Information Officer. 
SPEECHES AND ARTICLES 
Main developments in merger 
control during 1994, by Juan 
Briones Alonso [sp96002] 
Services publics et règles 
communautaires, par J.F. Pons, 
Colloque à Calais organisé par 
l'U.N.S.A., le 7 février 1996 
|sp96003] 
Die Stellung der Unternehmen im 
europäischen Beihilfeverfahren, 
Studienvereinigung Kartellrecht e.V., 
Arbeitssitzung, Brüssel 25/01/95, 
Wolfgang MEDERER [sp96004] 
European telecommunications 
policy,by Herbert UNGERER, 
Fontainebleau GiTi Forum Day, 7 
July 1995 [sp96005] 
Introduction to the EC Antitrust 
Law, practice and policy, by Roland 
A.J. KOBIA, 1st semester 1995 
|sp96006] 
Introduction to the law, practice 
and policy of state aids in the 
European Community, by Roland 
A.J. Kobia, Gand (Belgium), 1996 
Institute for European Business 
Administration [sp96007| 
An outl ine of Community 
Competition Policy, by Donncadh 
Woods. Speech to masters degree 
students from University College 
Dublin, CEEPA Irish Institute for 
European Affairs, Leuven, 22 March 
1996 [sp96008] 
Règles de concurrence de l'Union 
Européenne applicables aux 
entreprises, Joos Stragier. Charleroi, 
7.10.95 [sp96009] 
EU pharmaceut ica l forum: 
Mergers, Joint Ventures and the 
Pharmaceutical Industry, by John 
Gatti [sp96010] 
Calendrier et mesures d'ouverture 
des télécommunications à la 
concurrence, par J.F. Pons. 
Symposium international des 
télécommunications Monaco, le 22 
mars 1996 [sp96011] 
Transport multimodal et Fixation 
des taux de transport terrestre, 
Paris, le 28 mars 1996 par J.F. Pons 
[sp96012] 
Distribution automobile, et autres: 
les relations verticales entre règle 
de concurrence et règle de raison, 
par R. Goyer (paru le 7 mars 1996 
dans SEMAINE JURIDIQUE, 
Cahiers de Droit de l'Entreprise 
(Supplément) [sp96013] 
COMMUNITY PUBLICATIONS ON 
COMPETITION 
Unless otherwise indicated, these 
publications are available through 
the Office for Official Publications 
of the European Communities, 2 
rue Mercier, L 2985 Luxembourg 
- Tel.4992821 - Fax 488573, or 
its sales offices (see last page).; 
use ISBN or Catalogue Number 
to order. 
LEGISLATION 
Competition law in the European 
Communities ­ volume 1A Rules 
applicable to undertakings, situation at 
30 june 1994; this publication contains 
the text of all legislative acts relevant to 
Articles 85, 86 and 90. catalogue No: 
(xx=language code; 9 languages) CM 29­
93­AOl­xx­C 
Competition law in the European 
Communities, Addendum to Volume 
IA: Rules applicable to udertakings 
situation as of 31 December 1994. 
catalogue No: (xx=Ianguage code; 9 
languages) CM 88­95­436­xx­C 
Merger control in the European 
Union, this publication contains the text 
of all legislative acts relevant to the 
Merger regulation; catalogue No: 
(xx=language code; 9 languages) CV 88­
95­428­xx­C 
Competition law in the European 
Communities ­ volume HA Rules 
applicable to State aid, situation at 31 
December 1994; this publication contains 
the text of all legislative acts relevant to 
Articles 42, 77, 90, 92 to 94. Catalogue 
No. (xx=language code; 9 languages) : 
CM­29­93­A02­XX­C 
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Brochure concerning the competition 
rules applicable to undertakings as 
contained in the EEA agreement and 
their implementation by the EC 
Commission and the EFTA 
surveillance authority, CV­77­92­118­
EN­C 
COMPETITION DECISIONS 
Reports of Commission Decisions 
relating to competition 
­Articles 85,86 and 90 of the EC Treaty. 
Catalogue numbers: 
* 64/72, in it, de, fr, ni: CM 76­92­996­xx­C 
* 73/80, in da, de, en, fr, it, nl: CM 76­92­
988­xx­C 
* 81/85, in 7 languages: CM79­93­792­xx­C 
* 86/88, 9 languages: CM 80­93­290­xx­C 
* 89/90, 9 languages: CV 73­92­772­xx­C 
* 90/92, 9 languages: CV 84­94­387­xx­C 
* 93/94, 9 languages: CV 90­95­946­xx­C 
COMPETITION REPORTS 
European Community competition 
policy 1994, 11 languages, (available on 
request through DG IV's Cellule 
Information) 
XXIV Report on competition policy 
1994, 11 languages, CM­90­95­283­xx­
C 
XXIHeme Rapport sur la politique de 
concurrence 1993, 9 languages, CM 82­
94­650­xx­C 
XXIIe Rapport sur la politique de 
concurrence: 1992, 9 languages, CM 
76­93­689­xx­C 
XXIe Rapport sur la politique de 
concurrence: 1991, 9 languages, CM 
73­92­247­xx­C 
Fourth survey on State aid in the 
European Union in the manufacturing 
and certain other sectors ( 11 
languages). ISBN 92­827­5381­6. 
Older annual reports are also available 
on request. 
OTHER DOCUMENTS and 
STUDIES 
Community Competition Policy in the 
Telecommunications Sector, a 
compedium prepared by DG IV; it 
contains Directives under ari 90, 
Decisions under Regulation 17 and 
under the Merger Regulation as well as 
relevant Judgements of the Court of 
Justice. Copies available through DG 
IV­C­1 (tel. +322­2968623, 2968622, 
fax+322­2969819). 
Brochure explicative sur les modalités 
d'application du Règlement (CE) N­
1475/95 de la Commission concernant 
certaines catégories d' accords de 
distribution et de service de vente et 
d'après­vente de véhicules 
automobiles. Copies available through 
DG IV­F­2 (tel. +322­2951880, 
2950479, fax. +322­2969800) 
Proceedings of the 2nd EU/Japan 
Seminar on competition, 
CV­87­95321­EN­C. 
The Institutional Framework for the 
Regulation of Telecom­munications 
and the Application of EC Compe­
tition Rules ­ Final Report, Forrester 
Norall & Sutton, CM­94­96­590­EN­C 
Competition Aspects of Access Pricing 
­December 1995, M. Cave, P. Crowther, 
L. Hancher, CM­94­96­582­EN­C 
Competition Aspects of 
Interconnection Agreements in the 
Telecommunications Sector, CM­90­
95­801­EN­C 
The effect of conglomerate mergers on 
competition; CM­59­90­039­EN­C 
Surveys of' the Member States' powers 
to investigate and sanction violations of 
national competition laws. 
CM 90­95­089­EN­C 
L' Office de l'harmonisation dans le 
marche interieur, AH­89­95­260­FR­C 
Information exchanges among firms 
and their impact on competition. 
CV 89­95­026­EN­C 
Impact of EC­funded R&I) 
programmes on human resource 
development and long­term 
competitiveness, CG NA­15­920­EN­C 
Meeting universal service obligations 
in a competitive telecommunications 
sector, CV 83­94­757­EN­C 
The geographical dimension of 
competition in the European single 
market, CV 78­93­136­EN­C 
Copyright and information limits to 
the protection of' literary and 
pseudo­literary works in the Member 
States of the EC, CM 75­92­049­EN­C 
Evaluation of the Impact of European 
Community Research Programmes 
upon the Competitiveness of European 
Industry: Concepts and approaches. 
CDNA­14­198­EN­C 
Competition and integration: 
Community merger control 
policy,CM AR­94­057­EN­C 
Growth, competitiveness, employment: 
The challenges and ways forward Into 
the 21st century: White paper, 9 
languages, CM 82­94­529­xx­C 
Growth, competitiveness, employment: 
The challenges and ways forward into 
the 21st century: "White paper" ­ Vol. 
2 ­Part C. CM NF­93­0629­A­C 
EG­Wettbewerbsrecht und 
Zulieferbeziehungen der 
Automobilindustrie, 
CV 73­92­788­DE­C 
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Competition policy in the new trade 
order: strengthening international 
cooperation and rules, 
CM 91-95-124-EN-C 
The impact of joint ventures on 
competition: The case of 
petrochemical industry in the EEC, 
CM70-91-491-EN-C 
Forum consultatif de la comptabilité: 
subventions publiques, 
C-184-94-735-FR-C 
Les investissements dans les 
industries du charbon et de l'acier de 
la Communauté: Rapport sur 
l'enquête 1993, CM 83-94-2963-A-C 
Les investissements dans les 
industries du charbon et de l'acier de 
la Communauté: Enquete 1992, 9 
languages, CM 76-93-6733-A-C 
The effect of different state aid 
measures on intra-Community 
competition, CM 59-90-702-EN-C 
Study on the impact of liberalization 
of' inward cross-border mail on the 
provision of the universal postal 
service and the options for progressive 
liberalization: Final report, 
CV 89-95-018-EN-C 
Green Paper on the development of 
the single market for postal services, 9 
languages, CD NA-14-858-EN-C 
COST allocation and cross subsidies, 
CV 83-94-894-EN-C 
New industrial economics and 
experiences from European merger 
control: New lessons about collective 
dominance ? CM 89-95-737-EN-C 
Competition and integration: 
Community merger control policy, 
CM AR-94-057-EN-C 
The effects of intra-Community 
competition of export subsidies to 
third countries: The case of export 
credits, export insurance and official 
development assistance, 
CM 59-90-281-EN-C 
Aid element of government R&D 
contracts, CM 70-91-314-EN-C 
Concurrence et cooperation dans Ie 
transport aérien en Europe, 
CV 74-92-815-FR-C 
European Economy, Supplement A, 
Recent economic trends, No 4 - 04/94, 
State aid control in the context of 
other community policies, 9 languages, 
CM-AS-94-004-XX-C. 
European Economy,; "Competition and 
integration - Community merger control 
policy", Supplement A nr. 3/95, 9 
languages, CM AS-95-005-xx-C, 
Activities in favour of SMEs and the 
craft sector. European Commission. 
1995. ISBN 92-827-5175-9 + version 
FR et DE. 
Aides et prêts de l'Union européenne -
Guide des financements 
communautaires. 1995. ISBN 92-827-
4601-1. 
Répertoire de jurisprudence de droit 
communautaire 1977-1990. 3 volumes. 
Cour de justice des Commuâmes 
européennes. 
Conference on Competition Policy. 
Organised by the European Commission 
in cooperation with the Office of 
Economic Competition of Hungary. 
Visegrad. 19-21 June 1995. 
Les marchés publics en Europe - Les 
directives (+EN,DE) ISBN 92-826-
8189-0. 
PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL 
JOURNAL 
1st January to 31 March 1996 
ARTICLES 85, 86, 90 
(RESTRICTIONS AND 
DISTORTIONS OF COMPETITION 
BY UNDERTAKINGS) 
Legislation 
Décision du Comité mixte de 1ΈΕΕ n° 
65/95, du 22 novembre 1995, modifiant 
l'annexe XIV (concurrence) de l'accord 
EEE, J O L 8 , 11/01/96 
96/2/CE: Directive de la Commission, du 
16 janvier 1996, modifiant la directive 
90/388/CEE en ce qui concerne les 
communications mobiles et personnelles, 
JOL 20, 26/01/96 
Règlement (CE) n° 385/96 du Conseil, 
du 29 janvier 1996, relatif à la défense 
contre les pratiques préjudiciables en 
matière de prix dans la construction 
navale, JO L 56, 06/03/96 
Règlement (CE) no 240/96 de la 
Commission, du 31 janvier 1996, 
concernant l'application de l'article 85 
paragraphe 3 du traité à des catégories 
d'accords de transfert de technologie 
(Texte présentant de l'intérêt pour le 
EEE), JOL 31, 09/02/96 
Decisions 
96/180/CE - Décision de la Commission, 
du 16 janvier 1996, relative à une 
procédure d'application de l'article 85 du 
traité CE et de l'article 53 de l'accord 
EEE (IV/35. 545 LH/SAS), JO L 54, 
02/03/96 
Communications 
Communication de la Commission. Les 
défis auxquels sont confrontées les 
industries européennes liées à la défense 
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- contribution en vue d'actions au 
niveau européen, COM/96/lO/f 24/01/96 
Communication effectuée conformément 
à l'article 12 paragraphe 2 du règlement 
(CEE) No. 4056/86 du Conseil et à 
l'article 12 paragraphe 2 du règlement 
(CEE) n° 1017/68 du Conseil 
concernant l'affaire n° IV/35. 680 Baltic 
Liner Conference Agreement, JO C 44, 
16/02/96 
Communication faite conformément à 
l'article 19 paragraphe 3 du règlement 
n° 17 du Conseil concernant le cas n° 
IV/E-3/35.875 - Nuclear Electric 
plc/British Nuclear Fuels pic, JO C 89, 
26/03/96 
Notification d'accords concernant la 
coopération industrielle entre entreprises 
et la création d'une entreprise commune 
(Affaire n° IV/35.895 - Mercedes-Benz, 
MTU, Detroit Diesel Corporation), JO C 
63, 02/03/96 
Notification d'une entreprise commune 
(Affaire n° IV/35.993/F3), JO C 76, 
16/03/96 
Affaire n° IV/34. 657 - Sammelrevers, 
JO C 54, 23/02/96 
CONTROL OF 
CONCENTRATIONS/MERGER 
PROCEDURES 
Non-opposition à une concentration 
notifiée (Affaire n° 1V/M. 567 -
Lyonnaise des eaux/Northumbrian 
Water), JO C 11, 16/01/96 
Non-applicabilité du règlement à une 
opération notifiée (Affaire n° IV/M. 544 
- Unisource/Telefónica), JO C 13, 
18/01/96 
Non-opposition à une concentration 
notifiée (Affaire n° IV/M. 595 - British 
Telecommunications/VIAG), JO C 15, 
20/01/96/ 
Non-opposition à une concentration 
notifiée (Affaire n° IV/M. 655 -
Canal+/UFA/MDO), JO C 15, 20/01/96 
Communication faite conformément à 
l'article 19 paragraphe 3 du règlement 
n° 17 du Conseil concernant le cas n° 
IV/E-3/35.876 - Scotish Nuclear 
Ltd/British Nuclear Fuels pic, JO C 89, 
26/03/96 
Communication faite en application de 
l'article 19 paragraphe 3 du règlement 
n° 17 du Conseil concernant l'affaire n° 
IV/E-3/35.757 - British Gas pic - Code 
de gestion du réseau, JO C 93, 29/03/96 
Opinions 
Avis sur le "XXIVe rapport de la 
Commission sur la politique de 
concurrence 1994", JO C 39, 12/02/96 
Notifications 
Notification d'une entreprise commune 
(Affaire n° IV/E-2/35.883 -
Nisso/BASF), JO C 36, 09/02/96 
Notification d'une entreprise commune 
(Affaire n° IV/35.869 - Banque 
Bruxelles Lambert), JO C 41, 13/02/96 
Notification d'un accord sur les frais 
terminaux (REIMS) conclu entre 
opérateurs postaux (Affaire n° 
IV/35.849 -REIMS), JO C 42, 14/02/96 
Decisions 
96/177/CE: Décision de la Commission, 
du 19 juillet 1995, déclarant une 
concentration incompatible avec le 
marché commun et le fonctionnement de 
l'accord sur l'Espace économique 
européen (Affaire n° IV/M. 490 - Nordic 
Satellite Distribution), JO L 53, 
02/03/96 
96/204/CE: Décision de la Commission, 
du 20 septembre 1995, déclarant une 
concentration compatible avec le marché 
commun et le fonctionnement de 
l'accord sur l'Espace économique 
européen (Affaire n° IV/M.582 -
Orkla/Volvo), JO L 66, 16/03/96 
96/222/CE: Décision de la Commission, 
du 14 novembre 1995, déclarant une 
opération de concentration compatible 
avec le marché commun et l'accord EEE 
(Affaire n° IV/M.603 - Crown Cork & 
Seal/CarnaudMetalbox), JO L 75, 
23/03/96 
Non-opposition à une concentration 
notifiée (Affaire n° IV/M. 666 - Johnson 
Controls/Roth Frères). JO C 3, 06/01/96 
Non-opposition à une concentration 
notifiée (Affaire n° IV/M. 664 - GRS 
Holding), JO C 8. 13/01/96 
Non-opposition à une concentration 
notifiée (Affaire n° IV/M. 676 -
Ericsson/Ascom II), JO C 19, 23/01/96 
Non-opposition à une concentration 
notifiée (Affaire n° IV/M. 678 -
Minorco/Tilcon), JO C 24, 30/01/96 
Non-opposition à une concentration 
notifiée (Affaire n° IV/M. 670 - Elsag 
Bailey/Hartmann & Braun AG), JO C 24, 
30/01/96 
Non-opposition à une concentration 
notifiée (Affaire n° IV/M. 660 -
RTZ/CRA), JO C 22, 22/01/96 
Non-opposition à une concentration 
notifiée (Affaire n° IV/M. 621 -
BLG/Bawag), JO C 23, 27/01/96 
Non-applicabilité du règlement à une 
opération notifiée (Affaire n° IV/M. 650 
- SBG/Rentenanstalt, JO C 23, 27/01/96 
Non-opposition à une concentration 
notifiée (Affaire n° IV/M. 642 - Chase 
Manhattan/Chemical Banking), JO C 33, 
06/02/96 
Non-opposition à une concentration 
notifiée (Affaire n° IV/M. 674 -
Demag/Komatsu), JO C 38, 10/02/96 
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Non-applicabilité du règlement à une 
opération notifiée (Affaire n° IV/M. 661 
- Siragab/Bank Austria/Stuag, JO C 38, 
10/02/96 
Non-opposition à une concentration 
notifiée (Affaire n° IV/M. 677 - Skanska 
Fastighetcr/Securum Förvaltning, JO C 
54, 23/02/96 
Non-applicabilité du règlement à une 
opération notifiée (Affaire n° IV/M. 681 
- RB of Scotland/Bank of Ireland), JO C 
57, 27/02/96 
Non-applicabilité du règlement à une 
opération notifiée (Affaire n° IV/M. 673 
- Channel Five)., JO C 57, 27/02/96 
Non-opposition à une concentration 
notifiée (Affaire n° IV/M. 668 -
Philips/Origin), JO C 58, 28/02/96 
Non-opposition à une concentration 
notifiée (Afaire n° IV/M. 657 -
Röhm/Ciba Geigy/TFL Ledertechnik), 
JO C 60, 29/02/96 
Non-opposition à une concentration 
notifiée (Affaire n° IV/M. 662 - Leisure 
Plan), JO C 63, 02/03/96 
Non-opposition à une concentration 
notifiée (Affaire n° IV/M. 692 -
Elektrowatt/Landis & Gyr), JO C 69, 
07/03/96 
Non-opposition à une concentration 
notifiée (Affaire n° IV/M. 686 -
Nokia/Autoliv, JO C 69, 07/03/96 
Non-opposition à une concentration 
notifiée (Affaire n° IV/M. 672 -
BP/Sonatrach), JO C 72, 12/03/96 
Non-opposition à une concentration 
notifiée (Affaire n° IV/M.694 -
SKF/1NA/WPB), JO C 76, 16/03/96 
Non-opposition à une concentration 
notifiée (Affaire n° IV/M.707 - Toro 
Assicurazioni/Banca di Roma), JO C 76, 
16/03/96 
Non-opposition à une concentration 
notifiée (Affaire n° IV/M.685 -
Siemens/Lagardère), JO C 86, 23/03/96 
Opinions 
Avis du comité consultatif en matière de 
concentrations rendu lors de la 30e 
réunion tenue le 5 juillet 1995 
concernant une proposition de décision 
dans l'affaire n° IV/M. 490 - Nordic 
Satellite Distribution, JO C 63, 02/03/96 
Avis du comité consultatif en matière de 
concentrations entre entreprises rendu 
lors de sa trente et unième réunion, le 4 
septembre 1995, sur un avant-projet de 
décision relatif à l'affaire IV/M.582 -
Orkla/Volvo, JO C 76, 16/03/96 
Avis du comité consultatif en matière de 
concentrations rendu lors de la 34e 
réunion, le 6 novembre 1995, sur un 
avant-projet de décision relatif à 
l'affaire n° IV/M. 603 - Crown Cork & 
Seal/ CarnaudMetalbox, JO C 86, 
23/03/96 
Notifications 
Affaire n° IV/M. 681 - RB of 
Scotland/Bank of Ireland), JO C 7, 
12/01/96 
Affaire n° IV/M. 686 - Nokia/Autoliv, 
JO C 7, 12/01/96 
Affaire n° IV/M. 651 - AT&T/Philips 
Electronics NV, JO C 7, 12/01/96 
Affaire n° IV/M. 685 -
Siemens/Lagardère, JO C 8, 13/01/96 
Affaire n° IV/M. 672 - BP/Sonatrach, 
JO C 13, 18/01/96 
Affaire n° IV/M. 692 -
Elektrowatt/Landis & Gyr, JO C 13, 
18/01/96 
Affaire n° IV/M. 269 -
Shell/Montccatini, JO C 13, 18/01/96 
Affaire n° IV/M. 694 - SKF/INA/WPB, 
JO C 23, 27/01/96 
Affaire n°. IV/M. 663 - Dow/DuPont, JO 
C 24, 30/01/96 
Affaire n° IV/M. 697 - Lockheed Martin 
Corporation/Loral Corporation, JO C 33, 
06/02/96 
Affaire n° IV/M. 689 - ADSB/Belgacom, 
JO C 33, 06/02/96 
Affaire n° IV/M. 702 -
Starck/Wienerberger, JO C 35, 08/02/96 
Affaire n° IV/M. 707 - Toro 
Assicurazioni/Banca di Roma), JO C 36, 
09/02/96 
Affaire n° IV/M. 699 - Tomkins/Gates, 
JO C 38, 10/02/96 
Affaire n° IV/M. 683 - GTS-Hermes 
Inc/Danske Statsbaner/Deutsche Bahn 
AG/Ferrovie dello Stato SpA/NV 
Nederlandse Spoorwegen/Österreichische 
Bundesbahnen/Red Nacional de los 
Ferrocarriles Españoles/Société nationale 
des chemins de fer belges/Nationale 
Maatschappij der Belgische spoorwegen / 
Société nationale de chemins de fer 
français / Schweizerische Bundesbahnen 
/ Statens Järnvägar/Racal-BR Telecom-
munications Ltd, JO C 41, 13/02/96 
Affaire n° IV/M. 716 - GEHE/Lloyds 
Chemists, JO C 43, 15/02/96 
Affaire n° IV/M. 711 -
Generali/Unicredito, JO C 44, 16/02/96 
Affaire n° IV/M. 698 -
NAW/Saltano/Contrac, JO C 49, 
20/02/96 
Affaire n° IV/M. 714 - Preussag/Elco 
Looser, JO C 53, 22/02/96. 3) 
Affaire n° IV/M. 704 -
Unilever/Diversey, JO C 55, 24/02/96 
Affaire n° IV/M. 721 - Textron/Valois, 
JO C 58, 28/02/96 
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Affaire n° IV/M. 717 ­ Viacom/Bear 
Steams, JO C 60, 29/02/96 
Affaire n° IV/M. 718 ­
Phoenix/Comifar, JO C 62, 01/03/96 
Affaire n° IV/M. 697 ­ Lockheed Martin 
Corporation/Loral Corporation, JO C 68, 
06/03/96 
Affaire n° IV/M. 556 ­
Zeneca/Vanderhave, JO C 70, 08/03/96 
Affaire n° IV/M. 705 ­ Deutsche 
Telekom/SAP­S, JO C 70, 08/03/96 
Affaire n° IV/M. 726 ­ Bosch/Allied 
Signal, JOC71,09/03/96 
Retrait de la notification d'une opération 
de concentration (Affaire n° IV/M. 680 ­
Kvaerner/Amec), JO C 8, 13/01/96 
Affaire n° IV/M.722 ­ Téneo/Merill 
Lynch/Bankers Trust), JO C 81, 
19/03/96 
Affaire n° IV/M.731 ­
Kvaerner/Trafalgar), JO C 83, 20/03/96 
Affaire n° IV/M.732 ­ Nordic 
Capital/Euroc), JO C 85, 22/03/96 
Affaire n° IV/M.729 ­ GEC 
AIsthom/Tarmac/Central IMU), JO C 
86, 23/03/96 
Affaire n° IV/M.738 ­
Natwest/Schroder/Shefteld), JO C 89, 
26/03/96 
STATE AID 
96/75/CE: Décision de la Commission, 
du 4 octobre 1995, concernant l'aide 
accordée par la Région flamande de 
Belgique au constructeur de camions 
DAF, JOL 15,20/01/96 
96/76/CE: Décision de la Commission, 
du 4 octobre 1995, concernant l'aide 
accordée par les Pays­Bas au 
constructeur de camions DAF, JO L 15, 
20/01/96 
Approbation d'une aide d'Etat 
conformément aux articles 92 et 93 du 
traité CE ­ Cas pour lesquels la 
Commission ne soulève pas d'objections 
­ Aides d'Etat N 241/95 ­ Belgique, JO 
C 5 , 10/01/96 
Communication de la Commission 
concernant les aides d'Etat relatives aux 
crédits à court terme à taux d'intérêt 
bonifiés en agriculture ("crédits de 
gestion"), JO C 44, 16/02/96 
Encadrement communautaire des aides 
d'Etat à la recherche et au 
développement, JO C45, 17/02/96 
96/169/CE: Décision de la Commission, 
du 14 février 1996, relative aux dates à 
fixer par les Etats membres pour la 
présentation des demandes d'aides 
"surfaces" dans le cadre du système 
intégré de gestion et de contrôle relatif à 
certains régimes d'aides 
communautaires ("système intégré"), JO 
L 45, 23/02/96 
96/178/CECA: Décision de la 
Commission, du 18 octobre 1995, 
relative à des aides d'Etat accordées par 
le Land de Bavière à l'entreprise CECA 
Neue Maxhütte Stahlwerke GmbH. 
Sulzbach­Rosenberg, JO L 53, 02/03/96 
96/179/CE: Décision de la Commission, 
du 31 octobre 1995, enjoignant au 
gouvernement allemand de fournir tous 
les documents, informations et données 
concernant les projets de nouveaux 
investissements du groupe Volkswagen 
dans les nouveaux Länder allemands et 
les aides prévues en faveur de ces 
investissements (C 62/91 ex NN 75. 77. 
78 et 79/91), JO L53, 02/03/96 
Adoptions des aides d'Etat 
­C 45/95 (NN 48/95) ­ Italie, JO C 3, 
06/01/96 
­N 463/94 ­ Espagne, JO C 25, 31/01/96 
­C 2/93 (ex N 505/92) ­ Belgique. JO C 
33, 06/02/96 
­C 4/93 (ex N 652/92) ­ Allemagne, JO 
C 33, 06/02/96 
­Contrôle des aides d'Etat ­ Appel 
d'offres (IV G 5/PSI/01), JO C 36, 
09/02/96 
­C 21/94 (ex N 415/93) ­ Italie. JO C 42, 
14/02/96 
­C 46/95 (NN 130/93) ­ France. JO C 58, 
28/02/96 
­C 10/94 (ex NN 126/93) ­ Grèce, JO C 
68, 06/03/96 
­C 47/95 (ex NN 61/95) ­ Italie, JO C 68, 
06/03/96 
­C 43/93 ­ Irlande, JO C 70, 08/03/96 
­C 49/95 (ex N 76/95) ­ République 
fédérale d'Allemagne, JO C 71. 09/03/96 
­C 50/95 (N 317/95) ­ Autriche, JO C 71, 
09/03/96 
­C 51/95 (ex N 320/95) ­ Autriche, JO C 
71,09/03/96 
­C 48/95 (N 295/95 et N 296/95) ­
Belgique. JO C 73, 13/03/96 
­C 56/95 (N 941/95) ­ Espagne, JO C 75, 
15/03/96 
­C 32/94 (N 48/94) ­ Allemagne, JO C 
76. 16/03/96 
­C 2/88 (NN 128/87) ­ Grèce, JO C 84, 
21/03/96 
­C 5/96 (NN 138/95) ­ France, JO C 84, 
21/03/96 
­C 59/95 (ex NN 79/95) ­ Italie. JO C 92, 
28/03/96 
Autorisation des aides d'Etat dans le 
cadre des dispositions des articles 92 et 
93 du traité CE ­ Cas à l'égard desquels 
la Commission ne soulève pas 
d'objection: 
JO C 6, 11/01/96; JO C 23, 27/01/96; 
JO C 19. 23/01/96; JO C 53. 22/02/96: 
JO C 63, 02/03/96; JO C 67, 05/03/96; 
JO C 70. 08/03/96; JO C 72. 12/03/96; 
JO C 73, 13/03/96; JO C 74, 14/03/96; 
JO C 75. 15/03/96; JO C 72, 12/03/96; 
JO C 73. 13/03/96: JO C 74, 14/03/96; 
JO C 85. 22/03/96; JO C 86, 23/03/96 
DIVERS 
Appel à manifestations d'intérêt 
d'experts­conseils dans le domaine de la 
politique de la concurrence, de 
l'information, de la communication et de 
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la société de l'information, JO C 73, 
13/03/96 
WRITTEN QUESTIONS 
E­1875/95 de Christine Crawley 
(Écolabel) 
E­2101/95 de Lyndon Harrison (tarifs 
autoroutiers au Benelux) 
E­2403/95 de Edward McMillan­Scott 
(commandes en chaîne dans le secteur 
des chemins de fer) 
E­2549/95 de Tony Cunningham 
(finnancement d'un fabricant d'armes 
par la Commission) 
E­2617/95 de Amedeo Amadeo (réseaux 
câblés de télévision) 
E­2159/95 de Markus Ferber (initiatives 
communautaires à venir visant à 
promouvoir la compétitivité de 
l'industrie européenne aéronautique et 
astronautique face aux Etats Unis 
d'Amérique et aux pays asiatiques) 
E­2376/95 de WolfgangKreissl­Dôrfler 
(aide de l'Union européenne à des 
projets industriels en Chine) 
E­2733/95 de Amedeo Amadeo et 
Cristiana Muscardini (transports aériens) 
E­2720/95 de Mathias Reichhold 
(violation des règles de concurrence de 
l'Union européenne sous forme de 
double péage en Autriche) 
E­2734/95 de Cristiana Muscardini 
(restructuration des industries 
informatiques du groupe Olivetti) 
E­1984/95 de Nel van Dijk (distorsions 
de concurrence provoquées par une aide 
publique accordée par la ville de La 
Haye) 
E­2169/95 de Ursula Schleider (tarifs 
aériens) 
E­3136/95 de Jaak Vandemeulebroucke 
(distorsion de concurrence) 
E­2872/95 de Winifred Ewing (aides 
d'État) 
E­2717/95 de Gerardo Fernández­Albor 
(compatibilité entre les réglementations 
nationales relatives à l'établissement de 
pharmacies et les règles communautaires 
de libre concurrence) 
E­3166/95 de Imelda Read (entreprise 
commune Atlas) 
E­2618 de Amedeo Amadeo (réseaux 
câblés de télévision) 
E­2227/95 de Iñigo Méndez de Vigo 
(aides au secteur de l'automobile) 
E­2548/95 de Liam Hyland (ports 
privés) 
P­2761/95 de Hugh McMahon (non­
respect des règles communautaires de 
concurrence pour la traversée du pont de 
l'île de Skye) 
E­2728/95 de Christoph Konrad 
(subventions de l'Union européenne en 
faveur de la construction d'un nouvel 
aéroport à Athènes) 
E­2793/95 de Alexandras Alavanos 
(correspondance entre la Commission et 
le gouvernement grec concernant les 
chantiers navals grecs) 
P­2942/95 de Graham Watson (aide 
d'État au secteur irlandais d'extraction 
de la tourbe) 
E­2051/95 de Wolfgang Nußbaumer 
(financement des réseaux 
transeuropéens) 
E­2745/95 de Jannis Sakellariou 
(délocalisations d'entreprises 
industrielles opérées grâce des crédits de 
l'union européenne) 
E­2987/95 de Irene Crepaz (droits 
relatifs à la periode de non­concurrence 
et aux indemnités dues au titre de la 
clause de non­concurrence, acquis 
régulièrement dans un État membre et 
revendiqués dans un autre État membre 
de l'Union européenne) 
E­2533/95 de Detlev Samland 
(information sur le montant des aides 
accordées en 1994 à la région 
Nordrhein­Westphie) 
E­2579/95 de Richard Howitt (demande 
d'aide financière de Oikkos Ltd, Essex, 
pour un projet de régénéation des 
hydrocarbures) 
E­2833/95 de Gerhard Schmid (loi sur 
l'utilisation du français ­loi Toubon­ et 
libre concurrence sur le marché 
intérieur) 
E­1631/95 de Markus Ferber (aide de 
l'Union européenne à la recherche) 
E­3200/95 de KARL VON Wogau 
(distorsions de la concurrence dans le 
secteur de la production du boisen 
république fédérale d'Allemagne) 
E­3208/95 de James Fitzsimons (aides 
publiques excessives) 
COURT OF JUSTICE/TRIBUNAL 
Affaires introduites devant la Cour 
Aff. C­379/95 Ρ : France e.a. / 
Commission: Pourvoi contre l'arrêt du 
Tribunal (première chambre élargie), 
rendu le 18 septembre 1995, dans 
l'affaire T­548/93 ­ Annulation de la 
décision de la Commission rejetant la 
plainte de Ladbroke Racing Ltd ­
Paris sur les courses de chevaux ­ Pari 
mutuel urbain 
Aff. C­399/95 : Allemagne / Commission 
Annulation de la décision K(95)2828 
final concernant une aide du Freistaat 
Bayern à l'entreprise CECA Neue 
Maxhütte Stahlwerke GmbH 
Aff. C­404/95 : Allemagne / Commission 
Annulation de la décision K(95)2754 
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dela Commission du 31 octobre 1995 
concernant une aide de la Freie und 
Hansestadt Hamburg à l'entreprise 
Hamburger Stahlwerke GmbH 
Aff. C­406/95 : Italie / Commission 
Annulation de la décision de la 
Commission du 4 octobre 1995 relative 
aux conditions imposées au second 
opérateur de radiotéléphonie GSM en 
Italie 
Aff. C­410/95 : Grands garages 
méditerranéens SA et Nissan France 
SA / Nice ouest automobiles 
Préjudicielle ­ Tribunal de commerce 
de Nice ­ Interprétation du règlement 
(CEE) n 123/85 de la Commission 
concernant l'application de l'art. 85, par. 
3, du traité CE à des catégories 
d'accords de distribution et de service 
de vente et d'après­vente de véhicules 
automobiles ­ Revendeurs n'appartenant 
pas à un réseau de distribution 
exclusive ­ Activité consistant à vendre 
des véhicules neufs provenant 
d'importations parallèles 
Aff. C­2/96 : Carlo Sunino / Giancarlo 
Data : Préjudicielle ­ Pretura 
circondariale di Ivrea, sezione di 
Strambino ­ Interprétation des art. 48, 
55, 59, 60, 66, 86 et 90 du traité CE 
­ Législation nationale qui exclut les 
entreprises privées de l'activité 
d'intermédiaire dans le marché du 
travail intérimaire 
Aff. C­35/96 : Commission / Italie 
Manquement d'Etat ­ Concurrence ­
Violation des art. 5 et 85 du traité CE ­
Fixation des tarifs obligatoires pour les 
expéditeurs en douane 
Aff. C­41/96 : VAG­Hândlerbeirat e.V. / 
SYD­Consult : Préjudicielle ­
Landgericht ­ Hamburg ­
Interprétation de l'art. 85 du traité CE 
et du règlement (CEE) nu 123/85 de 
la Commission concernant 
l'application de l'article 85 paragraphe 
3 du traité CEE à des catégories 
d'accords de distribution et de service 
de vente et d'après­vente de 
véhicules automobiles ­ Législation 
nationale en matière de concurrence qui 
exige l'étanchéité du système pour 
que les membres du système puissent 
obtenir des injonctions interdisant à des 
tiers la distribution des produits 
concernés ­ Distinction entre 
systèmes de distribution 
théoriquement étanches et théoriquement 
et pratiquement étanches 
Aff. C­46/96 : Allemagne / Commission 
Annulation de la décision C(95)3319 
final concernant une aide fiscale en 
matière d'amortissements octroyée au 
profit d'entreprises allemandes ­
Amortissements extraordinaires sur les 
aéronefs 
Aff. C­51/96 : C. Deliège / Ligue 
francophone de judo et disciplines 
associées ASBL e.a. 
Préjudicielle ­ Tribunal de première 
instance de Namur ­ Interprétation des 
art. 59 à 66, 85 et 86 du traité CE au 
regard de la réglementation d'une 
association sportive (internationale) qui 
exige une autorisation ou une 
sélection de la fédération nationale 
pour concourir dans une compétition 
internationale ­ Sportif amateur, mais 
candidat au professionnalisme ou 
semi­professionnalisme ­ Judo féminin 
Aff. C­55/96 : Job Centre coop, ari 
Préjudicielle ­ Corte d'Appello ­
Milano ­ Interprétation des art. 48, 49, 
55, 59, 60, 62, 66, 86 et 90 du traité 
CE au regard d'une législation 
nationale qui exclut les entreprises 
privées de l'exercice des activités de 
placement des travailleurs 
Affaires introduites devant le 
Tribunal 
Aff. T­221/95 : Endemol Entertainemenl 
Holding e.a. / Commission 
Annulation de la décision de la 
Commision relative à une procédure 
d'application du règlement (CEE) nu 
4064/89 du Conseil (affaire nu 
IV/M.553­RTL/Veronica/Endemol), 
déclarant incompatible avec le marché 
commun l'accord de concentration 
d'entreprises visant la constitution du 
Holland Media Group. 
Aff. T­224/95 : R. Tremblay e.a. / 
Commission : Annulation de la décision 
de la Commision rejetant la plainte 
introduite par les requérants sur le 
fondement des art. 85 el 86 du Traité CE 
(nu IV/31.773), relative à l'entente entre 
les sociétés d'auteurs des différents États 
membres ­ Exécution incorrecte de l'arrêl 
du Tribunal du 24 janvier 1995 rendu 
dans l'affaire T­5/93 
Aff T­227/95 : AssiDomân Kraft 
Products e.a. / Commission 
Annulation de la décision de la 
Commision refusant de rembourser les 
amendes infligées aux requérantes par 
une décision relative à une procédure 
d'infraction à l'art. 85 du traité CE ayant 
été partiellement annulée par l'arrêt de la 
Cour du 31 mars 1993, rendu dans 
l'affaire C­89/95 
Aff. T­229/95 :Telecom Italia Mobile / 
Commission; Annulation de la décision 
de la Commission relative aux conditions 
imposées au second opérateur de 
radiotéléphonie GSM en Italie 
Aff. T­231/95 : SIC / Commission 
Recours en carence tendant à faire 
constater que la Commission s'est 
illégalement abstenue d'ouvrir une 
procédure au litre de l'article 93 par. 2, 
du traité CE suite à une plainte déposée 
par la requérante, relative aux aides 
accordées par le gouvernement portugais 
à la RTP ­ (radiotelevisão Portuguesa). 
Aff. T­234/95 : Hamburger Stahlwerke / 
Commission: Annulation de la décision 
le la Commission Κ (95) 2754 endg. 
relative à l'octroi d'une aide accordée 
par la ville hanscatique de Hamburg à 
l'entreprise CECA Hamburger 
Stahlwerke 
Aff. T­235/95 : A. Goidstein / 
Commission; Annulation de la décision 
de la Commission refusant de 
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reconsidérer, suite aux arguments de fait 
et de droit développés par le requérant, 
sa décision de rejeter la demande de 
mesures provisoires introduite dans le 
cadre d'une procédure tendant à faire 
constater la violation des art. 85 et 86 du 
traité CE par le "General Medical 
Council", organisme chargé de 
réglementer les professions médicales au 
Royaume­Uni 
Aff. T­236/95 : TAT European Airlines 
/ Commission; Annulation de la décision 
de la Commission relative au paiement 
de la seconde tranche de l'aide en faveur 
d'Air France, approuvé par la décision 
de la Commission consistant en une 
augmentation de capital payable en trois 
tranches 
Aff. T­2/96 : Neue Maxhuette 
Stahlwerke / Commission 
Annulation de la decision de la 
Commission K (95) 2828 endg., 
concernant une aide accordée par le 
Freistaat Bayern a l'entreprise Neue 
Maxhuette Slahlwerke 
Aff. T­9/96 : Européenne automobile / 
Commission; Recours en carence 
tendant a faire constater que la 
Commission s'est illégalement abstenue 
de prendre une decision suite a la 
plainte déposée par la requérante sur le 
fondement de l'art. 85 du traite CE et 
de l'art. 3, point 11, du reglement 
(CEE) no 123/85 de la Commission, et 
concernant les agissements de la 
société Peugeot auprès des 
concessionnaires de ses filiales 
étrangères afin de les empêcher 
d'accepter de vendre des véhicules aux 
intermédiaires francais ­ Recours en 
indemnité en reparation du prejudice 
prétendument cause par le 
comportement de la Commission 
Alf. Τ­14/96 : BAI / Commission 
Annulation de la décision de la 
Commission de clore la procédure 
ouverte, en application de l'art. 93, par. 
2, du traile CE, suite à une plainte de la 
requérante relative au soutien financier 
accordé par les autorités espagnoles en 
faveur d'un nouveau service de ferries 
pour le transport de marchandises et de 
passagers entre l'Angleterre et 
l'Espagne, exploité par la société Ferries 
Golfo de Vizcaya, estimant que l'accord 
en question ne constitue pas une aide 
d'Etat 
Aff. T­16/96 : City flyer Express / 
Commission; Annulation de la décision 
de la Commission concernant l'aide 
accordée par la région flamande à la 
compagnie aérienne belge Vlaamse 
Luchttransportmaatschappij NV (VLM) 
Aff. Τ­17/96 TFI / Commission 
Recours en carence tendant à faire 
constater que la Commission s'est 
illégalement abstenue de prendre 
position sur la plainte déposée par la 
requérante contre l'Etat français, sur le 
fondement des art. 85, 90 par. 1 et 92 du 
traité CE, et concernant les modes de 
financement des chaînes de télévision 
publiques FRANCE2 et FRANCE3 ­
Subsidiairement, annulation de la prise 
de position sur la plainte éventuellement 
contenue dans la lettre de la 
Commission du 11 décembre 1995 
Aff. T­18/96 SCK e.a. / Commission 
Annulation de la décision de la 
Commission relative à une procédure 
d'application de l'art. 85 du traité CE 
(IV/34.179, 34.202, 216 ­ Stichting 
Certificatie Kraanverhuurbedrijf et 
Federatie van Nederlandse 
Kraanverhuurbedrijven) ou, 
subsidairement, déclaration de 
l'inexistence de l'acte attaqué 
BOOKS and PUBLICATIONS 
Received by DG IV' s library 
The antimonopoly laws and 
policies of Japan by H. Iyori and 
A. Uesugi, published by New York: 
Federal Legal Publications 1994 ­
ISBN 0­87945­077­0. 
Approaching 2000 : the 
corporation in transition, edited by 
Dennis Campbell ­ Deventer: Kluwer 
Law and Taxation, 1994 ­ ISBN 90­
41­10007­5. 
Kommentar zum Kartellgesetz in 
der Fassung der 
Kartellgesetznovelle 1993 samt 
Nahversorgungsgesetz und EU­
Kartellrecht by Norbert Gugerbauer 
(Österreich). 
Gli aiuti alle imprese nel mercato 
unico europeo, by Patrizia Fariselli, 
Enrico Mantovani ­ Perugia: 
Protagon Editrice 1992 ­ ISBN 88­
7891­059­6. 
The legal protection of trade 
secrets by Alison Coleman, London: 
Sweet and Maxwell. 1992 ­ ISBN 0­
421­47170­0. 
Vorbeugender Rechtsschutz im 
Recht der Europäischen 
Gemeinschaften by,Thomas Jean 
Berrang. Baden­Baden: Nomos, 1994 
­ ISBN 3­7890­3577­7. 
Taylor and Winsor on joint 
operating agreements by Michael 
P.G. Taylor and Sally M. Tyne. 
London: Longman Law, Tax & 
Finance, 1992: ISBN 0­85121­854­7. 
The mystery of Japanese 
growth/Ramesh Ponnuru. London: 
Trade Policy Unit, Centre for Policy 
Studies, 1995 ­ ISBN 1­897969­31­7. 
Les nouveau maîtres du monde. 
Renaud de La Baume, Jean­Jerome 
Bertolus. Paris: Belfond, 1995 ­
ISBN 2­7144­3253­0. 
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International direct investment 
statistics = Annuaire des 
statistiques d'investissement direct 
international / Paris OECD. 
Multinationalisatie van 
Nederlandse dienst­
enondernemingen door Pieter Klaas 
Jagersma. Jagersma Research & 
Consultancy, 1994. 
Monopoly and competition policy 
edited by F.M. Scherer. Aldershot: 
Edward Elgar, 1993 2nd volume ­
ISBN 1­85278­753­8. 
State aid: Community law and 
policy ­ Staatliche Beihilfen: 
Gemeinschaftsrecht und 
Gemeinschaftspolitik 
herausgegeben von Ian Harden. 
Köln: Bundesanzeiger, 1993 ­ ISBN 
3­88784­424­6. 
EC shipping law: first supplement 
to the first edition by Vincent 
Power. London: Lloyd's of London 
Press, 1994. 
Les entreprises publiques dans 
l'Union européenne: entre 
concurrence et intérêt général 
sous la direction de Bernard Thiry et 
Jacques Vandamme; CIRIEC 
International; TEPSA. Paris: 
Pedone, 1995: ISBN 2­233­00270­9. 
Competition and integration: what 
goals count? EEC competition law 
and goals of industrial, monetary 
and cultural policy by R.B. 
Bouterse. Deventer: Kluwer Law 
and Taxation, 1994 ­ ISBN 90­6544­
8160­0. 
EC competition law source 
materials by Ivo Van Bael, Jean­
François Bellis. Bicester: CCH 
Europe, 1994: ISBN 0­86325­384­9. 
Pratique communautaire du 
contrôle des concentrations: 
analyses juridique, économique et 
comparative: Europe, Etats­Unis 
et Japon. Laurent Cohen­Tanugi, 
David Encoua, Antoine Winckler ... ­
ISBN 2­8041­1991­2. 
The Development of a 
Competitive Internal Energy 
Market in the European 
Community by Rüdiger Dohms. 
Connecticut Journal of International 
Law ­ Summer 1994. 
Monopolies & anti­competitive 
practices. A guide to the provisions 
of the Fair Trading Act 1973 & the 
Competition Act 1980. Office of 
Fair Trading 1995. 
Umbruch der Wettbewerb­
sordnung in Europa. Referate des 
XXVIII.FIW­Symposiums. 1995. 
Schwerpunkte des Kartellrechts 
1993/94. Referate des 
Zweiundzwanzigsten FIW­Seminars 
1994. 1995. 
The anti­subsidies code of the 
Uruguay Round transposition in 
the European Union. 1995. 
Loosening the strait­jacket. CBI 
proposals for reform of the scope 
and administration of Art. 85. CBI. 
Standortfaktor 
Wettbewerbspolitik ­
Reformbedarf auf deutscher und 
europäischer Ebene. 
Bundesverband der Deutschen 
Industrie e.V. 1995. 
Legislações nacionais de 
concorrência. (Einlândia, Hungria 
e Suécia). Direcção­Geral de 
Concorrência e Preços­ 1995. 
Die Anwendbarkeit der EG­
Eusionskontrollverordnung im 
Verhältnis zum 
Fusionskontrollrecht der 
Mitgliedstaaten von Dr. Thomas 
Lampen. 1995. 
L'Europe de l'utilité publique. Des 
industries de services publics réno­
vées dans l'Europe libérale. 1995. 
GATS ­ Allgemeines 
Übereinkommen über den 
Dienstleistungsverkehr. 1995. ISBN 
92­827­4228­8. 
Pricing. A Behavioural Approach to 
Abuses of Market Power by Conor 
Hanly. 1995. 
Sicherung des Wettbewerbs im 
kommunalen Bereich. Referate des 
Berliner Kolloquiums 1994 und einer 
Sonderveranstaltung 1994. 1995. 
Das LeisungsproFil des 
Großhandels in Bayern von Bruno 
Tietz. 1995. 
EG:s konkurrensrätt ­ vägledande 
domar. Carl Nisser, Anna Carin 
Krokstäde. 1995. 
Aktuelle Rechtsprobleme der 
Elektrizitätswirtschaft 1995 mit 
Beiträgen von K. Arnold, R. Dohms, 
H. Hörtenhuber, W. Pesendorfer, N. 
Wimmer. 
Marktaggressivität und 
Unternehmenserfolg von Joachim 
Lücking. 1995. 
Polish antimonopoly case law. 
Tadeusz Skoczny. 1995. 
Konkurrensreglerna i det 
Integrerade Europa (EU/EES). 
Johan Bärlund. 1995. 
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Rechtfertigungs­ und 
Entschuldigungsgründe im 
ßußgeldrecht der Europäischen 
Gemeinschaften von Dr. Markus 
Wagemann. 1995. 
Economic report of the President 
transmitted to the Congress. 
Together with the annual report of 
the Council of Economic Advisers. 
Washington, DCUSGPO. 1996. 
European Law Review. 
Competition Law Checklist 1995. 
Year 1994 by C. Jones et M. van 
der Woude, including "Main 
developments in merger control 
during 1994" by Juan Briones 
Alonso 
Konkurrensfoerhaallanden : Om 
foerhaallandet mellan EGs 
konkurrensraett och nationell 
Konkurrensraett/Nils Wahl. 
Stockholm : Juristfoerlaget, 1994. 
Droit des affaires de l'Union 
européenne by Christian Gavalda et 
Gilbert Parleani. 
Praxis der Europäischen 
1' 'usionskontrolle von Götz Drauz 
und Dirk Schröder. Köln. Verlag 
Kommunikationsforum, 1994. 
Global Forum on Competition 
and Trade Policy. Harmonization 
of International Competition Law 
Enforcement. June 1995. 
Frankfurter Institut ­ Stiftung 
Marktwirtschaft und Politik. 
Dauerkrise am europäischen 
Stahlmarkt ­Markt­ oder 
Politikversagen? von Norbert 
Berthold. 1994. ISBN 3­8015­044­6. 
Handelen med Stål. 
KonkurrenceRådet 1996. 
Les organisations interbancaires 
en Europe (Moyens et systèmes de 
paiement). Rapport pour le Conseil 
National du Crédit. Novembre 1995. 
Realkreditinstitutternes 
Samarbejde med Pengeinstitutter 
om Formidling af Realkreditlån til 
Ejerbolig. KonkurrenceRådet 1996. 
Aspects juridiques de la 
concurrence maritime : etude 
comparative a partir du droit 
communautaire, de L. Athanasiou, 
éditions Pedone, France. 
Coming up 
The following publications are 
under preparation by DG IV; 
however, a budget has been 
allocated only for publications 
marked with an *: 
EC Competition Policy 
Newsletter: Summer 1996*, 
autumn/Winter 1996 
Competition law in the European 
Communities ­volume IB 
Explanation of rules applicable to 
undertakings. 
Dealing with the Commission ­
notifications, complaints, 
inspections and fact­finding 
powers. 
XXV Report on Competition 
Policy ­ 1995* 
Competition law in the European 
Communities ­volume 3A: 
International aspects of 
competition policy.* 
Actes Forum Européen de la 
Concurrence.(co­edition with J. 
Wiley) Catalog number: CV­88­95­
985­EN­C* 
L' application des articles 85/86 
par les juridictions nationales* 
Recueil des décisions sur les aides 
d'Etat 
Brochure sur la politique de la 
concurrence dans le Marché 
unique (concernant les art.85,86,90 
et le règlement sur les 
concentrations) 
Brochure sur la politique 
concernant les aides d'Etat 
Brochure concernant des sujets 
présentant un intérêt pratique 
pour l'industrie de la 
Communauté et plus 
particulièrement les PMEs 
Video: Introduction to competition 
policy* 
Survey of the Memeber State 
National Law Governing Vertical 
Distribution Agreements* 
Interim report of the multimodal 
group* 
Video: Dealing with the 
Commission ­ Notifications, 
complaints, inspections and fact­
finding powers 
SHORTLY ON THE INTERNET / 
BIENTÔT SUR L'INTERNET 
EUROPA, the Commission's WWW 
site (http://www.cec.lu) will shortly 
contain data on European 
Community Competition Policy. 
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New procedure for the 
dissemination of 
Merger decisions 
In conformance with the rules that apply 
on public access to Commission 
documents (see Commision decision of 8 
February 1994 on public access to 
Commission documents (94I90IECSC, 
EC. Euratom) in OJ L 46 of ¡8/02/1994 
p. 58), the Commission is implementing 
a new system of disseminating 
Commission's Merger Decisions based 
on Articles 6(1) a) and b) of Regulation 
4064/89. 
Unfortunately, although the introduction 
of the new system was planned for the 
1st of March 1996, it has been delayed 
until mid­April, mainly for technical 
reasons. 
These decisions will be available: 
­ in paper form through the document 
delivery procedures of the Office for 
Official Publications of the European 
Communities and its sales agents; 
­ in electronic form, through the CELEX 
database containing Community 
legislation and case law. 
The announcement of these decisions in 
the Official Journal series C will contain 
the appropriate CELEX document 
number (necessary to consult the 
electronic version online). 
Several gateways provide access to 
CELEX, while commercial hosts 
distribute CELEX under licence either 
online or on CD­ROM. For more 
information about CELEX or to receive 
an updated list of gateways and 
distributors please contact: EUR­OP, 
Information, Marketing & Public 
Relations, (OP/4B), 2, rue Mercier, L­
2925 Luxembourg; tel. +(352) 2929 
42455 fax. +(352) 2929 42763 
For countries nol covered by gateways 
and for Universities please contact 
EUROBASES at the following address: 
EUR­OP, Eurobases, (OP/4C, 2, rue 
Mercier, L­2985 Luxembourg; tel. 
+(352) 2929 42053, fax. +(352) 2929 
42025. 
A short manual for extracting Article 6 
(1) a) and b) decisions from CELEX is 
available on request through DG IV's 
Cellule Information. 
More Information 
The Directorate General for Competition 
(DG IV) receives many requests with 
specific questions. While it is 
impossible, given the resources 
available, to investigate and reply 
individually to each one of them, we 
will do our best to reply as soon as 
possible. In order to better inform the 
public on Competition Policy, DG IV 
produces several publications, available 
through the Office for Official 
Publications of the European Union (see 
catalog on p. 46). We also publish three 
times a year the "EC Competition 
Policy Newsletter", available free of 
charge. Finally, we can provide copies 
of speeches by the Competition 
Commissioner and by officials from the 
Directorate General. Please address your 
questions to : 
European Commission, 
Directorate General IX'-Competition, 
Cellule Information, 
C150 00/158, Rue de la Loi 200 
Wetstraat, Bruxelles 
B-1049 Brussel, Belgium. 
fax(+322) 29 55437 E-Mail: Internet: 
info4@dg4.cec.be X.400: 
c=be;a=rtl;p=cec;ou=dg4;s=info4 
The members of the Cellule 
INFORMATION will endeavour to 
answer your enquiries. If they are unable 
to do so they will find someone who can. 
They will not. however, answer queslions 
pertaining to ongoing cases. 
Cases covered in this 
issue 
Anti-trust Rules 
Commission Decisions 
18 Bayer/Adalat 
18 Lufthansa I SAS 
19 UEFA 
Court Judgements 
21 C-70/93 BMW/ALD 
21 C-266/93 Bundeskartellamt/VAG 
23 C-399193 Oude Luttikhuis I 
Cobercoba 
Mergers 
Commission Decisions 
27 Kimberly-Clark/Scott Paper 
28 GEHEILloys Chemist 
28 Gencor/Lonrho 
29 Raab Karcher Kohle I 
Ruhrkohle Handel 
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PLEASE HELP US TO KEEP YOU INFORMED 
The EC Competition Policy Newsletter is available free of charge. If you want to receive it, 
please mail this form. 
Also use this form to notify us of changes in your address: in that case please do not forget to 
join the "subscription registration" Number (code appearing on the left of each label and 
beginning with 01 ). 
This sheet should be returned to the following address: 
EUR­OP 
MER 195 (Competition) 
2, rue Mercier 
L­2985 LUXEMBOURG 
Please tick appropriate box 
□ Please add my name to your mailing list 
□ Please delete my name from your mailing list (*) 
π Please amend my name and address as shown below (*) 
(*) My registration Number is as follows: 0 / 
Name: 
Position: 
Organisation: 
Department: 
Full Address: 
Postcode: City: Country: 
Type of Organisation: (Please tick appropriate box): 
□ (AUTHO) National Competition Authority □ (PERM) Permanent Representation to EU 
□ (MISS) Mission of third country to EU □ (INT) EU Institution!Official 
□ (UNIV) University Department/Library □ (­) Law firm/Solicitor/Consultant 
□ (PRESS) Press/Journalist □ (DOC) Professional Associât./Ministry/Research Center 
Main language spoken : please tick only one : 
□ EN □ FR □ DE □ IT □ NL □ DA □ ΕΛ □ ES □ PT □ SV □ FI 
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